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ABSTRACT 
 
The overarching aim of this study is to examine the significance of public expenditure 
management (PEM) for primary education outcomes in public schools in two South 
African provinces (Gauteng and North West). The study examines whether technical and 
allocative inefficiencies in public spending have a significant impact on education 
outcomes (measured by pass, repetition and dropout rates). In doing so, the study makes 
an important contribution to the economics of education literature, where the 
determinants of good education outcomes remain ambiguous. Using cross-sectional data 
from 175 public primary schools, the study finds evidence of technical inefficiencies in 
terms of misappropriation of education funds (leakages) and delays in remitting funds. 
While the occurrences of leakages are not strongly associated with poor education 
outcomes, the study finds a strong positive correlation between delays and Grade 1 
repetition. In terms of allocative efficiency, the study finds no evidence that public 
expenditure is significantly associated with education outcomes. This remains true for 
public spending even when the redistributive component (the disproportional allocation 
of funds to disadvantaged schools) is taken into account. Total resource wealth (including 
public and private contributions) only matters when interacted with certain poverty 
quintiles and class sizes. The findings from the OLS and negative binomial regression 
analyses reveal that increased spending on learning and teaching support (LTSM) 
materials is strongly associated with lower Grade 1 repetition rates. The relationship is 
even stronger when LTSM spending is interacted with socio-economic status. The study 
also finds that repetition rates are strongly driven by poverty indicators at the district 
level while dropout rates are strongly driven by district and school inefficiency.           
 
 
 
 
Keywords: public expenditure management, education expenditure, governance, 
primary education, education outcomes, economics of education,  South Africa, 
Gauteng province, North West province, PETS, QSDS.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Primary education has long been established as the cornerstone of poverty alleviation and 
socio-economic development (Birdsall, 2001, 2006; Duflo, 2001; Hanushek & Wossman 
2007a; Psacharopoulos, 1985, 1994, 2002, 2004; Su 2006). In most national development 
strategies in Africa, relatively large proportions of development resources have been 
allocated to education. In the 1990s, education budgets in developing nations were 
absorbing 15 to 27 percent of total government recurrent expenditure (Todaro, 2000). 
Public spending on primary education in sub-Saharan Africa rose by 29 percent in real 
terms between 2000 and 2005 (UNESCO, 2010). The reasons for sizable investments in 
education are numerous: young people with at a least primary level education are less 
likely to contract HIV than those with no schooling. Greater female education leads to 
more productive farming and significant decreases in malnutrition. An additional year of 
schooling results in higher wages and education supports democratic growth and political 
stability (Birdsall, 2006). 
 
Nevertheless, there is a paradox. While large proportions of GDP are consistently 
allocated to the education sector, the desired outcomes such as high pass and completion 
rates, strong academic achievement, absorption into a skilled labour force and 
competitive wages are severely lacking in many African countries. In fact, education 
enrolments and quality in about half of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 
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deteriorated since 1990 (Al-Samarrai, 2003). It has traditionally been thought that poor 
education outcomes are caused by under-spending by governments or high unit costs of 
schooling, but researchers are increasingly finding that there is still some ambiguity in the 
factors that yield good education outcomes and moreover, increasing spending does not 
automatically generate the desired outcomes as illustrated in Figure 1.1 below.  
 
Figure 1.1 Public Spending on Education and Primary Completion Rates for 
Malawi and Ethiopia 
 
  
Source: Andrews and Campos (2003)  
 
Both Malawi and Ethiopia were increasing education spending between 1980 and 1990, 
but had very divergent outcomes a decade later. While Malawi witnessed increasing 
primary completion rates, Ethiopia experienced declining completion rates. Notably, both 
countries had introduced free primary education in 1994 to boost enrolment (Oumer, 
2009). According to Andrews and Campos (2003) the education sector in Ethiopia may 
have been plagued by inefficiencies or by misappropriation of resources or both, which 
explains the dire education outcomes despite increased resources.  
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It is the decline of education outcomes despite increased expenditure coupled with the 
ambiguity surrounding the determinants of education outcomes that motivate this study. 
Given the scarcity of resources in Africa, it is worrying that many countries commit 
substantive amounts to education, particularly at the primary level and yet do not fully 
reap the expected rewards. Clearly, a systematic analysis of the efficiency of public 
spending is important.  
 
The mixed trends in education outcomes depicted in Figure 1.1, raise important 
questions. Why does money matter for education in some countries and not in others? 
Are there salient features such as the functioning of institutions, political economy 
constraints and country-specific contexts that explain the divergence in outcomes? It is 
therefore important to have country-based studies that take the local context into account. 
Indeed, such analysis will be important in the South African context given the words of 
Nick Taylor from JET Education Services in South Africa (2001, p.15):   
“Despite high levels of spending as a percentage of GDP, off a base that is 
significantly higher than that of the overwhelming majority of developing 
countries, learning outcomes [in South Africa] are either worse than or 
comparable with those of the poorest nations.”   
 
The statement by Taylor is substantiated with statistical evidence presented in Chapter 3 
on spending trends, which point to potential gross inefficiencies in public education 
spending in South Africa. While not discounting the importance of expenditure in the 
social sector, this study essentially argues that a focus on public spending alone is 
misleading. Attention should also be placed on the management of public expenditure as 
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it potentially plays an important role in making spending more efficient and fostering 
good education outcomes.  
 
Public Expenditure Management (PEM) is essentially about good governance; it 
addresses accountability, transparency, predictability and participation. Its central 
objective is to ensure (i) that governments spend within their budgets (also known as 
aggregate control or fiscal discipline), (ii) that resources are channelled towards highest 
impact activities (allocative efficiency or strategic prioritisation) and (iii) that services are 
delivered in the most efficient and effective manner (technical efficiency or good 
operational management) (World Bank, 1998). Indeed, the prudent management of 
resources is often argued to be paramount for efficient and effective delivery of public 
services and therefore an analysis of PEM as it pertains to education could provide useful 
insight in the framework of improving education outcomes.   
 
The study is especially inspired by the numerous studies conducted by the World Bank 
on public expenditure and education outcomes (reviewed in Chapter 2), which find that 
public spending alone does not guarantee good education outcomes; the key issue is how 
funding is managed. The World Bank‟s first study of this nature was conducted in 
Uganda in 1996, where the Government of Uganda, in partnership with the World Bank, 
sought to understand why despite substantial increases in public spending on basic 
education, education outcomes remained stagnant. The hypothesis for the poor results 
was that public resources did not actually reach the schools. Therefore a public 
expenditure tracking survey (PETS) was implemented to track resources from central 
government to the primary schools. PETS are survey instruments that track the flow of 
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resources through various strata of government (from central to provincial to local) in 
order to determine how much of the originally allocated public resources reach each level 
(IIEP, 2004). The survey is a useful tool for locating and quantifying political and 
bureaucratic obstacles, leakage of funds (funds that are misappropriated or cannot be 
accounted for) and problems in the deployment of resources. The PET surveys highlight 
not only the use and abuse of money, but also give insights into concepts of cost 
efficiency, decentralisation and accountability. The results for Uganda showed extensive 
leakage and corruption and thus confirmed that the hypothesis linking poor learning 
outcomes to a leakage of resources could not be rejected.     
 
Since the Uganda report, there have been education tracking exercises conducted in 
Cameroon (2004), Kenya (2004), Madagascar (2003), Mali (2005), Namibia (2003), 
Nigeria (2006), Rwanda (2000), Senegal (2002), Sierra Leone (2000) and Zambia (2001) 
(Gauthier, 2006). Significant leakages in education funding have been found in several 
countries as per Table 1.1 below.  
 
Table 1.1 Nonwage Funds Not Reaching Schools: Evidence from Public Expenditure 
Tracking Surveys (PETS) 
Country Mean percentage 
 Ghana 2000 49 
 Madagascar 2002 55 
 Peru 2001 (utilities) 30 
 Tanzania 1998 57 
 Uganda 1995 78 
 Zambia 2001 (discretionary funds/legislated funds) 76/10 
Source: Reinikka (2004)  
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Evidently, there are alarming proportions of leakages in education funds as shown in the 
table above. Over three-quarters of education funding allocated to schools in Uganda and 
Zambia were “leaked” and were therefore, not reaching the schools. In Madagascar and 
Tanzania, more than half of the education funding was embezzled before it reached the 
schools. These case-studies (see literature review chapter) show the importance of 
tracking the flow of funds to determine whether resources reach the intended 
beneficiaries.  
 
Interestingly, South Africa has never conducted a PET survey, although it has conducted 
some public sector reviews. This is because PET studies are largely driven by the World 
Bank and tend to focus on countries with very weak governance institutions and public 
finance management systems, low growth rates, high levels of corruption and poor 
service delivery. South Africa is a unique category because in many ways it fits the 
profile of an emerging economy with robust systems and impressive growth rates. At the 
same time, the country is burdened with poor service delivery and a significant deficiency 
in human resource capacity in the public sector despite increased public spending over 
the past decade.  
 
Therefore, a tracking exercise forms an important part of this study and is appropriately 
the starting point of the empirical analysis. The tracking instrument tends to be effective 
in answering questions on the impact of governance reforms on service delivery. 
Presumably, if PEM is being adequately implemented, there should be no leakages in the 
flow of funds. Proper PEM practices should ensure that resources reach the targeted 
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beneficiaries and moreover, that these resources are used in a manner that optimally 
enhances the quality of social services. In the absence of sound PEM, leakages may occur 
and this could adversely affect service delivery efforts. By using the data to explore 
empirically whether poor outcomes can be attributed to PEM shortcomings, this study 
goes beyond an assessment of bureaucratic inefficiencies, which has largely been the 
scope of the World Bank studies.    
 
South Africa is very much appropriate for this study because it is a young democracy 
with an enormous challenge of correcting historical injustices that oppressed and 
purposefully stifled human resource development prospects for about 90 percent of the 
population. In responding to the massive challenge, South Africa has shown itself to be 
an aggressive reformer and commits substantive funding to restoring human resource 
capacity by investing in education. Nonetheless, the education challenge is enormous and 
the outcomes (discussed in Chapter 3), so far, do not correspond to the financial 
investments made to improve education.  
 
Due to the vastness of the country, two provinces (North West and Gauteng) that are 
immensely different in many respects are deliberately selected for this study.
1
 These 
differences allow for comparative analyses and for lessons to be drawn from both 
contexts. While the findings may have relevance to other parts of South Africa, they are 
not generalised at the country level and speak to the specific contexts of the two 
provinces.      
                                                 
1
 The North West Province‟s contribution to GDP was 4.9 percent in 2004. In Gauteng, it was 33.3 percent 
for the same year. Literacy rates were 70 percent and 95 percent in North West and Gauteng respectively  
StatsSA (2004a) and StatsSA (2004b).  
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1.2 Aim  
The aim of this study is to twofold: (i) it aims to identify the key challenges experienced 
by the Government of South Africa in managing funds allocated to primary education in 
terms of transparency, accountability and efficiency and (ii) to assess whether PEM 
practices are significant in explaining education outcomes. The two parts to this research 
are elaborated below.  
Identification of PEM Challenges 
 
The study addresses two research questions in this part of the thesis: (i) to what extent is 
the flow of resources from government to primary schools efficient and (ii) to what extent 
is the management of education funds at the sub-national level of government efficient 
and effective? In the case of the former, the study will not only elucidate the mechanisms 
by which public resources are channelled from the central government to the end-user, 
but through a tracking survey instrument (see appendices 1 and 2), determine the 
effectiveness of this flow, in light of the recent reforms to make this channel efficient. 
This section will assess how much of the original allocation reaches the intended 
beneficiaries. The discrepancy will be an indication of leakage. The survey will also 
determine if there are substantial delays in channelling funds as this may have important 
implications for efficient and effective service delivery.    
 
The second research question takes cognizance of the fact that South Africa has a 
decentralised approach to social service delivery whereby sub-national governments (the 
provincial and district/regional education offices) are largely responsible for the 
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management of education resources and service delivery in primary education. The 
objective is to examine the extent to which provinces and districts implement sound PEM 
principles such as, adopting managerial practices that lead to efficiency, adhering to the 
legislated constraints on aggregate spending and involving civic and private partners in 
service delivery. In addition to desk research, policymakers and administrators in the 
various levels of government are interviewed to gain information on the existence and 
application of practices that lead to technical and allocative efficiency as well as fiscal 
discipline. Existing development budgets and expenditure statements are analysed 
systematically to assess whether resources are targeted where they are needed most. This 
section relies mainly on qualitative analysis and will particularly be useful in shedding 
light on institutional and political economy constraints that may impede service delivery.   
Assessing the Importance of PEM in explaining education outcomes 
 
The second part of this study aims to assess empirically the relationship between PEM 
and education outcomes. In doing so, it addresses the overarching research question of 
the thesis: is PEM a significant determinant of education outcomes? This is further 
broken down into five specific research questions that will be addressed empirically in 
the analysis:  
 
(i) Is there a significant relationship between leakage of funds 
(misappropriation) and education outcomes?  
(ii) Is there a significant relationship between delays in the disbursement of 
funds and education outcomes?  
(iii) Is there a significant relationship between public expenditure (government 
subsidies) per capita and education outcomes?  
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(iv) Is there a significant relationship between a school‟s total resource wealth 
per capita and education outcomes? and  
(v) Is there a significant relationship between LTSM (learning, teaching and 
support material) expenditure per capita and education outcomes? 
 
Education outcomes are measured by: pass, repetition and dropout rates (see section 1.4 
below for a brief discussion of these outcome variables and Chapter 2 for a detailed 
review). The research questions are addressed qualitatively through an institutional 
analysis at the district level and quantitatively though a regression analysis of the school 
level data. In order to isolate the effect of PEM on education outcomes, other factors that 
are also potentially important in explaining education outcomes such as socio-economic 
status and other school inputs, are identified and controlled for in the empirical analyses. 
A brief overview of the methodological approach is outlined below.   
1.3 Overview of Methodology  
Given that there is no existing dataset capturing both education and PEM variables, cross-
sectional data were collected with the assistance of field researchers for a sample of 175 
public primary schools (7 percent of the school population) in Gauteng and North West 
provinces. The schools were stratified into districts to allow for a school in every district 
to have an equal chance of being selected into the study. At the district education office 
level, 13 local education offices (out of a total of 19) in the two provinces were surveyed. 
Both school and district data were collected through two micro-level surveys: a Public 
Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) and a Quantitative Service Delivery Survey 
(QSDS).  
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The PETS is an instrument that tracks the flow of funds and exposes bureaucratic 
inefficiencies while the QSDS collects information on the service provider and on various 
agents in the system in order to allow for an examination of the efficiency of service 
delivery on the frontline as well as dissipation of resources. The two instruments were 
conducted jointly in order to obtain a complete picture of education quality, financial 
management and other governance processes involved in the delivery of primary 
education services. The surveys were supplemented by information obtained from 
published reports pertaining to public expenditure management and education.  
 
In terms of analyses, this study uses both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
qualitative analysis involves institutional analysis mainly at the district education office 
level in order to provide insight into the functioning of institutions, the level of efficiency 
and accountability in sub-national government and the impact these have on education 
outcomes. In the quantitative analysis, bivariate correlations are first used to assess the 
strengths of the relationship between PEM variables and the education outcome variables 
without conditioning for other factors. Then regression analysis is used to isolate the 
PEM variables that influence education outcomes while conditioning for both school and 
non-school inputs. 
1.4 Limitations of Study  
It is important to underscore that the aim of this study is not to explain all the key factors 
that determine education outcomes as done in education production function studies. The 
focus is placed on examining the strengths of PEM variables in determining good 
education outcomes. Therefore, this study does not exhaustively explore the respective 
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strengths of all the factors that engender good learning outcomes. What the study does do 
is to provide input into other non-PEM variables that matter for education and ones that 
do not matter.      
 
As with most research studies, the methodology selected comes with a number of 
limitations. For one, the study uses two micro surveys (PETS-QSDS) which require 
accurate or truthful information from the respondents in government and in schools. The 
nature of the study is such that there is an incentive for agents to misreport (Dehn, 
Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). For example, where resources are used for other purposes, a 
district education officer or school head teacher may not provide an honest account. The 
study has tried to overcome this limitation by requesting copies of audited financial 
statements to complement the surveys and also through data triangulation, whereby the 
same information is sought from different sources. This serves the purpose of cross-
validating the information obtained. Generally, this study requires a culture of good 
recordkeeping within the concerned sectors. Incomplete or unreliable data posed a real 
challenge in this study which increased the level of non-sampling errors. 
 
It is important to acknowledge that studies that seek to explain education outcomes in the 
economics of education literature are increasingly using nationally or internationally 
comparable test scores as proxies for education outcomes. The argument is that an 
outcome of education should generally be an indication of learning achievement. In that 
regard, the study is potentially limited in its use of alternative indicators, namely, pass, 
repetition and dropout rates as opposed to test scores. Test scores were not incorporated 
into this study due to the simple fact that not all schools selected in the sample for this 
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study would have participated in the only two international standardised tests available at 
primary level in South Africa: the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study 
(PIRLS) and Southern and East African Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality 
(SACMEQ) and the one national test, namely, Systemic Evaluations, that assess a sample 
of primary school students in South Africa in literacy and numeracy.  
 
The test scores from secondary leaving school exams (matric) would have been the next 
best option as these tests are set nationally and therefore, comparable across schools. This 
option was not explored because it would have changed the study‟s focus from primary to 
secondary education. Primary schools are of critical interest not only because primary 
education is arguably the cornerstone of poverty reduction and socio-economic 
development but also because of the importance the Government of South Africa places 
on primary education as evidenced by the substantive spending in that sector (see Chapter 
3). Therefore, notwithstanding its methodological difficulties, primary education, 
especially in the South African context, deserves analytical attention.  
 
The methodological difficulties with the use of pass, repetition and dropout rates are 
discussed at length in Chapter 2. In summary, pass rates, while indicative of achievement, 
suffer from a lack of comparability due to the arbitrary setting of examinations by 
schools. Repetition rates may reflect weak learning abilities but in South Africa‟s context 
these rates could be inflated at the Grade 1 level due to underage enrolment. Conversely, 
artificially low repetition rates at the Grade 7 level could be due to policy restrictions on 
the number of repetitions allowed and restraints on overage repetition. Dropout rates on 
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the other hand, do not distinguish between pupils who leave the school system never to 
return and those who leave a school to transfer to another school. 
  
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, dropout rates as well repetition rates are considered 
by the Department of Education as important indicators to monitor as they also reflect 
problems with internal efficiency in schools in addition to the pupil-related characteristics 
(Department of Education, 2009). There is also quantitative evidence showing that low 
test scores are correlated with high repetition and dropout rates, thus making the latter 
variables valid indicators of learning outcomes (see Chapter 2 and Appendix 4). It is also 
important to underscore that many credible studies have used completion, repetition 
and/or drop-out rates (see for instance, Bruns & Mingat, 2003, Lee & Barro, 1997; 
McMahon, 1999; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008 and Serra, Barr & Packard, 2011). The 
study also incorporates other measures of educational outputs that illustrate school 
quality, specifically, measures of school infrastructure to supplement the analyses. 
1.5 Structure of Thesis  
Chapter 1 of this thesis has focused on providing a background to the study and has 
established the importance of and motivation for the research. It also presented the aim of 
the study, research questions to be investigated and a brief discussion of the methodology 
to be employed. An overview of the limitations of the study was also presented. Chapter 
2 provides a detailed literature review of the relationship between PEM and primary 
education. It reviews the theoretical considerations and debates around the importance of 
school and non-school inputs for education outcomes as well as the theoretical 
considerations around pass, repetition and dropout rates as indicators of education 
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outcomes, particularly in the South African context. The literature review chapter 
essentially shows that the relationship between public spending and education are 
inconclusive and that PEM is potentially key in the pursuit of desirable education 
outcomes.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the context of South Africa, highlighting the governance and primary 
education frameworks in South Africa. In this chapter, there is a detailed review of the 
structure of government; capacity constraints at the sub-national level, inter-
governmental fiscal relations; public expenditure management reforms; school-based 
governance and the state of primary education. This chapter provides a contextual 
background for the analysis. Chapter 4 provides the theoretical considerations for the 
relationship between PEM and education outcomes. It relies mainly on the theories of 
economics of education and the education production function model.   
 
The research methodology is presented in Chapter 5. It covers the research design, data 
collection, sampling, data triangulation, implementation of the questionnaire and data 
analysis. Descriptive analysis of the data from the school survey findings are presented in 
Chapter 6, where the general findings on education outcomes, school funding, school 
facilities, governance of schools, among others, are discussed. It also presents a detailed 
discussion of the key findings of the PETS in terms of leakage and delays. Chapter 7 
examines the extent of technical efficiency in the management of resources and 
accountability at the sub-national level. By using the findings of PETS-QSDS surveys as 
well as interviews of public officials, this chapter examines the extent to which provinces 
and districts adopt managerial practices that lead to efficiency in service delivery.  
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Chapter 8 analyses the impact of PEM on service delivery in primary education. This 
chapter focuses on empirical analyses to establish if there is a significant relationship 
between PEM variables and primary education outcomes. It presents the findings of the 
correlation and regression analyses between PEM and education outcomes. Chapter 9 
presents a summary of findings, limitations of study, areas for further research, policy 
implications and conclusions.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The introductory chapter set the context for this study by demonstrating that spending 
alone does not guarantee good outcomes and public expenditure management (PEM) may 
be instrumental for achieving good education outcomes. It is clear however, that there 
continues to be some ambiguity in the factors that yield good outcomes in education. 
Increasingly, education economists are finding that governance blockages may be 
significant in explaining poor outcomes in education. The literature, however, has been 
fairly silent on this given the lack of education production function models that 
incorporate governance deficiencies at the state level. By discussing and analysing the 
key studies on the economics of education, this chapter aims to shed light on the 
following key questions: What are the key determinants of education outcomes? What are 
the appropriate indicators of education outcomes? Does public expenditure management 
(PEM) matter for education outcomes? The literature on these topics is vast, but it does 
reveal ambiguities and inconsistencies as well important gaps in the factors that 
determine education outcomes.  
  
The chapter begins with a critical review of the economics of education literature. It 
elaborates on the various proxies for education outcomes applied in the international 
literature as well as in the South African context, while highlighting their strengths and 
limitations. The chapter then discusses the findings on the explanatory variables for 
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education outcomes. This is followed by a review of some country case-studies in Africa 
that have implemented a public expenditure tracking survey in the education sector.   
2.2 The Economics of Education  
Introduction  
 
The importance of education for growth and development is rooted in the early human 
capital theory, where emphasis was placed on education as an input to economic 
production, rather than an outcome of economic production (Becker, 1964; Mincer, 
1970). Primary education, in particular, has long been argued to be the cornerstone of 
poverty reduction and socio-economic development. Psacharopoulos (1994, 2002) in his 
review of empirical studies shows that both private and social rates of return to 
investment in education were highest at the primary level, regardless of the number of 
students.  
 
Education economists have raised important policy questions on the role of education in 
improving the welfare of the 5 billion people living in developing countries. There are 
some macroeconomists (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer & Weil, 1992) that have examined 
the impact of education on economic growth. Other economists (Psacharopoulos, 1985, 
1994; Duflo, 2001) have used regressions and natural experiments to estimate both the 
private and social returns to education. Education has been found to be instrumental in 
the adoption of new agricultural technologies (Foster & Rosenzweig, 1996) and also as a 
means to improve health and reduce fertility (Straus & Thomas, 1995). Sen (1999) 
describes education as an intrinsic good in itself.  
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Research has shown that the major issues with regard to primary education are often 
quality, equity and efficiency. The quality of education may be constrained by poorly 
equipped educators and inadequate supervision. Equity may be limited by geographical 
disparity in access and efficiency may be compromised by limited relevance of the 
curriculum or again, persistent lack of school facilities. In this regard, Behrman and 
Birdsall (1983) argue that a focus on expansion of primary schools is misleading; the 
optimal social investment strategy would be to improve the quality of existing primary 
schools. Birdsall (2001) takes the argument further by emphasising that the value of 
human capital in part depends on its owners ability to deploy it in a competitive market in 
which the rules of the game reward innovation, entrepreneurship and higher productivity.     
 
As the importance of education has been firmly established in the literature, researchers 
have endeavoured to understand the precise inputs that yield good education outcomes. 
Education inputs may be defined as the resources provided by parents, school 
management and government authorities to facilitate learning in schools. These include: 
qualified and well-paid teachers, classrooms, learning materials, facilities, organisation, 
curriculum, tuition fees, government subsidies and technical support to schools. Their 
importance may seem obvious for education outcomes. Nonetheless, their significance 
has been the subject of intense debate among economists and the findings have been 
largely contradictory.  
 
In the literature, education outcomes are typically grouped into: completion rates, 
learning achievement (for example test scores), average years of education of the adult 
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population and labour force and earnings and productivity (Boissiere, 2004). In practice, 
a number of other variables have been used in the education literature, some more often 
than others. In the section below, the key outcome variables are reviewed and their 
appropriateness especially for the South African context, discussed.            
Review of Education Outcome (Dependent) Variables  
 
Inputs are relatively straight forward to identify in the education production function 
process but, outputs or outcomes are extraordinarily difficult to be precise about. This is 
well illustrated in the extract below.  
“Clearly, to analyze school production, it is essential to employ adequate 
measures of outcomes. But measuring outputs is not simple. While economic 
theory concentrates on varying quantities of a homogeneous output, this is not 
easily translated into an educational equivalent. Education is a service that 
transforms fixed quantities of inputs (that is, individuals) into individuals with 
different qualities. Educational studies concentrate as they should on "quality" 
differences. A majority of studies into educational production relationships 
measure output by standardized achievement test scores, although significant 
numbers have employed other quantitative measures such as student attitudes, 
school attendance rates, and college continuation or dropout rates. The measures 
used, however, are generally proxies (with varying degrees of validation) for 
more fundamental outcomes. Some people, including many school practitioners, 
simply reject this line of research entirely because they believe that education 
outcomes are not or cannot be adequately quantified” (Hanushek, 1986, p.1150) 
 
Vaizey (1971) argues that assertions about global output of education are not meaningful 
if they are intended to be a guide about the efficiency with which resources in education 
as a whole are used compared with the way resources are used in other parts of the 
economy. He illustrates this challenge by giving an example of a school that remains 
unchanged in every respect except for an additional teacher or an extra $100 to spend on 
equipment. A reasonable assumption can be made that changes with respect to pupils 
could be attributed to the extra teacher or extra $100. The reality is that in the course of 
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the year, pupils and teachers become a year older and there are withdrawals and additions 
to student body and teaching staff. Thus, changes in the cultural ambiance of the school 
and even within pupils‟ families can be explanatory factors. Education production 
function studies try to control for such external factors but, Vaizey‟s concern remains an 
important caveat that must be borne in mind in the analytical discussions. Indeed, the 
cumulative nature of learning makes it difficult to isolate indicators of education 
outcomes.  
 
As observed by Leclerq (2005), education outcomes are truly diverse and there is a great 
deal of arbitrariness in their definition. Several studies such as Case and Deaton (1999); 
McMahon (1999); Colclough with Lewin (1993) and Schultz (1995) have used enrolment 
rates or attainment as their measures of outcomes. Jones, Toma and Zimmer (2006) used 
school attendance – an output variable influenced by enrolment and number of schools in 
a district. Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008) used failure to complete an adequate level of 
primary schooling. Other notable studies such as Al Samarrai (2003); Gupta, Verhoeven 
and Tiongson (1999); Lee and Barro (1997) and Rumberger & Thomas, 2000) have used 
survival, repetition and dropout rates in their analyses. The most recent of these studies, 
however, have used test scores (Duflo, Dupas & Kremer,  2008;  Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer 
2010; Holmlund et al., 2008; Van der Berg, 2008).   
 
The emerging consensus from a review of recent literature is that outcome variables 
should be an indicator of student achievement, preferably measured by internationally or 
nationally comparable test scores. According to Hanushek, Rivkin & Jamison (1992), 
these tests provide a convenient quantitative measure of differences in performance. 
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Hanushek et al. argue that, as a consistent instrument, test scores allow for a comparison 
of student performance in different environments, their strongest point being their ability 
to evaluate changes in the organisation and character of the school environment.  
 
Hanushek et al. do however acknowledge the weaknesses of tests as a measure of 
education outcomes. They note the following limitations: (i) every available test 
evaluates only a very limited range of skills; (ii) there is no reason to be sure that mastery 
of skills tested is highly correlated with other skills which may be important in the labour 
market; and (iii) real skills in other areas may not be tested. The shortcomings of test 
scores are also corroborated by Deller and Rudnicki (1993) who argue that “knowledge”, 
the true output of education, is not limited to the simple recall of facts but, it is also 
composed of the ability to reason and understand.  
 
Attainment or simply years of schooling completed, has been frequently used in older 
studies. While attainment as a rough measure of individual skill in the labour force has 
been verified in many studies such as Mincer (1970) and Psacharapoulos and Patrinos 
(2004), it is a problematic indicator because it simply counts the time spent in school 
without judging what happens in school (Hanushek, 2007). For example, it assumes that a 
year of schooling produces the same skills or pupil achievement across the board. One 
can therefore infer that a good indicator of outcome should incorporate what happens 
within the school. A pass rate would meet this requirement as it involves the successful 
undertaking of the primary school-leaving exam. Repetition and dropout rates would also 
meet this requirement if they reflect academic challenges experienced by pupils as argued 
by Brophy (2006), Lee and Barro (1997) and the Ministerial Committee (2008). The three 
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indicators therefore have strengths but also suffer from limitations as measures of 
education outcomes.   
 
Repetition rates can be problematic because there are two schools of thought on how 
repetition relates to achievement. One school espouses that schools with higher levels of 
repetition may generate better learning outcomes because repeating a grade may enable 
the retained student to do better on tests the second time around (Eide & Showalter, 
2001). The second school of thought argues that any improvements from repetition are 
temporary and actually misleading because mastering the same curriculum for the second 
time around does not translate into a general advancement in knowledge (Jimmerson, 
Pletcher & Graydon, 2006; Brophy, 2006). In the latter argument, repetition rates are 
symptomatic of learning difficulties and are therefore associated with poor outcomes. 
This study is aligned with the second school of thought partly because of the existing 
evidence showing grade repetition to be associated with low achievement and dropping 
out (Alexander, Entwisle & Dauber, 1994; Brophy, 2006; Corman, 2003; Jimmerson, 
2001) and partly because of its suitability to the context of this study, whereby an 
influential report on learner retention in South Africa acknowledged that grade repetition 
is symptomatic of learning abilities and internal inefficiencies with the schools and also 
that grade repetition in South Africa is generally ineffective as intervention to address 
early learning problems (Ministerial Committee, 2008).   
 
The dropout rate as an indicator of outcomes is also not without controversy in the sense 
that students may drop out of the school not because they are weak students but for 
several other reasons such as dissatisfaction with school quality (Hanushek, Lavy & 
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Hitomy, 2006) or socio-economic conditions (Levy, 1871; UNESCO, 1984) – essentially 
reasons that are independent of ability. In this context, one could argue that high cases of 
dropouts in one school do not necessarily equate to poor outcomes. The literature 
concludes that the dropout phenomenon, in the end, is a complex interplay among 
student, family, school, and community variables, as well as risk and protective factors 
(Christenson & Thurlow, 2004). Cairns, Cairns and Neckerman (1989) in a US study 
using census data find evidence that high levels of aggression and low academic 
performance are highly associated with early dropouts. This would lend support to the 
association of dropout with poor outcomes. This is corroborated by Goldschmidt and 
Wang (1999) who find that early dropouts are linked with “student risk factors” such as, 
history of repetition, behaviour and test scores. To conclude, there is evidence that ability 
plays a part in the dropout phenomenon, but other reasons such as socio-economic status 
have been put forward. Therefore, dropout data must be interpreted holistically.    
 
Review of Pass, Dropout and Repetition Rates in the South African Context 
 
In South Africa, there is much controversy centring on several of the education outcomes 
that are widely used in the global literature. Virtually, all variables, with the exception of 
the limited nationally and internationally comparable test scores
2
 are subject to scrutiny. 
Pass rates refer to the passing of primary leaving exams, usually Grade 7. In South 
Africa, however, these exams are not set nationally: they are set by individual schools so 
                                                 
2
 There are two international test scores that South Africa has participated in at the primary level: the 
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and Southern and East African Consortium for 
Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ). Both were done for a sample of schools, which are different 
samples to the one used in this study. A new dataset of primary tests scores for all public schools in South 
Africa was done in 2010. This dataset would be been highly useful but the Department of Education did not 
made this data available for use in this study.  
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it is an imprecise estimator. Pass rates are likely to be high on an aggregate level as 
weaker schools are less likely to set very competitive exams, which in turn could allow 
for inflated pass rates. Nonetheless, there are still cases of pupils failing the primary-
leaving exam. For that reason, pass rates were incorporated into the study. The other 
outcome variables (repetition and dropout rates) are explored below.  
 
Repetition Rates in South Africa 
According to the Department of Education (2009), a repeater is a child who has to be held 
back in the same grade for reasons such as examination failure or low attendance record. 
Repetition rates in South Africa also tend to be problematic for four reasons. Firstly, they 
will be underreported at the Grade 7 level if overage pupils cannot be held back. 
Secondly, they can be overreported at Grade 1 level due to underage enrolment whereby 
Grade 1 is used as Grade R (pre-school) in cases where early childhood learning facilities 
are out of reach for poorer parents. The third problem is linked to South Africa‟s 
admission policy for public ordinary schools, which makes provision for a pupil to repeat 
only once per school phase or a maximum of four times in the twelve years of schooling 
(Fleisch and Shindler, 2009). The implication is that, knowing the limitation placed on 
repetitions, a weak pupil may only be held back in the middle or later grades when 
repetition is absolutely necessary rather than the early stages. Alternatively, some schools 
prefer to hold back a child in the Grade 1 rather than in later grades. Either case will lead 
to excessive or conservative repetition rates. Fourthly, according to Crouch (2005) and 
the Department of Education (2009) repetition rates may capture re-enrolment and not 
always repetition. For example, when pupils stop attending after a short period with the 
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intention of re-enrolling the following year, it raises the question: is the child a repeater 
or a new enrolee?  
 
Concerning the fourth point, the Department of Education does not delve into the reasons 
why a parent would remove a child with the intention of re-enrolling the child. The 
underlying reasons would determine whether the child was repeating or actually re-
enrolling. More often than not, the child would have been ill-prepared in terms of the 
foundations of social, physical, intellectual and emotional development and would need 
to start the phase again as was stated in the Ministerial Committee‟s report of 2008. 
Therefore, this study does not agree with the re-enrolment argument as a distinct 
phenomenon from repetition. In the same token, while the admissions policy and 
underage enrolment have to be acknowledged as influencing factors, they do not diminish 
repetition rates as credible indicators of learning outcomes because schools have to assess 
all pupils on the level of ability regardless of other extenuating circumstances. The 
problem would arise if a school held back a child purely because he or she was underage 
or any other reason outside of ability. As long as this is not the case, repetition remains a 
good indicator of education outcomes. The credibility of repetition rates as an indicator of 
ability is further demonstrated in Table 2.1 in Appendix 4 where SACMEQ data on South 
African schools show that low test scores and high repetition rates are strongly correlated.   
 
Dropout Rates in South Africa 
What is more controversial in the South African context is the use of dropout rates as a 
measure of outcome variables. According to the Department of Education (2009), the 
dropout rate refers to the percentage of learners who drop out of a given grade in a given 
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school year. The Department of Education does not collect actual numbers of learners 
that drop out each year. This information is calculated as a residual figure after repetition 
and promotion rates are estimated, which makes it unreliable given the tendency of 
significant under-reporting of repetition rates (Department of Education, 2009). The 
Department of Education‟s only discomfort with the statistic of dropout stems from its 
calculation as a residual figure.  
 
The Department therefore proposes a non-conventional calculation of dropout rates using 
a life table with grade attainment. For this, a survey was conducted in 2007 using four 
age categories: those born between 1970 and 1974 (age 33 to 37 at the time of the 
survey); between 1975 and 1979 (28 to 32 years); between 1980 and 1984 (23 to 17 
years) and between 1985 and 1989 (18 to 22 years). Participants of the survey were asked 
to specify their highest education level up to Grade 11. Therefore, a person who had only 
completed Grade 5 would be recorded as a dropout in Grade 6. The benefit of this method 
is that it would capture data of those who have left the schooling system, not to return and 
not just transferred to another school. The disadvantage is that it provides only historical 
data and does not reflect the current situation in education and therefore not helpful in 
policy recommendations.    
 
In Crouch‟s (2005) study on the dropout phenomena, he argues that dropout rates are 
grossly overstated and moreover they are subsumed under repetition rates. In his 
illustration, if 1.6 million pupils enrol in Grade 1 and only 1 million enrol in Grade 2 the 
following year, it does not necessarily mean 600 000 pupils dropped out. Crouch explains 
that this would mostly be due to large numbers repeating Grade 1.  
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This study circumvents this problem in the manner in which the question is asked (see 
appendix 1): “How many students did not return after completing Grade 1 last year?” 
The number given would not capture repeaters; however, the shortfall is that it may 
capture other reasons that have nothing to do with learning abilities or problems with the 
school system such as a family relocating to another area. Therefore the dropout statistic 
has important limitations which must be acknowledged. At the same time, they also do 
reveal academic challenges that are triggered by the pupil‟s own learning abilities of 
inefficiencies in the school system. Table 2.2 in Appendix 4 is provided as additional 
evidence on the strengths of dropout rates as an indicator of education outcomes in the 
South African context.    
 
Grade Variations in Repetition and Dropout Rates 
Using UNESCO indicators, Fleisch and Shindler (2009) show that most repetition occurs 
between Grades 1 and 2 in both primary and secondary education cycles. According to 
the Ministerial Committee on Learner Retention (2008), repetition occurs most frequently 
in Grade 1 due to inadequate school readiness programmes, problems with learning 
abilities and high enrolments not accompanied with appropriate levels of provisioning. 
The Ministerial Committee (2008, p.xix) further notes: “A problem that seems to plague 
Grade 1 is high repetition of the Grade, a phenomenon which is not peculiar to South 
Africa”. This makes analysis at the level of Grade 1 appropriate for this study. The 
international literature also places a great deal of emphasis on Grade 1. For example, 
proponents of repetition have argued that while it is counterproductive to make older 
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students repeat, it is helpful to hold back children in kindergarten or Grade 1 (Brophy, 
2006). Therefore, Grade 1 level is used in this study for both repetition and dropout rates.  
 
Additionally, the study uses Grade 5 dropout rates in accordance with the Ministerial 
Committee  on Learner Retention (2008, p.4), which states “the survival rate to Grade 5 
of primary education is of particular interest since this is commonly considered as a 
prerequisite for sustainable literacy”. Survival rate to Grade 5 is also used as one of the 
dependent variables in Al-Samarrai‟s (2002) cross-country study. The questionnaire used 
in this study asks: “How many students did not return after completing Grade 5 last 
year?” Again, the potential shortfall is the overestimation of dropouts if students are in 
fact transferring to another school.   
 
Finally, the study incorporates Grade 7 repetition to supplement the pass rates variable. A 
pupil would repeat Grade 7 if they did not perform well in the course of the academic 
year and also performed poorly in primary leaving exam and were also still within 
primary school age threshold. Therefore Grade 7 repetition is also a measure of 
achievement in the absence of actual scores but, it may also be a conservative estimate 
because would-be repeaters who are over the primary school age threshold cannot repeat 
and would have to transfer to an adult learning institution.  
 
An important question that arises is: why would we find variations in outcomes by grade 
level? Why for instance would there be an impact in terms of Grade 1 repetition but not 
in Grade 7 repetition? Why should grade level matter? In Guryan‟s (2001) study where 
he finds significant outcomes for Grade 4 test scores but not in Grade 8, he is unable to 
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provide a clear explanation and defers it as an area for further research. Hanushek (2007) 
in his review of EPF studies, emphasises the difficulty in interpreting the results of the 
study by Word et al. (1990) where class size emerges to have an impact in the first year 
of schooling on student outcomes but not in later years of schooling.  
 
Alexander, Entwisle and Dauber‟s (1994) review of retention in Baltimore‟s public 
schooling system offers some insight. They note that Grade 1 retention is distinctive 
because of the stresses around entry into a school. Grade 1 pupils must learn what kinds 
of behaviours are acceptable, adjust to school routine and begin serious academic work, 
whereas children retained later would have had some years of satisfactory performance. 
In comparing the performance of Grade 1 repeaters to Grade 5 repeaters, they find a 
striking difference. While both groups exhibit academic challenges, Grade 1 pupils have 
poorer academic skills on average. In addition, they are less invested in classroom 
activities; they are less popular with their peers and behave badly in classrooms.  
 
Therefore, Grade 1 retainees‟ profile reflect challenges on many fronts, which is why 
analysis of outcomes should be distinguished by early and advanced grades in the 
primary school system. Grade 1 repetition is potentially the most relevant  outcome 
variable for this study and would seem to be the most appropriate indicator to base policy 
recommendations on because of the pervasiveness of repetition at this level not only in 
South Africa but globally and its accuracy compared with the other outcome variables in 
capturing cognitive challenges. The other outcome variables are still used and 
additionally, the empirical analyses incorporate educational outputs, specifically 
measures of school facilities – an indicator of school quality – in the quantitative analysis.          
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Review of Education Input (Explanatory) Variables    
 
Introduction 
“Such a seemingly straightforward question – what determines the outcomes of 
education? – has generated volumes of controversial research over the years, and the 
end is still not in sight. Education policymakers and administrators have looked into this 
literature for guidance and found few clear-cut results to guide them. In the end, 
education is a complex enterprise and decision-makers still have to fall back on their 
experience and practical judgement” (Boissiere 2004, p.1) 
 
 The statement by Boissiere sets the tone for the complexity and continuing ambiguity in 
our understanding of the factors that yield desirable education outcomes. Many 
researchers trace the origin of empirical studies of education outcomes to the 1966 
Coleman report, which stirred some controversy by asserting that variations in school 
resources did not explain variations in academic achievement. Coleman et al. (1966) 
argued that socio-economic status (SES), as determined by parental education, profession 
and income were the critical factors that determined outcome when compared to other 
school inputs. Since the Coleman report, several studies have been conducted; some are 
in-country studies (mainly in the USA and UK) and others are cross-country studies but 
all have varying methodologies and wide ranging and often conflicting results. The 
controversies have often centred on key explanatory factors such as the roles of socio-
economic factors, additional resources, especially public spending and specific school 
inputs such as, class size, school governance and teacher characteristics. These are 
critically reviewed in the sections that follow.   
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The Role of Socio-economic Status 
Socio-economic status (SES) usually refers to a number of family background 
characteristics such as parental education, profession and income (Boissiere, 2004). As 
previously mentioned, the Coleman report was the first report that placed socio-economic 
status at the heart of the debate. In a review of the education production literature, 
Leclercq (2005) reviews an influential UK report conducted a decade after the Coleman 
report by Ruter et al. (1979) which also showed that school inputs had a modest but 
significant impact on learning outcomes but again family circumstances, socio-economic 
background and individual ability mattered far more than school inputs. The importance 
of SES was however put into question by Heyneman (1979), who surveyed a large 
sample of students in Uganda and found socio-economic status not to be an important 
factor in determining outcomes. Heyneman found that the socio-economic status of 
Ugandan children had little influence on their academic performance. What was a more 
significant determinant of education outcomes was their level of self-confidence – a 
characteristic that was found to be independent of socio-economic background.  
 
Many other studies however, have found SES to be important. In Deller and Rudnicki‟s 
(1993) education production function analysis of schools in Maine, USA, peer and family 
influences were found to be the most important factors in determining student 
achievement. Lee and Barro (1997) also found family background as measured by 
income and education of parents to be important for education outcomes. Similarly, 
Bishop (2003) in a cross-country study, using TIMMS data, found parental education to 
be a significant explanatory factor in education performance. He also found that students 
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in geographically isolated communities performed worse than those in urban areas and 
GDP per capita to be positively correlated with mathematics achievement.    
 
In the South African literature, SES seems to matter fairly consistently. Case and Deaton 
(1999) found that pupils in better-off black households do better in their education. In 
their findings however, SES had no impact on the white population. The only explanation 
offered by Case and Deaton for the lack of impact on the white population is the small 
sample size. It may also be linked to the little variation in SES among the white 
population. Thomas (1996) using 1991 census data found parental education to be 
important for schooling outcomes. This finding was also corroborated by Lam (1999). 
Thomas (1996) further found that among the black population, the impact of a mother‟s 
education on a daughter‟s schooling was significantly larger than the impact of the 
father‟s education. In Van der Berg‟s (2008) study, socio-economic differentials at the 
school level played a major role in educational outcomes at the primary school level in 
South Africa. Using hierarchal linear modelling and quantile regressions, he controlled 
for geographic location, school equipment and school building and found that students in 
rich schools performed better in reading and mathematics. This was not the case for 
students in poor schools. On the whole, the literature appears to support the claim that 
SES matters for education outcomes in South Africa but it matters more in certain groups 
and the relationship may be non-linear whereby the relationship between SES and 
achievement is stronger in the poorest quintile (van der Berg, 2008).  
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Class Size    
Class size is often used interchangeably with pupil-to-teacher ratio but the two differ 
conceptually. Class size refers to the number of students under the instruction of a teacher 
whereas the pupil-to-teacher (PT) ratio refers to the proportion between the number of 
students in a school and the total number of educators, including administrative staff 
(Zuze, 2008). This distinction, however, is not applied in many studies. For example, in 
Lee and Barro‟s (1997) calculation of PT ratio, they specify that teachers refer directly to 
persons engaged in instructing a group of students; these may be full or part time 
teachers. Therefore, supervisory and other personnel are only included if they have 
regular teaching responsibilities. In the literature review, a distinction is not made 
between class size and PT ratio. The two are used interchangeably. The definition 
becomes more important in the data analysis (Chapters 6 and 8) whereby the PT ratio is 
defined in line with Lee and Barro‟s definition and further includes a secondary measure 
(ratio of pupils to classrooms) to equally capture the effect of class size.
3
     
 
Advocates of small class sizes argue that they are associated with better learning 
outcomes as smaller classes allow for individualised instruction, higher quality 
instruction, greater scope or innovation, student-centred teaching and increased teacher 
morale (Hattie, 2005).  Another argument in favour of small class sizes is that there is a 
tendency for teachers in large classes to promote rote learning (learning something by 
repeating it many times rather than by understanding it) as compared with problem 
solving skills (Lee & Barro, 1997). Additionally, smaller classes reduce a student‟s 
                                                 
3
 Crouch and Mabogoane (1998) also use this variable, which they refer to as Learner-Classroom Ratio. 
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propensity to disrupt class due to closer supervision and enables teachers to better tailor 
instruction to individual students (Krueger, 2002).  
 
However, there are also counter claims against the purported benefit of small class size 
by scholars who argue that the evidence in support of class size is weak and the effects of 
reducing class size are small and not significantly different from large class sizes (Hattie, 
2005; Hanushek, 1998). The literature on class size typically make reference to Eric 
Hanushek (1981, 1986, 1995, 1998 and 1999) who has long argued that school inputs, 
including class size have no systemic impact on student performance. In a vote counting 
exercise, Hanushek (1999) found only 13 percent of studies on class size to be 
statistically significant and in favour of smaller classes; 15 percent were negative and 72 
percent were not different from zero. Krueger (2002) disputed these conclusions arguing 
that Hanushek did not define his criterion for strong or consistent relationships and drew 
conclusions from sample estimates that were likely to find positive effects of small class 
sizes on achievement as they were to find negative effects. Furthermore, Krueger argued 
that a majority of Hanushek‟s estimates were statistically insignificant. If focus was 
placed on studies with large samples, it would reveal a clear trend that class size matters.  
 
In other studies, Card and Krueger (1992) found PT ratio to be important in determining 
education outcomes in the US if measured by the rates of return to education (earnings). 
Akerhielm (1995), Krueger (2002) and Lee and Barro (2001) all found smaller classes to 
be associated with achievement. Similarly, Jones, Toma and Zimmer (2008) found that in 
addition to class size, school size and district size have an inverse relationship with 
school attendance rates – an alternative measure of education output. Hoxby (2000) 
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however, found no systematic effect of class size in her regression discontinuity 
estimation of Connecticut schools. In a review of nine studies in developing countries, 
with a mean class size of 44, Fuller (1987) found no difference in learning outcomes 
relating to class size. Wossman and West (2006), in examining the effect of class size on 
achievement in 11 countries, found beneficial effects of small class sizes in only two 
countries. They noted that the class size reduction has an impact in the context of good 
quality teaching. Therefore a policy focus on capable teachers is more useful than 
reducing class size.  
 
It is important to emphasise that the studies that dispute the benefits of small class sizes 
do not present evidence showing that small classes result in poor outcomes; they simply 
argue that there is lack of evidence showing a strong association between small class size 
and good learning outcomes. Moreover, the effects of class size on achievement may be 
non-linear. Glass and Smith (1978) found a reduction of class size from 40 to 20 resulted 
in a close to zero increment in achievement, but when further reduced to 15 pupils or 
lower, the increments were much larger. According to Hattie (2005), the lack of evidence 
is explained by the tendency of teaching methods to remain the same regardless of 
changes in class size. Finn, Gerber, Achilles and Boyd Zacharias (2001) provide evidence 
to the effect that actual impact on achievement as a result of class size reductions have 
more to do with peer influences. In this context, smaller classes provided more visibility 
of the individual and there is more pressure to participate and therefore benefits of small 
classes relate more to student effects rather than teacher effects.  
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Class size: Evidence for South Africa 
The evidence for South Africa also appears to be mixed. Crouch and Mabogoane (1998) 
found PT ratio to be insignificant in explaining outcomes and learner-classroom ratio to 
be only relatively slight in its effect. Case and Deaton (1999) found strong and significant 
effects of PT ratio on enrolment and numeracy test scores, although, this was only true 
for black students and not of other racial groups. Van der Berg and Louw (2006) 
however, pointed out that Case and Deaton‟s finding for black students can be explained 
by the timing of the study: it was shortly before the end of apartheid when PT ratios were 
considerably higher in black schools. Van der Berg and Louw (2006) in their analyses of 
data from the Southern African Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality 
(SACMEQ) also found class size to be statistically insignificant in explaining outcomes.   
 
Teacher Characteristics   
The impact of teacher characteristics on education outcomes is one of the most heated 
areas in the education literature. Teacher characteristics may include teacher 
qualifications, experience, training, salary (if determined by qualification), level of 
preparedness, teaching approach and absenteeism. It would seem logical that poorly 
remunerated teachers may lack the incentive to teach; poorly trained and inexperienced 
teachers would undermine the quality of instruction and not meet the needs of the 
students and chronically absent teachers would adversely impact learning. The literature 
is inconclusive on these arguments. The much cited studies by Hanushek (1986, 1981 and 
1995) found that many attributes of teacher characteristics have no real impact on 
academic achievement. In Hanushek‟s (1995) study that summarises 96 studies on the 
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estimated effects of resources on education in developing countries, the majority of 
studies that focused on teacher education were statistically significant and positive but, 
the majority of studies on teacher experience and salary were statistically insignificant. In 
his view, differences in school quality are better explained by teacher “skills” – an 
indicator that captures background and training, and also choices on presentation styles 
and curricular materials (Hanushek 1981).  
 
In contrast to Hanushek‟s findings, Lee and Barro‟s (2001) cross-country study of 58 
countries found that teacher salary had a positive impact on reading scores. The impact of 
teacher incentives was found to be mixed. In a study on schools in Kenya, Glewwe, Illias 
and Kremer (2010) found that increasing incentives for teachers had little or no effect on 
dropout rates and test scores but in Israel, an incentive programme in the form of cash 
prizes to teachers improved test scores and participation in high school matriculation 
exams (Lavy, 2002). In Botswana, Zuze (2010) found a clear association between teacher 
content preparation and student achievement, suggesting that teacher preparation is 
important in outcomes. Bishop (2003) also found teacher influence (ability of individual 
teachers to influence curriculum and decide on teaching methods) as significant in 
generating good learning outcomes.  
 
Given the prevalence of teacher absenteeism in developing countries, for example, on an 
average day, 27 percent of teachers in Uganda do not report to work (JPAL, 2009), there 
is a fair amount of literature examining whether interventions to curb absenteeism results 
in improved learning outcomes (see for instance, Duflo and Hanna, 2005 and Chaudhury, 
Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, & Rogers, 2006). Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2008) found 
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that in a programme that increased teacher attendance from 58 to 79 percent, 7 percent 
more girls were able to write. In rural India, the installation of cameras at the schools led 
to a reduction of absenteeism by 20 percent and a year later, test scores were significantly 
higher (MIT, 2009).     
   
Teacher Characteristics: Evidence for South Africa 
In the South African literature, the research on teacher characteristics has also produced 
mixed results. Van der Berg and Louw (2006) found teacher absenteeism and teacher 
quality (measured by a dummy variable indicating that the mathematics teacher has a 
degree and another indicating that the teacher has teaching training) to have a large effect 
on test scores. In an earlier study, however, Van der Berg and Burger (2002a) found that 
teacher salary did not explain the differentials in the performance of black students in the 
Western Cape. Crouch and Mabogoane (1998) found little evidence that teacher 
experience mattered for education outcomes although additional teacher training does 
matter. Crouch and Mabogoane‟s regression results show that one more year of additional 
training yields a 16 percent increase in pass rates. In a later study, Crouch and 
Mabogoane (2001) find that increasing “quality-oriented” resources such as teacher 
qualifications and teacher behaviour is useful for outcomes.  
 
Fiske and Ladd (2005) in their study of academic achievement and resources at the 
secondary level in South Africa, found evidence to support the argument that teacher 
characteristics matters. Using 2001 data on matriculation results, enrolment statistics and 
4 teacher variables (ratio of state-paid teachers to learners, ratio of SGB funded teachers 
to state-paid teachers, average quality of unqualified teachers and proportion of 
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unqualified teachers)  in the Western Cape, they found a strong statistically significant 
relationship between weighted test scores and three out of four teacher variables. 
Controlling for socio-economic status, the study revealed that increasing teaching staff by 
more than 30 percent resulted in 5 to 7 percent difference in pass rates.  
 
School-Based Management 
School-based management (SBM) – the devolution of authority from central government 
to principals, teachers, parents, communities and sometimes students – is gaining 
widespread acceptance globally. The theoretical appeal is strong: through participative 
decision making and autonomy, schools under SBM can be more efficient in the use of 
resources and respond better to local needs (Santibanez, 2006) and schools and parents 
who are interested in maximising their children‟s learning outcomes have incentives to 
make decisions that will impact positively on the learning process (Hanushek & 
Wossman, 2007b). It is from these arguments and the empirical evidence (discussed 
below) that SBM interventions in South Africa, namely, Student Governing Bodies 
(SGBs) and Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) are incorporated in this study as 
potential explanatory variables.  
 
The existing empirical evidence demonstrating a relationship (or lack of one) between 
SBM and education outcomes is limited and mixed at best. Wossman (2003) in his cross-
country analysis of education outcomes concluded that the following elements of SBM 
were significant in student performance in terms of cognitive tests: school autonomy in 
process and personnel decisions; individual teachers having both incentives and powers 
to decide on appropriate teaching methods and encouragement of parents to take interest 
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in teaching matters. He argued that it is these differences in educational institutions that 
explain variations in student performance and not differences in school resources.  
   
Barera-Osorio et al. (2009), in their comprehensive review of SBM initiatives across the 
globe, found that several of the studies that they reviewed, showed positive results of 
SBM interventions in reducing repetition and failure rates but were associated with mixed 
results in terms of impact on test scores. In Latin American countries, where the most 
extensive empirical analysis has been conducted, there was evidence of a positive and 
significant impact of SBM in reducing repetition, failure and to a lesser extent, dropout 
rates in countries such as Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras and Mexico but in two of those 
countries, Honduras and in Brazil, there were no improvements in test scores. What is 
evident from the reviews is that SBMs appear to have a positive impact if measured by 
repetition and failure but yield mixed results when measured by standardised test scores. 
The authors attempted to explain the anomaly by attributing it to timing: in their 
estimation, SBM need more time (at least 8 years) in order for the benefits to manifest in 
test scores. The timing explanation is limited as Brazil was assessed after 11 years of 
reform and Honduras, 13 years. Therefore, the relationship between SBM and outcomes 
remained ambiguous.   
 
The evidence for African countries is very limited. Barrera-Osorio et al write extensively 
about the Kenya experience, drawing from Duflo, Dupas and Kremer‟s (2008) 
randomised experiment in which school committees appointed and evaluated teachers, 
leading to significantly improved test scores after 18 months. This study was actually 
about assessing the impact of “tracking” (dividing students to different classes by initial 
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ability) and was not designed to isolate the impact of SBM on learning outcomes. There 
are other studies that evaluate SBM (for instance, Chapman, Barcikowski, Sowah, 
Gyamera & Woode, 2001; Kai-Ming, 1994), but while they reveal interesting findings 
such as limited effectiveness of SBMs due to lack of understanding of the educational 
process by community members, these studies do not give much information on the 
actual impact on education outcomes. The South African literature presents the same 
dilemma where a number of scholars have analysed the effectiveness of SGBs (Bush et 
al., 2008; Lewis & Naidoo, 2006; McPherson, 2001 In Karlson, 2002; Sayed, 1997) but 
presented virtually no empirical evidence on their impact on outcomes. This is a topic 
that would require extensive research in the future. This study presents preliminary 
findings on the relationship between SGB/PTAs and education outcomes in Chapter 8.      
 
Role of Public Expenditure 
There is real scepticism about resources being an important determinant of education 
outcomes. This concern is well captured in the quote below: 
“It is widely argued that the great need in schooling is more money to 
build more facilities and to pay higher salaries to teachers in order to 
attract better teachers. This seems a false diagnosis. ... The problem is not 
primarily that we are spending too little money – though we may be – but 
that we are getting so little per dollar spent.” (Friedman, 1962, p. 93). 
 
Milton Friedman‟s concern about resources is still valid today as evidenced by continuing 
contradictory findings on this topic. Proponents of resources as an important input in 
education outcomes, such as Case and Deaton (1999) argue that the work by Hanushek 
and other similar studies that find inputs ineffective are fundamentally flawed and are of 
very mixed quality.
 
Aside from their tendency to focus on developed countries, many of 
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these studies were never peer reviewed and for those still available, it is difficult to find 
what data were used and how the analysis was done. Case and Deaton further argue that 
the econometric procedures, including the Gauss-Markov theorem are too “exotic” and 
raise doubts about the validity of the results. This methodology also does not tell us what 
variables are being controlled for. In reviewing the various studies, Case and Deaton 
concluded that a closer look at the individual studies showed findings that are often far 
from suggesting that resources do not matter. In fact, there are various high quality 
studies that suggest resources do matter.  
 
One study that finds resources to be important is Guryan‟s (2001) study on education 
finance in Massachusetts, where he found that increased educational funding for 
historically low-spending districts led to improved student performance. Public schools in 
the US are traditionally controlled and funded at the local level, which means that the 
taste for education, property tax rates and labour costs understandably drive much of the 
variation in education spending. Guryan‟s study however, showed state equalisation 
schemes (a formula designed to redistribute income by giving more aid to poorer 
districts) could be a source of variation that explains the causal relationship between 
spending and student outcomes. According to the study, estimates based on variation in 
spending caused by state aid formulas result in improved Grade 4 test scores and 
improved performance by low scoring students even though the results for Grade 8 pupils 
showed no evidence of an effect of spending on mean test scores.  
 
In a UK study, using Panel data of 13,000 primary schools, Holmlund, McNally and 
Viarengo (2008) found a positive and significant effect of expenditure on achievement. 
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Given the concerns raised about the quality of data as one of the major problems in EPF 
studies, this particular study adds value to the body of literature because of the use of a 
comprehensive census data. Their findings are based on OLS regressions and a 
falsification test which essentially compares the impact of expenditure inputs during 
pupils‟ enrolment and after pupils leave primary schools. They concluded that resources 
matter (taking endogeneity of education funding into account) but they mattered even 
more for economically disadvantaged pupils. McMahon (1999) found the impact of 
public spending on enrolment to vary depending on male or female enrolment and 
whether the explanatory variable is recurrent expenditure or recurrent expenditure per 
capita.  
 
Evidence from Developing Countries  
A review of the literature focusing on developing countries shows the same inconsistency 
on the importance of resources. A cross-country study by Al-Samarrai (2002) relied on a 
dataset containing between 33 and 90 developed and developing countries (depending on 
the dependent variable used). The study explored the extent to which differences in the 
resources allocated to education explained differences in educational access and 
performance across countries. In measuring public spending, the study used three 
different variables: public primary education spending as a proportion of GNP, primary 
education expenditure per pupil and primary student-teacher ratio. Four dependent 
variables were also used in the analysis: primary gross enrolment ratio; primary net 
enrolment ratio, survival rate to primary Grade 5 and primary school completion rate. 
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Levels of urbanisation, the Muslim population and a set of regional dummies were 
included as additional control variables.
4
  
 
The cross-country analysis showed a weak relationship between public spending and 
education outcomes. Of the three measures used for public resources, only per pupil 
spending showed some significance in explaining cross-country variations in education 
outcomes. Nonetheless, the impact was small; large increases in per pupil spending 
resulted in small improvements in primary education outcomes (enrolment and 
completion rates).  
 
In a cross-country study of 50 developing and transition countries, Gupta, Verhoeven and 
Tiongson (1999) found that total education spending hardly affects outcomes but the 
proportion of primary and secondary spending in total spending has a positive and 
significant impact. Pritchett and Filmer (1999) found in their survey of developing 
countries, that resources only marginally affect education quality, however, they also 
found that there could be significant efficiency and productivity gains by allocating 
expenditure to areas of high marginal productivity, such as learning materials (textbooks 
and other types of instructional materials).  
 
The evidence in Africa specifically, is also mixed. In examining the relationship between 
public spending and education outcomes in African countries, Al-Samarrai (2003) found 
that in Malawi and Botswana, when dropout rates were regressed against per pupil 
                                                 
4
 In the case of urbanization, it was included as it is easier to provide educational services to more densely 
populated areas and household travel costs may be lower in urban than rural areas; some studies have 
shown that countries with large Muslim populations tend to have poorer education outcomes (Al-Samarrai, 
2003).  
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expenditure, the regression line actually showed higher expenditure to be associated with 
higher dropout rates, thus, confirming a lack of consistency in the link between resources 
and education and the direction of the relationship between public spending and 
education outcomes.  
 
In South Africa, there is an ongoing debate among academics on the value of resources. 
Advocates of resources as a key input in education outcomes argue that education 
expenditure, even if increasing, is still inadequate to meet educational demands. 
According to Reschovsky (2006, p.43), “Although more money alone will not guarantee 
an improvement in the quality of education, the absence of sufficient financial resources 
devoted to education almost certainly ensures that students will remain undereducated”. 
There are also researchers such as Crouch (1998) who attribute educational problems to a 
combination of resources constraints and poor management at school and/or district 
levels. Then, there are those who link poor education outcomes exclusively to bad 
management. According to Taylor (2001, p.15), “All the evidence at our disposal 
indicates that the disparities in learning outcomes between successful schools and their 
less successful neighbours are essentially due to differences in their management 
practices.”  
 
Summary of public spending and education outcomes: cross-country evidence 
In summarising various multiple regression results that try to explain education 
outcomes, Fiske (2000) arrived at the conclusion that increasing specific education inputs 
generally matters more for low-income countries than for higher-income ones. In other 
words, resources matter when they are added to an already low resource base. Then, at a 
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certain level, one observes diminishing returns – this aligns with general interpretations 
of production functions. In the end, cross-country estimates of the impact of resources on 
education outcomes show no consistency.  
 
In reviewing the cross-country evidence, Al-Samarai concluded that the levels of 
household spending, the effectiveness of PEM and the composition of public education 
spending are more important factors in explaining this weak link. He cautioned, however, 
that the findings do not mean resources are unnecessary and it would be misleading to 
conclude that resources are unimportant for education as schools require buildings, books 
and other learning materials. Al-Samarrai arrived at the conclusion that that cross country 
studies are limited.
5
 Country case-studies would therefore be required to unpack the 
relationship between public expenditure and education outcomes. Wossman (2003) 
argued that in-country studies are however, limited. For instance, examining institutional 
effects in educational production can hardly be tested using country-specific data as there 
is no significant variation in many institutional features within a single country. Rather, 
international evidence, encompassing many educational systems with varying 
institutional structures can explain variations in education outcomes. Indeed, this is an 
important strength to cross-country studies despite their many limitations already 
mentioned. This study aims to test for institutional variation in a single-country while 
arguing that there is substantive variation at the sub-national level, where local education 
                                                 
5
 The author had also noted that although cross-country econometric analyses are useful in establishing the 
importance of variations in public spending in explaining education outcomes, many key variables are not 
available on a cross-country basis. In addition, cross-country relationships may be very different from those 
within a country over time.  Furthermore, there is a lack of cross-country data to measure the effectiveness 
of PEM on education outcomes. Therefore cross-country analyses are limited and do not give a picture of 
the dynamics of educational financing and progress for any particular country.  
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offices have some operational autonomy and therefore exhibit differences in carrying out 
their service delivery functions.    
2.3 Public Expenditure Management and Education Outcomes: Review of 
Selected Case-Studies 
 
This section will review some of the country case studies, particularly those countries that 
have successfully implemented a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) to address 
questions of governance in the areas of efficiency and equity of public spending and 
service delivery.  To date, PETS have been conducted in many countries including but 
not limited to: Albania, Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. From these, the discussion below 
will review the cases of the African countries where a PETS has been conducted in the 
education sector.
 
The findings will be discussed around three main themes: leakages, 
delays and accountability.     
Findings on Leakage  
 
Leakage refers to the misappropriation of funds whereby local officials divert education 
resources for other purposes or for private gain. It is perhaps the most significant and 
astounding finding from the various PET surveys conducted in Africa. As discussed 
earlier, Uganda was the first country to implement a PETS in 1996. The study revealed 
that on average, only 13 percent of the annual capitation grant
6
 from the central 
government reached schools between 1991 and 1995 (Reinikka & Svensson, 2001). 
                                                 
6
 Capitation grants are subsidies provided to public schools on a per student basis.  
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District officials captured 87 percent for purposes unrelated to education. This level of 
leakage confirmed initial suspicions and led to policy changes. It also led other countries 
to emulate the PETS.  
 
The Uganda Case-study is particularly interesting and inspiring for this thesis because it 
demonstrated clearly, the extent to which inefficiencies at the local level can allow for 
misappropriation of funds. What the study did not show strongly were the salient 
elements that allow leakage to thrive in specific contexts as evidenced by the case of 
Zambia. In Zambia, when funds were disbursed through “legislative” funding (a fixed 
amount of $600 per school), more than 90 percent of schools received their funding (Das, 
Dercon, Habyarimana & Krishnan, 2004). When funds were channelled to schools at the 
discretion of district authorities, less than 20 percent of schools received their funding. 
This showed that allowing districts to disburse funds at their discretion potentially 
facilitates misappropriation. There was also evidence that in-kind transfers also facilitated 
leakages. In the PETS experiences of Ghana and Madagascar, the propensity for leakage 
was greater for in-kind transfers rather than cash transfers (Gauthier, 2006). Additionally, 
in Madagascar, leakage was more rampant in schools that were far from the capital. 
Therefore, the more remote the location of a school, the greater the likelihood of funds 
being diverted for other purposes.    
 
The PETS studies provided evidence that leakages can be rampant in countries that have 
a complex system of transferring funds. A PETS conducted in Tanzania in 2003 revealed 
leakage of less than 5 percent However, it turned out that the finding was a gross 
underestimation because it was not apparent to the consultants that two other ministries, 
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in addition to the Ministry of Finance (Ministries of Education and Local Government) 
were also charged with disbursing education funds. Subsequently, what initially seemed 
like minimal leakage, turned out to be considerable leakage of approximately 40 percent. 
The study attributed leakage to Tanzania‟s complex system of transferring funds – one 
that involved three separate ministries as well as distinct transferring and reporting 
mechanisms and channels (Sundet, 2007). 
 
Finally, the literature review of the country case-studies showed that information 
asymmetry, whereby schools are uninformed about decisions taken on education 
resources, can allow for extensive leakages, as was found in Madagascar and Tanzania. 
In Madagascar, only 35 percent of schools reported that they knew what they were meant 
to receive (Gauthier, 2006). In Tanzania, head teachers and school committees were not 
knowledgeable about their entitlements (Sundet, 2007). Of the 10,000 Tsh capitation 
grant, schools were entitled to 6,000 Tsh (with the remaining 4,000 Tsh to be used by 
local government to purchase books for the schools). When asked how much schools 
should be receiving, the average answer was 3,200 Tsh.     
Findings on Delays 
 
Delays and bottlenecks in the allocation of resources through public administrations have 
been identified in tracking surveys as a potentially serious problem affecting quality of 
services. In Tanzania, there was evidence of delays in disbursing school subsidies and the 
processing of non-wage funds, ranging from 6 to 42 days at the Treasury (Gauthier, 
2006). When Rwanda conducted a PET survey in 1998, it was observed that delays in the 
payment of capitation grants occurred between the submission of a funding release request 
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by the line ministry and the authorisation by the Ministry of Finance and most of the 
money arrived in the fourth quarter of the budget year (Fofack, Obidegwu & Ngong, 
2003). Explanations for delays were linked to the unpredictable pattern of fund inflows to 
the Government due to the volatility of external budget support, the seasonality of 
revenues, and poor cash management in Ministry of Finance and the discretion of 
regional authorities.  
 
The timeliness of payment of salaries varied among countries. In Rwanda for instance, 
about 13 percent of teachers did not receive their salaries regularly and 82 percent of 
teachers reported salary arrears in 2003 but, in Zambia, 95 percent of staff were paid on 
time (Gauthier, 2006). In Uganda, there was only anecdotal evidence of delays; by and 
large, salary payments were made on time (Ablo & Reinikka, 1998). None of the studies, 
however, assessed the impact of delays on education outcomes.  
Findings on Accountability   
 
Issues of accountability are vital in education. In the education sector, teachers are 
accountable to head teachers; head teachers to district and provincial education officers; 
these officers to education ministries; ministries to politicians and politicians to client-
citizens (Reinnika & Smith, 2004). In most cases, schools are also accountable to parents 
as customers paying for a service. This is particularly true where parents are involved in 
school decision-making bodies. Public expenditure tracking surveys in education are 
instrumental in shedding light on the accountability links between schools, parents and 
government bodies.  
 
  
52 |  
 
PETS are able to expose weaknesses in internal controls that allow for inefficiencies in 
public spending. The Rwanda PETS found rampant lack of accountability in these 
offices, with poor bookkeeping and lack of internal financial controls and auditing 
requirements (Fofack, Obidegwu & Ngong, 2003). Most education officials interviewed 
in the study (92 percent) indicated knowledge of instructions on the utilization of public 
funds but 25 percent found these instructions less than clear and many of the school 
administrators could not provide any copy of the instructions during the survey (Fofack, 
Obidegwu & Ngong, 2003). Lack of accountability mechanisms in the education sector, 
saw some schools in Kenya, receiving more allocations than required (Gauthier, 2006). 
The survey also revealed that schools in Kenya maintained poor records and that funds 
were diverted for personal gain at the schools As previously mentioned, Tanzania‟s 
complex system of disbursement made it difficult to monitor and enforce public financial 
accountability.  
Lessons from Case-studies 
 
It has often been the case that the prescribed solution to poor social services is to increase 
resources. What these case-studies have shown is that the solution does not always lie in 
increasing resources as there may be blockages in the public system and other governance 
constraints that prevent even well-meaning governments from achieving their goals. 
Governments need to periodically conduct tracking surveys to find out where the 
problems lie so that they can be corrected. Therefore, improving PEM as a whole, rather 
than just focusing on budget allocations, may be critical for effective service delivery. In 
terms of accountability, it is important to note that the failure of accountability does not 
automatically lead to a failure in service delivery as an inadequately financed or 
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monitored agent can still perform well if motivated by a sense of duty (Reinnika & 
Smith, 2004). Nonetheless, the likelihoods are slim as agents may become demoralised if 
other colleagues are corrupt or non-performing. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The review of the literature presented the pros and cons of the various indicators of 
education outcomes, while highlighting Grade 1 repetition to be the strongest of the 
outcome variables internationally and in the South African context. With regards to the 
input variables, the literature is divided on the merits of class size reductions, teacher 
characteristics and public expenditure. There is wide support for socio-economic status as 
a determinant of education outcomes and limited evidence of school-based management 
as a determinant of education outcomes.   
 
The review of country case-studies that examine the relationship between PEM and 
education outcomes in Africa revealed that leakages occur at an alarming rate in many 
African countries that have weak accountability systems and complex public financial 
management systems. Leakages and issues around accountability are also well 
documented. Nonetheless, this is a research area that has largely been dominated by 
World Bank economists. Therefore, there is a gap in terms of diverse contributions to the 
field, which is only starting to gain recognition as issues of governance and development 
challenges such as unemployment, weak human resource capacity and skills shortage– all 
of which have strong links to problems in educational quality – are brought to the 
forefront of the global development agenda.  
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With more evaluative research, it is becoming clear that merely increasing resources is 
not enough and good governance and the management of resources may be conditional to 
good education outcomes. The PEM-education nexus effectively shows that elements of 
accountability, transparency, technical and allocative efficiency potentially have a 
significant impact on education outcomes.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT 
AND EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
After over 300 years of colonial and apartheid rule, South Africa consolidated democracy 
in 1994 and put an end to a long history of oppression of black South Africans by a white 
minority. The new democratic administration proceeded to establish and entrench a 
system of democratic governance with a strong emphasis on individual and collective 
rights. A significant milestone in South Africa‟s process of consolidating democracy was 
the promulgation of the 1996 Constitution – a document that has evoked world-wide 
acclaim. It placed high emphasis on equal opportunities for all, such as the right to 
education, which has led to some remarkable gains in social service delivery. 
 
The legacy of apartheid however, left South Africa with strains of severe socio-economic 
problems. Many of these socio-economic problems are rooted in the history of education 
in South Africa because the former apartheid government had entrenched an inequitable 
system whereby black South Africans would receive a sub-standard level of education 
(referred to as Bantu education). These educational challenges and other socio-economic 
constraints necessitated government initiatives to address socio-economic rights as a 
priority while ensuring that public expenditure remained under control and properly 
managed through legislations on the use of public funds.  
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This chapter provides a contextual overview of public expenditure management and 
primary education in South Africa. It begins with a description of the governmental 
system, which was restructured in 1994 to create three spheres (central, provincial and 
local). These decentralised structures have important implications for both PEM and 
educational service delivery. It then goes on to provide a background on the state of PEM 
and educational quality and outcomes in South Africa.  
3.2 Overview of National and Sub-National Government Structure 
Introduction 
 
The 1994 Constitution established three separate spheres of government: a national 
government, nine provincial governments and 284 local governments (Yemek, 2005). 
Each sphere was assigned its own powers, functions and responsibilities. The national 
government, with overall responsibilities for managing the country‟s affairs, would share 
responsibilities for service provision with sub-national governments. The national 
government‟s power to intervene in the decisions of provincial or local government is 
defined and limited by the Constitution. Exclusive functions for the national government 
includes national defence, the criminal justice system, higher education and other 
administrative functions such as tax collection. Provinces are largely mandated to deliver 
most of the basic services, including basic education, health and welfare. Local 
governments have the major responsibility for local services and infrastructure such as 
water, sanitation, and electricity.  
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Intergovernmental Relations 
 
Intergovernmental relations, including the devolution of revenue and expenditure at the 
sub-national governmental level, are established by the Constitution. The Division of 
Revenue Act of 2005 annually allocates national revenues to the three spheres of 
government (vertical split) and among the nine provinces in a horizontal split. The 
intergovernmental system faces three key challenges (National Treasury, 2007). Firstly, 
there is a misalignment between policy objectives and resource allocation and therefore, 
budget items that are under-funded are rarely implemented. This is an important context 
for this study because it cautions that education policies set at a national level may not be 
fully funded and implemented at the sub-national level due to a misalignment of policy 
and allocation.  
 
The second challenge pertains to accountability, whereby it is not always clear which 
sphere or political bearer is to be held accountable for delivering functions that are 
concurrent.  In education for instance, implementation failure may not be the fault of the 
implementer, which is the provincial government; it may lie with the national sphere for 
not properly funding it from the onset. The third challenge raises questions as to whether 
the configuration of certain functions lends itself to inefficiency and ineffectiveness even 
though the Constitution provides for functions to be assigned to spheres that will 
presumably administer them most effectively. Section 3.5 of this chapter shows clearly 
that provinces and districts play an important role in managing education funds and 
delivering education services. In Chapter 7, the technical inefficiencies plaguing the 
effectiveness of the district education offices lend support to this last challenge.   
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3.3 Public Expenditure Management in South Africa  
Introduction 
 
The South African Government has established several mechanisms and legislative 
frameworks in accordance with the Constitution in an attempt to improve and sustain 
sound public expenditure management. Key developments include: the Annual Division 
of Revenue Act (Equitable Share Formula) for the division of revenue between 
provinces; the Public Finance Management Act (1999); the Municipal Finance 
Management Act (2003); the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (2005); the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (1994); and the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (1997). These are elaborated below.   
Policies and Institutions for Public Expenditure Management   
 
The Equitable Share Formula is the basis by which revenue is shared among provinces. 
The formula contains several components – shown below with assigned weights for 2010 
in brackets (Government of South Africa, 2010):  
 Education share (51%) based on the size of the school age population in a 
province (ages 5-17 years) and the average number of learners enrolled in the 
public ordinary schools in the last three years; 
 Health share (26%) based on the population with and without access to medical 
aid; 
 Basic share (14%) based on each province‟s share in the national population; 
 Economic activity share (1%) based on GDP by region; 
 Institutional component (5%) divided equally among provinces; and 
 Poverty component (3%) to reinforce the redistributive component of the formula 
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These weights are in fact guidelines as provincial governments have the flexibility in 
allocating funds as deemed appropriate. Furthermore, provinces may receive a higher 
allocation depending on certain demographic characteristics such a high ratio of school-
age children. In addition to these equitable shares, provinces also receive additional 
grants. This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  
 
The Public Finance Management Act (1999) provides for the establishment of provincial 
treasuries, headed by the MEC for finance in the province. The provincial treasury is 
charged with (a) preparing a provincial budget (b) exercising control over the 
implementation of the provincial budget (c) promoting and enforcing transparency and 
effective management in respect of revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of 
provincial departments and provincial public entities and (d) ensuring that its fiscal 
policies do not materially and unreasonably prejudice national economic policies. 
Provincial treasuries are to submit to the National Treasury at least quarterly, a statement 
of revenue and expenditure for publication in the national Government Gazette.  
 
Typically, national annual budgets are tabled for a financial year in the National 
Assembly by the Minister of Finance, normally before the start of the financial year. A 
provincial annual budget is supposed to be tabled to the provincial legislature not later 
than two weeks after the tabling of the annual budget (PFMA, 1999). As stipulated in the 
PFMA, within 30 days after the end of each month, the National Treasury must publish in 
the national Government Gazette, a statement of actual revenue and expenditure with 
regard to the National Revenue Fund.  
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A Medium Term Expenditure Framework was implemented in 1997. In addition, the 
Minister of Finance also makes a Medium Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS), 
usually in October of each year. The MTEF lays out planned government expenditure for 
the next budget year as well as the two years following the next budget year. By 
formulating and publishing the MTEF, the government aims to improve the planning of 
government expenditure as well as the transparency of expenditure planning.  
 
Evidently, the country has put in place structures to promote transparency and 
accountability in the management of public resources. In addition to legislations and the 
inclusive budget formulation process, a National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) was established in 1994. NEDLAC comprises organized business, 
labour, government and community groupings. The council aims to ensure that economic 
decisions are inclusive and promote goals of growth and social equity. Subsequently, 
NEDLAC reinforces good governance in public expenditure management by fostering 
accountability and transparency in public spending.  
3.4 Primary Education in South Africa 
Introduction 
 
The State of Education in the Apartheid Era  
Primary education in South Africa needs to be understood in its historical context, where 
racial inequality was the order of the day before democracy in 1994. During the system of 
apartheid, the white population enjoyed access to democratic institutions of government, 
a well-developed system of public infrastructure and a full array of public services that 
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were on par with those of the developed world. The black population on the other hand, 
had very few political and socio-economic rights. They did not benefit from 
representation in government affairs and had very limited access to government provided 
public services. Although whites made up less than 15 percent of the total population,  87 
percent of South Africa‟s land area was reserved for them (Rechovsky, 2006). Blacks 
were relegated to “homelands” and lived in inhospitable conditions.  
 
Under the apartheid system, the provision of education was racially unequal by design.  
There were 15 distinct departments of education serving different racially defined group 
of students. Not only were the departments racially defined, they differed significantly in 
terms of funding. At the peak of apartheid, schools serving white students had more than 
10 times the funding per pupil than schools serving black pupils (Fiske and Ladd, 2005). 
Resources were lavished on white schools. Black schools were hugely deprived of 
resources and given poor education in order to keep black children out of the modern 
sector of the economy and to ensure a steady supply of cheap labour.  
 
A fundamental aspect of education in the apartheid era was the establishment of “Bantu 
education” – a system of education designed for black pupils by the apartheid 
government and propagated as “a specialised education system that would meet the 
special needs of the African people and assist them to develop, along their own lines, 
towards their own separate national destinies” (Murphy, 1973, p.233). In reality, the 
architects of apartheid aspired to develop a black labour policy that would encourage 
white capital accumulation without endangering the legitimacy and stability of political 
domination (Terreblanche, 2002). Bantu education, established through the Bantu 
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Education Act of 1953 under the control of the then Department of Native Affairs, led to 
the closing of many African schools, including some of the oldest and best secondary 
schools run by Christian missions, in favour of a new system that placed emphasis on 
mother tongue instruction and enhanced community participation but was in reality, 
designed to protect and sustain the rule of the white minority and separate Africans 
farther from the mainstream of South African development (Davis, 1972).  
 
While Bantu education saw to the expansion of schools and increased enrolment, teacher 
training did not keep up with enrolments; education was severely underfunded and 
schools were overcrowded and ill-equipped (Murphy, 1973). Worse still, the curriculum 
failed to provide any of the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes essential to work in a 
self-reliant society. In the words of Murphy (1973, p.237), “Bantu education [was] a 
carefully designed instrument of domination and manipulation”.          
 
Inevitably, the disparities in education between whites and blacks were vast. The Bantu 
Education Act required that African education be largely self-funded. Therefore, 
expenditure on African education was pegged to the level of African taxation and as a 
result, per capita expenditure fell from 13 percent of white levels in 1953 to 10 percent in 
1961 and then to only 4 percent in 1975 (Terreblanche, 2002).  The sharp increase to 22 
percent of white levels in 1990 was the result of the Soweto Unrest in 1976, where black 
pupils rebelled against a new policy requiring that certain subjects be taught in Afrikaans 
in black schools. (Terreblanche, 2002). In this racially divided system, the pupil-to-
teacher ratio remained around the teens and early 20s for 7 decades in the white schools. 
In the black schools, the range was between 40 and 70 (Rechovsky, 2006). There were 
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drastic differences in facilities, teacher salaries and other measures of educational quality. 
It is therefore not surprising that among South Africans at the age of 30 in 1993, whites 
on average had completed slightly above 12 years of education, while the average black 
had completed only 8 (Case & Deaton, 1999).   
 
Education Reform in the Post-apartheid Era 
The new democratic government that emerged in 1994 was faced with the daunting task 
of correcting this anomaly by providing equal educational opportunities to all South 
Africans. The new Constitution guaranteed all South Africans a right to basic education. 
A White Paper on Education and Training in a Democratic South Africa (March 1995), 
set out a new policy framework for education in the new democratic South Africa. 
Numerous other Acts, Bills and Policies were developed to improve the education system 
in South Africa. These include, among others, the National Education Policy Act No. 27 
of 1996 the South African Schools Act No. 84 of 1996; and the South African Council for 
Educators Act No. 31 of 2000.  
 
The curriculum was also overhauled in 1997, with the introduction of an outcomes-based 
education (OBE) policy (applied in countries such as the United States and Australia), 
whereby the end goal of schooling was measured against a set of policies such as 
effective communication, critical thinking and teamwork (Malcolm, 2001). OBE 
provided a broad framework for the development of an alternative to apartheid education 
that was open, non-prescriptive and reliant on teachers creating their own learning 
programmes and learning support materials (Chisholm, 2003). It has been deemed 
controversial for several reasons such as: being skewed in its structure and design; its 
  
64 |  
 
failure to draw sharp distinctions between inputs and outputs; the little attention given to 
levels of achievement; unclear performance indicators; lack of consideration around 
selection and sequencing in terms of content particularly in science subjects; the undue 
pressure on teachers to design curricula and inadequate teacher training (Chisholm, 2003; 
Malcolm, 2001).    
 
A Plan of Action was established in 2003 by the then Department of Education to 
improve access to free and quality basic education for all. This plan included valuable 
strategic pointers for ensuring that the government‟s resources were used effectively to 
accomplish the country‟s education mission (Department of Education, 2003). The 
emphasis in this Plan of Action was to ensure that the poorest 40 percent of learners in 
South Africa continue to experience improvements in the quality of the schooling that 
they receive, and that all barriers to access definitively removed.  
 
By and large, the various measures put in place to correct the distortion of education in 
the apartheid era were largely supported by different interest groups in the country. 
During the negotiations, however, a political agreement was made to the effect that there 
would not be a cap set on private contributions to schools (Jansen and Taylor, 2003). This 
meant that whites and middle class South Africans could continue to privately fund 
public schools through very high fees in order to maintain what was felt to be an 
acceptable standard of education. This agreement is arguably a contributing factor as to 
why inequities have been difficult to address. The government to date relies on fiscal 
measures to address inequity issues in education mainly through a poverty quintile 
system where the extent of resources allocated to schools is based on their poverty 
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profile. The effects of these measures on equity, outcomes and quality of education are 
reviewed later in this section after a review of education spending.       
Education Spending in South Africa   
 
Education is the single largest expenditure in South Africa with spending amounting to 
5.5 percent of GDP. (Department of Basic Education, 2010). This proportion of spending 
is extremely high by global standards. The Education For All Global Monitoring Report 
(UNESCO, 2011) provides comparable international data on education spending in 
2008
7
. In this report, South Africa had an education expenditure amounting to 5.6 percent 
of GNP and 17 percent of total government expenditure. In comparison, the sub-Saharan 
average education spending was 4.1 percent of GNP; 4.2 percent in Arab states; 4.9 
percent in Latin America and the Caribbean; 5.5 percent in North America and Western 
Europe; 3.7 percent in South and West Asia and 5.0 Central and Eastern Europe. 
Therefore, South Africa can be clearly seen to spend significantly in education.   
 
Between 2000 and 2007, the national per learner expenditure in public ordinary schools 
increased by 37% in real terms (Department of Education, 2009). In addition to subsidies, 
the South African Government also provides conditional grants to schools: the National 
School Nutrition Programme; the Recapitalisation of Further Education and Training 
(FET) Colleges and the HIV/AIDS Life Skills Education Grant. The first two are the 
applicable grants to public primary schools. The nutrition programme was introduced in 
September 1994 (initially under the Department of Health) mainly to “contribute to 
                                                 
7
 For a few countries, however, the data presented fall between 2005 and 2009 depending on availability.  
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enhanced learning capacity and school attendance” (FFC, 2006, p.25). Data on education 
spending is shown in Table 3.1 below.  
Table 3.1 Education Expenditure: 2003/04 – 2008/09 
R million 2003/04   2004/05   2005/06 
                   
Outcome 
2006/07 
 
Preliminary 
Outcome 
2007/08               2008/09     
     
Medium term estimates 
Average 
rate of 
increase 
(2003/4-
2008/9) 
Public 
Ordinary 
Education 
Of which: 
50,627 54,474 
(7.6) 
 
60,387 
(10.9) 
 
66,305 
(9.8) 
 
73,518 
 (10.9) 
 
81,502 
(10.9) 
 
 
(10.0) 
Real rate of 
increase* 
 6.2 7.5 5.2 3.7 -0.6 4.4 
Primary 
schools 
27,853 29,703 
(6.6) 
32,606 
(9.8) 
34,370 
(5.4) 
38,068 
(10.8) 
42,395 
(14.0) 
 
(9.3) 
Real rate of 
increase* 
 5.2 6.4 0.8 3.6 2.5 3.7 
Secondary 
schools 
20,922 22,651 
(8.3) 
25,242 
(11.4) 
28,133 
(11.5) 
31,032 
(10.3) 
34,251 
(10.4) 
 
(10.3) 
Real rate of 
increase* 
 6.9 8.0 6.9 3.1 -.1.1 4.8 
Other sub-
programmes 
1,852 
 
2,120 
(14.5) 
2,540 
(19.8) 
3,802 
(49.7) 
4,417 
(16.2) 
4,857 
(10.0) 
 
(22.0) 
Real rate of 
increase* 
 13.1 16.4 45.1 9.0 -1.5 16.4 
Inflation rates  1.4 3.4 4.6 7.2 11.5  
Source: Computed from National Treasury (2007) and StatsSA (CPI inflation data) 2009.  
(Annual rate of increase, percentage) 
* calculated by subtracting inflation rates (from last row) from actual rates of increase.  
 
 
Table 3.1 shows that primary schools command the majority of public ordinary education 
spending. This is consistent from 2003/04 to 2008/09. The data also shows that the rate of 
increase in public spending in primary schools is much less than secondary and other sub 
programmes. Taking inflation into account, funding for primary schools has grown by 
about 3.7 percent on average since 2003 compared with 4.8 percent in secondary and 16.4 
percent in other sub-programmes (which constitute a relatively small share of the public 
ordinary schools budget). Nonetheless, with the exception of 2006/07 when the real rate 
of increase was less than 1 percent and in 2008/09, when there was double digit inflation, 
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the Government appears to have been increasing spending in primary education in real 
terms.   
 
Fiske and Ladd (2002) and Reschovsky (2006) argue that education financing is limited 
by fiscal constraint and therefore, there continues to be inadequate levels of resources in 
schools. Based on the spending trends (as shown in table 3.1), the assertions of fiscal 
constraint is questionable as the government has been increasing resources even in real 
terms. But, one could also argue that real increases of about 4 percent are fairly 
conservative and inadequate to meet the overwhelming education demands. In fact, as 
depicted in the chart below, a review of education expenditure as a proportion of total 
government expenditure shows education funding to be fairly static since 1994.  
 
Figure 3.1 Public Education Expenditure as Share of Total Government 
Expenditure 
 
 
Source: Taylor, Fleisch and Schindler (2008) for 1994/95-2005/06 data and World Bank Development  
Indicators (2012) for 2006/07-2008/09 data.  
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The figure shows that education expenditure at national level fell from about 21 percent 
in 1994 to 16.9 percent in 2009. The high levels of spending in the first few years after 
democracy would be expected given the huge demands to reverse the deterioration of the 
education system. Taylor, Fleisch and Schindler (2008) express concern that personnel 
expenditures continue to dominate despite effort to reduce it to 80 percent of the budget. 
This is shown in Table 3.2 below.  
Table 3.2 Provincial Education Expenditure by Economic Category 
Expenditure Type 1995-6 2005-6 
Personnel Expenditure 86.9 84.3 
Transfer payment (current) 1.9 3.1 
Other (current) 9.0 8.4 
Transfer payment (capital) 1.0 - 
Other (capital) 1.3 4.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Taylor, Fleisch and Schindler (2008) 
 While the table does not give the break-down in educational programmes, it shows that 
personnel expenditure continues to be above 80 percent. The section below examines the 
trends in education spending over a medium term in the two case-study provinces.  
Education Spending in Gauteng and North West  
 
Although education spending in South Africa was stagnant over the long term (Figure 
3.1), the medium term analysis showed a real increase in expenditure (Table 3.1). In 
Gauteng and North West provinces, there is evidence of actual and planned increases in 
education spending as shown in Table 3.3 below.   
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Table 3.3 Provincial Education Budgets 
Province  2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 Real annual 
change 
between 
2007/08 and 
2010/11 
Gauteng 14,649,391 16,628,082 18,461,601 19,882,314 5.2 
North West  6,096,036 6,995,482 7,995,239 8,842,782 6.0 
Source: Wildeman and Lefko-Everett (2008) 
Table 3.3 not only shows that aggregate levels of education expenditure have been 
increasing in the two provinces but also shows that Gauteng province spends and plans to 
spend more than double that of the North West province. A review of the per learner 
spending shows that North West actually spends more per learner than Gauteng.  
Table 3.4 Per Learner Spending in Public Ordinary Schools 
Province  2005 2006 2007 
Gauteng 5,160 5,327 6,740 
North West  6,167 7,488 6,776 
National 5,075 5,549 6,201 
Source: Wildeman and Lefko-Everett (2008) 
The North West per learner spending is not only higher than Gauteng, but higher than the 
national average. This is to be expected as North West has a larger concentration of 
students from poor backgrounds proportional to Gauteng. 
Redistributive Measures in Education Finance  
 
South Africa has largely relied on fiscal measures to address redistribution. These 
measures include: real increases in overall education expenditure; weighted funding plans 
to address inter-provincial inequalities; special funding programmes such as school 
nutrition; exemption legislation to reduce direct costs of schooling and pro-poor funding 
of schools according to the resource targeting list (Jansen & Taylor, 2003). Of the above 
mentioned measures, the two most prominent reforms are the planned increases in overall 
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expenditures and the pro-poor funding through the National Norms and Standards for 
School Funding (NNSSF), which requires that provincial departments allocate funds to 
books and other school supplies in a way that favours the neediest students (in terms of 
physical condition of schools and the degree of poverty in the communities in which the 
schools are located). The provincial budgets are also meant to cater for learner materials 
such as textbooks, pencils, paper and school maintenance. Rising teacher salaries, 
however, have had the effect of crowding out expenditures on learner materials in the 
post-apartheid era (Reschovsky, 2006).   
 
The Department of Education bases the allocation of resources on national poverty 
standards (quintiles). Quintiles are categories in which schools are classified based on 
rates of unemployment, income and illiteracy within a school catchment area. Therefore, 
schools that were ranked within a lower quintile (between 1 and 3) would receive more 
subsidies as opposed to schools that are ranked in the fourth or fifth quintile; these 
schools rely through a combination of government grants and school fees.  
 
Many schools, particularly those in the higher quintiles, are not dependent on provincial 
allocations for the operation of their schools. Rather, by charging school fees, which is 
provided for in the South Africa Schools Act, schools are able to operate almost 
independently. The Act, however, stipulates that the fees must be set through a vote by 
the majority of parents with children attending the school. The decision to allow fees to 
be set in public schools remains controversial. Some feel that it perpetuates inequalities, 
while others see a necessary supplement to scarce resources and an incentive for middle 
class families to keep their children in the public school system. Nonetheless, the NNSSF 
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also stipulates that students from low income families must be granted partial or complete 
exemptions from fees. In other words, no student should be turned away because they are 
unable to pay the school fees.  
 
A number of schools based on their poverty ranking have been categorized as No-fee 
Schools. Essentially, these schools have been barred from charging tuition fees. The No-
Fee policy was adopted by Government in 2007. The aim of the policy is to give effect to 
the constitutional right to basic education and respond to the need to make education truly 
inclusive by removing the fees barrier (National Treasury, 2007). The allocation, which is 
meant to fund the expenses typically funded by school fees, is based on the poverty 
quintile. In 2009, 55.2 percent of public schools covering 41.8 percent of learners were 
classified as no-fee schools (Department of Education, 2009).
8
 The minimum allocation 
per learner is R554, though provinces are encouraged to a target of 738 per learner 
(National Treasury, 2007).    
Impact on Equity  
 
The critical question is whether the extensive redistributive measures have been able to 
address the equity concerns. The findings are mixed. According to Fiske and Ladd 
(2002), significant progress has been made towards a fairer distribution of resources 
across provinces and across schools. The authors, however, maintain that much less 
progress has been made in ensuring that schools have enough resources to meet optimal 
educational standards. Van der Berg and Burger (2002) argued that racial inequality in 
                                                 
8
 For the purposes of this study, it is worthwhile pointing out that 23 and 34 percent of public schools in the 
provinces of Gauteng and North West respectively are no-fee schools (National Treasury, 2007).  
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primary education is still a concern in post-apartheid South Africa. They noted that while 
the massive resource shift to black schools was successful in narrowing the pupil-to-
teacher ratio gap, matriculation results remained substandard and even deteriorated in the 
post-apartheid era again reinforcing the notion that increased budgetary allocations do not 
necessary translate into outcomes. The poor pass rates further translate into limited 
upward mobility of poor children into the labour force.   
 
Jansen and Taylor (2003) found that inequalities between schools persist due to the 
previous backlogs and lack of management for efficient and effective use of resources. 
The Department of Education (2003) however, argued that a reduction of 60 percent in 
education inequality illustrates the positive progress that has been made since 1994. 
According to Reschovsky (2006), differences between provinces where education is 
concerned, has been reducing even though the three provinces with historically the lowest 
levels of poverty (Gauteng, Northern Cape and Western Cape) continue to have higher 
levels of spending per pupil. Reschovsky argued that one of the reasons why these 
provinces still have higher levels of spending per pupil is that teachers in these provinces 
have higher average salaries.
9
 To clarify, salaries are set nationally, however, more 
experienced and more qualified teachers are paid higher salaries. As the Department of 
Education cannot reassign teachers across provinces, provinces with the highest 
concentration of whites tend to have more experienced and more qualified teachers.  
 
                                                 
9
 The PET survey (discussed in Chapter 6) does not corroborate this argument – at least, where Gauteng 
and North West are concerned.  
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Van der Berg (2005) maintains that redistributive measures have not had the desired 
impact on equity. He cites the following as reasons: (i) the provincial quintile 
distributions do not match the national quintile distribution; (ii) provincial budgets have 
varying amounts for recurrent spending; (iii) provinces may top slice the recurrent 
expenditure before applying the NNSSF formula and many do so on a large scale; (iv) 
data on which provinces base their ranking is often poor; and finally, (v) the poverty 
status does not necessarily match those of all their pupils.  
Impact on Quality and Outcomes   
 
Though it is acknowledged that South Africa, within a short period of time, has been able 
to transform the educational system that was race-based and highly unequal; at best, the 
jury is still out on the impact on school quality and outcomes. In the words of 
Reschovsky (2006, p.43):  
“Despite the large improvements in funding equity, many students, especially in 
rural South Africa, continue to face dilapidated schools, few, if any, textbooks and 
school supplies, and poorly trained teachers. Even in the absence of 
comprehensive data on student academic performance, it seems clear that many 
South African children do not yet have access to a constitutionally mandated 
“basic education.” Although more money alone will not guarantee an 
improvement in the quality of education, the absence of sufficient financial 
resources devoted to education almost certainly ensures that students will remain 
undereducated.”  
 
As a solution, Reschovsky recommends the scrapping of fee exemptions and awarding 
poor families with public funds such as, a needs-based scholarship or giving poor 
families additional weight in the equitable share formula.   
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In South Africa, comprehensive data on education outcomes, such as pass, repetition, 
dropout rates as well as test scores are quite scarce at the primary level. A comprehensive 
study on primary education was published in 2003. It was a study designed to gather 
baseline information on learners, schools and ultimately learning in the first 3 years of 
formal schooling (Fleisch, 2008). In the survey of some 51,000 randomly selected Grade 
3 learners, the report found that Grade 3 pupils had a very poor grasp of elementary 
statistics (30 percent average score on numeracy) and average grasp of literacy (54 
percent average score), within which the average score of reading and writing was 39 
percent (Fleisch, 2008). In 2005, the Department of Education followed up with a 
systemic evaluation of Grade 6 learners. The report found achievement scores to be very 
low, with an average score of 38 percent in language, 27 percent in mathematics and 41 
percent in natural sciences (Department of Basic Education, 2010).    
 
South Africa has also participated in 3 international surveys: (i) the Progress in 
International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) in 2006, (ii) the Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) in 2003 and the Southern and East African 
Consortium for Monitoring Education Quality (SACMEQ) in 2000 and 2007. In the 
PIRLS, South Africa had the lowest score despite the fact that 5
th
 Grade pupils were 
tested against 4
th
 Grade pupils in other countries and that 72 percent of pupils wrote the 
test in an African language (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 2009). South Africa 
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emerged with 2 standard deviations below the norm. South Africa‟s average score was 
lower than every other country assessed.
10
  
 
The TIMMS captures scores from the first year of secondary school (8
th
 Grade). The 
results are similar to the findings discussed above and reveal the extent to which 
mathematics scores lags behind when compared internationally (Mullis, Martin, & Foy 
2005). The TIMMS results showed South Africa to have the lowest scores among 47 
countries tested, including four other African countries. South Africa did not participate 
in the 2007 survey, which would have been important in determining whether progress is 
being made. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (2009) found from the analysis 
of the TIMMS study that only 1 in 40 children who started school in 1995 passed 
mathematics at the higher grade level in matric and moreover, 93 percent of the maths 
passes came from only 21 percent of the schools. The poor outcomes at the secondary 
level could also be a reflection of inadequate preparation at the primary level.   
 
The 2000 SACMEQ survey focused on Grade 6 reading and mathematics scores.
11
 Table 
3.5 below presents data on the Grade 6 learners‟ scores that were analyzed using 
computer software that applied the Rasch Model of measurement, whereby the pre-
determined mean score was 500 for the entire SACMEQ sample and the standard 
deviation was 100.   
 
                                                 
10
 It should be noted that South Africa was only one of two African countries participating. The other 
country was Morocco. There were 40 countries in total. The vast majority were European countries.  
11
 Moloi and Strauss (2005) caution that the findings have to be interpreted with caution due to the small 
sample size of 230 pupils.  
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Table 3.5 Grade 6 Learner Performance on Reading and Mathematics Tests (2000)    
 
 
Learner performance on all test items 
Reading Mathematics 
Mean SE Mean SE 
Eastern Cape 444.3 13.98 449.5 10.72 
Free State 446.4 12.43 447.7 5.99 
Gauteng 576.3 35.14 552.3 25.97 
Kwazulu Natal 517.5 21.57 510.3 17.45 
Mpumalanga 428.4 17.50 433.6 10.80 
Northern Cape 470.5 13.33 461.1 8.23 
Limpopo 437.0 19.60 446.2 18.77 
North West 428.0 9.59 419.8 10.58 
Western Cape 629.1 17.90 591.0 23.89 
South Africa  492.4 8.98 486.2 7.18 
Source: Moloi and Strauss (2005)  
The results indicate that, for South Africa as a whole, the Grade 6 learners performed 
slightly better in Reading (mean score of 492.4) than in Mathematics (mean score of 
486.2).  However, both mean scores were below the pre-determined mean Rasch score of 
500 for the SACMEQ countries, which shows that math and reading scores are below 
standard for a typical student in the SACMEQ region. In three provinces – Western Cape, 
Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal – the scores exceeded the overall mean of 500 for both 
Reading and Mathematics.  The lowest mean Rasch scores were obtained by Grade 6 
learners from Mpumalanga – 428.4 for Reading and 433.6 for Mathematics – and from 
North West where the scores were 428.0 for Reading and 419.8 for Mathematics. 
Gauteng and North West – the case study provinces – are highlighted in Table 3.6 to 
show the wide gap in achievements. The results from all three comparative tests are clear. 
South Africa lags behind internationally and regionally. It fares worse than countries with 
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only a fraction of its GDP and education expenditure. Moreover, within the country, there 
are regional disparities in performance.  
 
A review of the education system by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2008) provides important insights into the state of educational 
quality in South Africa. The report essentially finds that levels of achievement especially 
in numeracy and literacy are still very poor; school infrastructure backlogs are huge; the 
shortage of teachers is growing; many teachers are ill-prepared to teach the grades they 
are assigned to teach; many student governing bodies in former disadvantaged schools 
perform poorly and the cost of education for most households has dramatically increased 
since 1994. The same report however, acknowledges that some improvements have been 
made in terms of quality as evidenced by national initiatives such as bursaries for teacher 
training and the “Dinaledi” project which aims to improve maths and science pass rates in 
a limited number of schools. Ultimately, quantifiable progress in education is manifested 
in increasing expenditure and improved gross enrolment ratios. The quality of education 
however, remains a key challenge.  
 
Taylor, Fleisch and Schindler (2008) in their review of education in the past 15 years, 
examine the roots of poor quality of schooling in South Africa. Explanations offered 
include: the rapid expansion of the system, which has resulted in large numbers of poor 
quality institutions; systemic inefficiency, for example, the inability of some provinces to 
spend their budgets; substandard quality of teachers, whereby a 2004 assessment of 
Grade 3 teachers drawn from 24 primary schools, revealed an average score of 67 percent 
for maths and 55 percent for language (see also DBSA 2009); high levels of teacher 
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absenteeism, inadequate time allocated to reading and lack of teacher interest in using 
available books when teaching; and finally, lack of appropriate government interventions 
to address quality, as its focus has not evolved from racial inclusiveness.  
3.5 Governance of Schools  
Introduction  
 
The South Africa Schools Act (SASA) of 1996 is the main legislation governing schools. 
The Act, in accordance with the Constitution, provides for a national system of schools, 
including private and public schools, free and compulsory education up to Grade 9 (or 15 
years) and the prohibition of racial discrimination, among others. In consultation with the 
Minister of Finance, the Council of Education Ministers and the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission (FFC), the Minister of Education sets the norms and standards for the 
funding of public schools. The Act calls for each school to have a Governing Body 
(including parents and educators) which advises the provincial department for education 
on various matters such as appointment of educators; oversees the procurement 
management of school facilities and finds means of supplementing resources from the 
central government. In this arrangement, communities are obliged by law to actively 
participate in the affairs of the schools.  
The School Governing Body 
 
SASA prescribes that parents should form the majority of the School Governing Body 
(SGB) and that the SGB must include the principal and elected representatives of 
educators and support staff. The overarching purpose of the SGB is to allow for a 
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democratic and all inclusive approach to the governance of schools. The mandatory 
functions of school governing bodies can be demarcated as follows (Joubert, 2005): 
 
 Policy matters (adopting a Constitution, mission statement, admissions language, 
religious observances, code of conduct for learners, financial policy, 
recommendation of appointments) 
 Day-to-day matters (determining the times of the school day, support for the 
principal, educators and other staff members, the administration and control of the 
school‟s property, buildings and grounds) 
 Financial matters (establish a school fund, prepare a budget, collect and 
administer school fees, financial records, appoint an accountant, supplementing 
resources). 
 
The 1996 South African Schools Act (SASA) categorises public schools into two types: 
section 21 and non-section 21 (also called section 20 schools). The latter are schools that 
lack capacity and rely on the Department to handle some of the financial and managerial 
functions of the school. These schools will be discussed later in the chapter under the role 
of provinces and districts. The former are largely self-reliant and possess the capacity to 
manage the finances of the school. According to SASA, schools on the section 21 list 
receive a lump-sum per learner as subsidies and are accountable for their expenditures. If 
a school's bills for these services or items are lower than the lump-sum transfer, the SGB 
may allocate the transferred amount to the purchase of other education-related items such 
as maintaining and improving the school‟s property, buildings and grounds, purchasing 
textbooks and other educational materials and equipment, paying for services to the 
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school and providing adult basic education or other training classes. SGBs have 
authorisation to deal directly with suppliers and contractors for the relevant budgeted 
items in accordance with standard procurement procedures.  
Effectiveness of the School Governing Body 
 
There have been a number of assessments of SGBs conducted by academics, government 
and independent research organizations. The reviews on the whole agree that SGBs are 
important to educational governance and that their capacity must be continually enhanced 
in order to make them fully effective. In one such report, Joubert (2005) stated that some 
of the challenges that SGBs typically encounter include: issues of accountability, lack of 
a shared vision, the composition and structure of SGBs and lack of clearly defined goals. 
Joubert‟s review of literature on the effectiveness of SGBs further indicated that some 
parents‟ inability to communicate in certain languages as well as their 
educational/literacy levels compromised the effectiveness of SGBs and that SGB 
members require a basic training in financial management, fundraising and budgeting, yet 
these skills were sometimes lacking.  
 
In assessing SGBs (representing a sample of 252 schools) across South Africa, Pereira 
and Roberts (2003) found that while many schools have begun to successfully implement 
the SASA where governance is concerned, a high number of schools lagged behind. 
Pereira and Roberts found that the vast majority of public schools had elected SGBs, 
which were properly constituted but, the issue of governing body composition mirroring 
the learner population remained problematic. For example, black parents and women in 
general were underrepresented.  
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In terms of discharging its mandatory functions, Pereira and Roberts found SGBs to be 
functioning fairly well in terms of holding meetings, at least once a term and keeping 
records (minutes) of the meetings. In terms of financial management, all the schools were 
found to be compliant. For instance, all had budgets and bank accounts and could present 
audited reports at the Annual General Assembly Meeting (AGM). In communities of high 
illiteracy, financial management is often delegated to the principal. This was a key 
finding in one region in the North West province by Pereira and Roberts, whereby an 
interview with the District Director revealed instances where there have been problems of 
financial accountability on the part of SGBs. The District Director however, noted that 
these cases warrant investigations and SGB members may be liable to account for 
financial mismanagement. On the whole, Pereira and Roberts found the perceived 
strengths of SGBs to include the infusion of positive values and technical leadership in 
education management as well as community involvement. Perceived weaknesses include 
skills deficits, apathy and other contextual limitations.  
Role of Parent-Teacher Associations in School Governance  
 
The 1996 SASA does not make any provision for Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) in 
the public school system. It is therefore not surprising that most schools no longer have 
this body. Prior to 1994, Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs) existed in 
township schools as part of a broad-based resistance to apartheid, while in historically 
white schools, Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) offered parents opportunities mainly 
to fundraise and minimally to set school direction (Pereira and Roberts, 2003). In the new 
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political dispensation, schools governance were transformed and mainstreamed to ensure 
a minimal standard for educational governance.  
 
Pereira and Roberts found that as many as 24 percent of the schools surveyed, considered 
PTAs as an important structure, which operated alongside the SGBs. The authors found 
this to be an issue of concern as they felt that PTAs should have discontinued in light of 
the introduction of SGBs. The authors however, did not elaborate on potential or actual 
impacts that PTAs have on educational quality and whether or how they complement 
SGBs.   
Role of Provinces and Districts in School Governance  
 
Provincial Departments of Education are responsible for implementing educational 
policies established by the central government. According to the South African Schools 
Act (SASA), each provincial education department (PED) must develop a “section 21 
list” of schools that have been allocated functions and a list of schools that are not yet 
section 21 schools. The lists must also be revised each year. The SASA envisages that the 
section 21 list will grow as more schools acquire the requisite capacity. The SASA 
stipulates further that a school may be removed from the list if the governing body proves 
unable to undertake the additional functions, as provided in section 22 of the Act. 
 
Provinces and districts are largely responsible for the management of non-section 21 
schools. These are schools that have not been granted approval to procure their own 
goods and services and therefore have to procure their goods and services through 
existing departmental arrangements. The PED exercises administrative controls to ensure 
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that spending is within the budget. PEDs allocate recurrent funds to the following cost 
items: learning materials, maintenance and administrative costs, in accordance with the 
provisions of SASA. Even though PEDs manage the finances and procurement for 
section 21 schools, these schools are provided with a “paper” budget (not actual 
allocations) to help them  understand actual costs of running their schools and to improve 
their capacity to join the section 21 list in the future.  
 
Districts also play an important role in the delivery of services in primary and secondary 
education and fostering educational governance. Interestingly, there is no legislation that 
covers districts directly as district officers are created by provincial departments as part of 
their approved structures (Department of Education, 2006). Subsequently, it is important 
to note that district education offices are merely a deconcentration of the provincial 
education offices and references to PEDs may also include the districts. Typically, district 
offices are staffed by a Chief Director (in charge of corporate services); a Deputy 
Director (in charge of areas such as budget planning, human resources and procurement); 
a Directorate for professional and auxiliary services such as curriculum and sports and 
other administrative support.  
 
Within the directorate for professional services, there are Institutional Development and 
Support Officers (IDSOs) whose duties are to promote the implementation of policies 
through overall institutional development, support and training programmes (Aheer, 
2006). These duties specifically include: facilitating SGBs and school management teams 
as well as monitoring and assessing their performance; collecting and maintaining 
information on institutional and district demographics; helping to establish financial and 
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administrative management systems at schools; building and promoting a culture of 
teaching and learning and redressing historical imbalances. In Arhee‟s (2006) study, she 
concluded that the effectiveness of IDSOs in providing support to schools was being 
hampered by inadequate leadership and management skills such as, conflict resolutions 
skills; involving communities in the activities of the schools and a lack of a clearly 
defining job description for IDSOs.  
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a broad contextual overview of public expenditure 
management and primary education in South Africa. It showed that the legacy of 
apartheid in South Africa resulted in the need for extensive governance reforms, which 
the country boldly embarked on. In the education sector, the impact of the reforms 
appears to be mixed. On the one hand, measures have been taken to correct the historical 
racial imbalance and regional inequities; increasing investments have been in the 
education sector and structures such as school governing bodies have been established in 
order to involve communities in the education process. Conversely, evaluative studies 
have found persisting racial inequalities; inadequate resources needed for optimal 
education outcomes; low quality of education in general and some shortcomings in the 
strengths and effectiveness of SGBs.  
 
This chapter has presented a factual analysis that provides the reader with some 
background information on PEM and education outcomes in South Africa. It suggests 
that PEM reforms are having mixed results on the quality and outcomes of education. In 
Chapters 7 and 8, I address the central thesis question – are PEM reforms having the 
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envisaged impact on education outcomes? The analysis is premised on a theoretical 
framework that is presented in the next chapter.      
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The theoretical framework discussed in this chapter is ultimately intended to explain the 
important interrelationships between public expenditure management-related inputs and 
good education outcomes. The discussion to a large extent relies on education production 
function (EPF) models, notwithstanding its methodological limitations (see section 4.2). 
Nonetheless, the persistent gap in appropriate frameworks for estimating education 
outcomes and the prevalent application of EPFs in the economics of education literature 
warrants this study to build its framework from the EPF literature. The resultant 
framework however, incorporates lessons from other social science disciplines, including 
education management, public administration and political science.    
 
This chapter begins with a discussion on education production functions and the 
methodological issues concerning the estimation of education outcomes. From this 
discussion, the author develops a framework that shows the linkages between public 
expenditure management (PEM) and education outcomes. It is important to mention that 
even though the study relies on EPF literature for conceptual guidance, the aim of this 
study is not to determine all the key inputs that matter for good education outcomes but to 
examine whether PEM is significant in explaining education outcomes. Therefore, this 
chapter also gives attention to methodological considerations in exploring underlying 
relationships between education inputs and outcomes.    
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4.2 Education Production Functions  
Introduction to EPFs  
 
Several of the empirical studies that have sought to explain education outcomes argue 
that outcomes are shaped by the behaviour of parents and community members and 
socio-economic backgrounds. In that regard, Behrman (1996) advocates models that 
control for parental characteristics that co-determine parents‟ direct influence on their 
children‟s learning productivity and labour market outcomes as well controlling for 
indirect influences on the types of communities in which children grow up and the 
schools they attend. Certainly, a more complete understanding of the interacting 
behavioural relationships that determine school outcomes would be invaluable in our 
understanding of the determinants of education outcomes. This further implies that 
insights from educational psychology and the sociology of education, which have studied 
the determinants of education outcomes before the more recent interests of economists, 
have an essential role to play (Boissiere, 2004).  
 
Examining both supply and demand factors in the determination of education outcomes is 
said to provide a more comprehensive framework for assessment. Households are usually 
modelled on the demand side and schools as production units on the supply side. 
Households demand education because of its social, cultural and economic benefits. 
Demand for education will depend on inter alia direct and indirect costs, school quality, 
perceived outcomes and access to schools. Schools can be treated analytically as 
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production units on the supply side, but with few exceptions, they are not profit 
maximising firms, which leads to the issue of how to treat them in a theoretic economic 
model (Boissiere, 2004). Thinking of schools as producers of education services naturally 
leads to the application of production functions as often used in microeconomic theory. 
Pritchett and Filmer (1999) note that the appropriate modification needed in the education 
context is to treat schools like organisations that try to maximise output, for example 
learning in a variety of areas, subject to budget constraints. This mathematical 
relationship between inputs and education outputs is referred to as education production 
functions. 
 
Production functions refer to explicit mathematical equation between inputs and 
outcomes and an econometric strategy for estimating those relationships (Boissiere, 
2004). The significance of these strengths is investigated through multiple regression 
analysis and other sophisticated econometric methods that deal with problems of biased 
estimates.
12
 Education Production Function (EPFs) are therefore based on the idea that: 
„school education can be represented as a production process whereby a vector of 
inputs, comprising pupils‟ innate ability, initial achievement level and various 
characteristics of the schools they attend (usually teachers‟ education, training, 
experience, salaries, pupil-to-teacher ratio and learning materials) is transformed 
into a vector of outputs, usually cognitive achievement, most frequently measured 
by test scores in language, mathematics and science‟ (Leclercq, 2005, p.15).  
 
EPFs have generally risen in response to the need to guide policy makers by identifying 
which policy-controlled inputs have a high marginal impact on education outcomes.   
 
                                                 
12
 The empirical estimation methods tend to be parametric methods in that, they require assumptions about 
the functional form of mapping inputs into outputs and the error process for that formulation (Vignoles et 
al., 2000).   
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Glewwe and Kremer (2005) propose the following production function as a 
methodological framework for an educational outcome: A = a(S, Q, C, H, I), whereby A 
is the skills learned (achievement); S is years of schooling; Q is a vector of school and 
teacher characteristics (quality), C is a vector of child characteristics (including innate 
ability), H is a vector of household characteristics and I is a vector of school inputs under 
the control of parents, such as children‟s daily attendance and the purchase of textbooks 
and other school supplies. Using regression techniques, many empirical studies have 
sought to test the assumption that greater quantities of explanatory variables, such as 
those expressed in the above equation will translate into greater learning outcomes.  
 
However, EPF studies have received some criticism. According to Deller and Rudnicki 
(1993), there are three core reasons why EPF literature has failed to identify the perceived 
relationship between key policy variables and student outcomes. The first questions the 
validity of the EPF framework as often variables that may not fit into the conceptual 
framework are included in the empirical analysis. Secondly, it is plausible that public 
policy does not have any measurable effect on student achievement. This argument is 
aligned with research carried out by Hanushek and others where family influences 
dominate in the educational production process. The third shortfall relates to the 
efficiency of the production process. That is, production function describes the maximum 
feasible output, given assorted input combinations. If the maximum output is not realised, 
then the school can be deemed economically inefficient. Therefore, there is an 
implication that resources are used to their fullest for efficiency to be realised. But, in 
reality, there could be inefficiencies in the data which means that conclusions drawn from 
such empirical models may be in error.  
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EPF studies also fail to capture critical qualitative details such as the cognitive process in 
the classroom that contribute to education outcomes. These salient aspects are often 
treated as a “black box” in the input-out methodology of EPF studies. According to 
Hanushek (1981), this is a serious problem for two reasons: (i) policies based on these 
studies may fail because they may not take into account the institutional factors important 
in implementing any change, (ii) variations in these other factors such as process choices 
or legal requirements may dominate the input-output relationship. The treatment of 
important issues as black boxes is also relevant to regression models as discussed below.    
Use of Regression Models in Education Production  
 
Regression models are the most commonly used methods to ascertain whether increased 
education inputs results in increased education outcomes. In most regression analysis, a 
single education input is regressed against various explanatory variables or inputs. It is 
assumed that greater quantity of certain inputs will translate into higher output, although 
the mechanism by which this happens is usually unknown and often treated as a black 
box. The earliest studies according to Vignoles et al (2000) often lacked specific data on 
school characteristics and therefore attempted to measure the magnitude of any schooling 
effect by modelling a set of dummy variables to measure the separate effect of each 
school in a standard regression of outcomes. Researchers then progressed from 
identifying school effects to analysing the effects of specific inputs such as family 
background and education expenditure. Nonetheless, empirical work has not brought 
about consensus on the specific inputs and outputs of importance in education (Vignoles 
et al, 2000).  
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Regression techniques on the whole, are riddled with methodological constraints. Mainly, 
institutions supplying and surrounding education have been treated as black boxes, 
especially schools and political bodies that finance education (Hoenack, 1996).  
Moreover, the typical EPF model tends to suffer from endogeneity. There tend to be 
unobserved variables which explain both the dependent and the explanatory variables, 
leading to a confusion of the true causal impact of the latter on the former (Leclerq, 
2005). These problems of course are typical in quantitative economics and are often 
corrected through instrumental variables (discussed later in this section).  
 
There are two specific sources of endogeneity that tend to characterise the education 
literature (Leclerq, 2005). One is selective migration or self-sorting, where parents can 
choose the schools their children attend on the basis of its resources. Therefore schools 
with more resources end up having pupils with more favourable family backgrounds. 
Similarly, better teachers may want to teach in schools where students are better. This 
leads to an overestimation of the impact of resources on outcomes and therefore an OLS 
estimation will be biased. „Purposive programme placement‟ is the second problem. This 
is where educational resources are from a policy standpoint targeted to weaker or 
disadvantaged schools (Leclerq, 2005). Therefore schools with more resources may tend 
to have weaker outcomes leading to an underestimation of the true causal parameter. 
These two sources of endogeneity are important considerations for this study and 
addressed in the methodology chapter.    
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Aggregation bias is increasingly being recognised as a problem in regression models that 
estimate education outcomes. Education production functions are estimated at various 
levels of aggregation such as, across individuals, schools, school districts or the 
equivalent geographic regions or countries (Fertig & Wright, 2004). The aggregation bias 
concerns are two-fold. The first pertains to studies that mix the levels at which variables 
are measured in the same study. For example, some studies make conclusions about pupil 
attainment, which is measured at individual (pupil) level, while using school quality data 
measured at a higher aggregation level, for instance, at district or national levels in the 
same model. Therefore, the bias arises when the different levels of aggregations 
(aggregated levels and disaggregated levels) are interacted (Fertig & Wright, 2004; 
Hanushek, Rivkin & Taylor, 1996). This problem is most pervasive in resource variables 
which are often only available at an administrative level that includes a large number of 
schools and therefore do not reflect the actual resources experienced by pupils, if the 
intention is to make conclusions at the pupil level (Leclerq (2005).   
 
The second concern pertains to the over-use of higher levels of aggregations in the 
literature. Findings have shown that high levels aggregation, for instance using multiple-
state samples rather than state level data in the US (Hanushek, Rivkin & Taylor, 1996) 
increases the probability of positive and significant estimates. In lower levels of 
aggregation, for example at school and pupil level, Fertig and Wright (2004) found that 
the probability of positive and significant estimates of resources on outcomes decreases. 
The ensuing danger in using aggregate data is increased omission biases, which was 
recognised as a problem in the Coleman report and later discredited as a result 
(Rumberger & Palardy, 2003). Therefore, it would be important for this study to (i) be 
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consistent in the units of analysis or use alternative models that are discussed in the next 
section and (ii) be cognisant of the power of analysis at the level of aggregation applied 
in the study.     
  
In general, EPFs are limited in the theoretical frameworks, inadequacy of available data 
and omission bias (Leclerq, 2005). All of these lead to model misspecification. According 
to Leclerq, the linear function form is also often used out of convenience although there 
is evidence of non-linearities when other regression techniques are used. The 
methodological issues raised lend evidence to the fact that the reliability of EPF studies 
are mixed depending on the specification, quality of data and the rigour in statistical and 
econometric analyses. Alternative methods are discussed below.      
Alternative Methods for estimating Education outcomes  
 
Given the constraints to EPF and regression techniques as discussed above, economists 
have begun to appreciate better the effects of school organisations and public educational 
priorities on education outcomes, which also speak to the need to broaden existing 
analytical frameworks that explain learning outcomes. Hoenack (1996) argues that the 
black boxes of administrative structure and political bodies that make decisions about 
variables affecting education are equally important, especially in the development of 
policies when important parental and community influences on human capital 
development are missing. Furthermore, in light of the shortcomings of the regression 
models, it is imperative to examine alternative or complementary models.   
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As previously established, some research findings show that an individual‟s innate 
abilities, socio-economic status and other non-schooling inputs such as the effectiveness 
of district education authorities, can explain learning outcomes. Isolating the effects of 
these variables can help to overcome the endogeneity problem. Value-added models help 
to improve the regression approach by including these variables so as to level the playing 
field at the time of school entry (Vignoles et al., 2000). The impact of additional 
schooling can then be measured separately from these other factors. The dependent 
variable would then have to be a change in test results over a set period of schooling. 
Vignoles et al. (2000) note that the value-added model improves vastly on single equation 
education production function models, though it by itself is not enough to overcome the 
endogeneity problem. In other words, even after controlling for initial ability and other 
non-school inputs, per learner expenditure may still be related to family background.   
 
An alternative approach is the simultaneous equation model and the use of instrumental 
variables. According to Vignoles et al. (2000, p.6), “in the simultaneous equations 
approach, the structural relationships are made explicit and form a system of equations 
that permit the untangling of structural associations between multiple inputs and outputs”. 
In other words, it can allow for the identification of both the impact of the various factors 
that influence the level and mix of educational inputs and the effect of these inputs on 
education outcomes. The main drawback pertains to identification (Vignoles et al., 2000). 
That is, to solve the equation system, the researcher must find a factor that influences the 
level of educational input for example, resources without also influencing outcomes. This 
is where another method – instrumental variables – becomes important.  
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Instrumental variables (IVs) are variables that are uncorrelated with the unobserved 
variables and determine the dependent variable only through their impact on the 
explanatory variable. It may be a more practical approach than the simultaneous 
equations model in that it requires just the identification of such instruments rather than 
specifying the full set of equations complete with feedback mechanisms between the 
dependent variables. Although, IVs have been used with some success to address the 
problem of endogeneity, they also have their limitations. For instance, identifying these 
variables and credibly arguing that they are uncorrelated with unobservable determinants 
of expenditures and outcomes is a major challenge.  
 
Hierarchal linear modelling (HLM) (or multi-level models) is an alternative statistical 
technique designed to address the problem of aggregation and disaggregation bias 
discussed earlier. It stems from the understanding that the school system is inherently a 
multi-level or nested phenomenon in which activities at one level are influenced by those 
at a higher level (Rumberger and Palardy, 2003). HLM is a regression method that 
models the nesting of pupils within schools and shows the varied effects of individual 
schools on pupil outcomes, and in doing so, offers benefits beyond OLS models (Van der 
Berg, 2008). Similar to OLS models, they make assumptions around the parameters of 
the data such as a linear relationship and the explanatory variables not being related with 
each other.     
 
Finally, randomised or experimental trials are increasingly being seen as the most 
effective way of evading the endogeneity problem. A carefully planned experiment 
cannot eliminate endogeneity issues altogether but can significantly reduce it as the 
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subjects and the environment are within great measure of control. There are some pitfalls, 
however. Firstly, it is a costly undertaking. Secondly, as with all social science 
experiments, it may raise ethical issues (Vignoles et al, 2000). There are also risks of 
“Hawthorne” effects whereby subjects involved in the experiment are generally aware of 
it and this may alter their behaviour (Vignoles et al., 2000).  
Conclusion   
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that model specification poses a real difficulty in 
estimating education outcomes. This is compounded by a lack of an established 
theoretical model that is widely accepted in the field. Despite its shortcomings, multiple 
regressions have been dominant, especially as alternative methods are not without 
challenges. In the end, an appropriate model would require a good data, be well specified 
and employ rigorous statistical techniques. This proposed model is presented in Chapter 5 
based on a theoretical framework that fits within the objective of the study, which is to 
examine the strengths of PEM in explaining education outcomes. This framework is 
discussed in the next section.      
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4.3 Proposed Theoretical Model of PEM and Education outcomes 
 
By incorporating elements from EPF frameworks discussed in the previous section and 
considering the objectives of this particular study, in this section, a theoretical framework 
for assessing the relationship between PEM and education outcomes is proposed. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. 
 
Figure 4.1 A Model for illustrating the Relationship between PEM and Education 
Outcomes 
 
          PEM                             EDUC OUTCOMES      SCHOOL AND 
     NON-SCHOOL INPUTS 
 
 
Figure 4.1 above illustrates the various factors that affect education outcomes. It isolates 
PEM on one side, showing how government can independently enhance education by 
executing their statutory functions. It also isolates non-PEM variables on the other side 
that have been shown in various studies to impact education outcomes. The non-PEM 
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variables are divided into two. One category involves factors within the remit of the 
school and the second category pertains to external factors involving the community and 
the students‟ background. The main task of this study is to assess the strength of PEM in 
fostering education outcomes, while controlling for school and non-school inputs.  
 
The review of EPF literature revealed that model specification is a fundamental problem 
in these studies. It is therefore important that the variables (inputs) selected be clearly 
justified. The risk of selecting variables that may not be a good fit is that all the variation 
will be captured in the error term of the regression model. In what follows below, 
theoretical justifications are offered to justify the importance of PEM variables in 
education outcomes.  
Theoretical Mechanisms by which Technical Efficiency affects Education 
Outcomes 
 
Technical efficiency, simply put, is the effectiveness by which a set of inputs are used to 
produce outputs. It refers to the capacity of line agencies to use allocated resources in a 
manner that ensures an efficient and effective delivery of public goods and services. 
Technical efficiency should result in reliable and predictable delivery of budgetary 
resources to spending units as well as timely external audit. Therefore, a technically 
efficient government should inter alia: be performance-orientated; be able to remit funds 
to schools on time; ensure that all funds leaving the central government reach the 
intended beneficiaries; schedule supervisory visits to schools and ensure that they remain 
accountable by publishing and regularly auditing their accounts. The question therefore is 
how do these PEM qualities theoretically result in education outcomes? These are dealt 
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with in two parts. The first part focuses on technical efficiency (leakages, delays and 
accountability) and the second part focuses on allocative efficiency (education 
expenditure).  
 
Technical Efficiency: Leakage and Outcomes 
In the ideal flow chain, a hundred percent of funds leaving the central government will 
reach the intended beneficiaries – schools. As described in the literature review chapter, 
this seldom happens in many developing countries. In the absence of proper checks and 
balances or sound public financial management, money is leaked at various levels for 
instance, at the provincial department of education or the district education office. The 
remainder reaches the schools, many of whom are not aware of the amount they are 
supposed to receive in the first place. The question then is how does leakage adversely 
impact education outcomes?  
 
In addressing this question, there are two issues to keep in mind. For one, leakage could 
impact education outcomes simply through reduced spending or insufficient resources 
needed for educational development. Therefore, mechanisms explaining this link would 
focus on the effect of total public education resources on education and the effect of 
allocative decisions on education outcomes. This is explored in the allocative efficiency 
section. Secondly, leakage in most findings is attributed to corruption. Therefore, the 
theoretical mechanisms by which corruption potentially affects social services such as 
education will have to be expounded upon.  
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Corruption  
 
There are a number of studies that have examined the impact of corruption on social 
services (see for instance, Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, Mauro, 1998, Kaufmann, 
Montorriol-Garriga and Recanatini, 2008, Shleifer and Vishn, 1993, Bearse, Gloom and 
Janeba, 2000, Ehrlich and Lui, 1999). These studies offer insights into the underlying 
mechanisms by which leakage (corruption) impacts education outcomes. In Gupta, 
Davoodi and Tiongson‟s (2000) study, they argue that from a review of available studies, 
there are three channels through which corruption adversely impacts social service 
delivery. First, it can drive up the price and lower the level of government output and 
services. Secondly, it can reduce investments in human capital and thirdly, it reduces 
government revenue, which can in turn lower the quality of publically provided services.  
 
In other words, misappropriation of education funds by government officials could drive 
up the price of education. This is a transfer of costs to parents as fee-charging schools 
may have to raise their fees given the shortage of funds. For low-income parents, this 
would be a form of regressive tax as it absorbs a greater share of income than wealthier 
parents. Furthermore, for parents who cannot afford to pay, they can be discouraged and 
subsequently remove their children from the school
13
 (see for instance, Kaufmann, 
Montorriol-Garriga & Recanatini, 2008, who confirm this occurrence by finding in their 
research that corruption (in the form of bribery) discourages low-income users from 
seeking the public service). These linkages are captured in Figure 4.3 below. 
 
                                                 
13
 In theory, these parents are entitled to apply for exemption. Some findings have shown however, that 
schools or specifically, the SGBs, do not grant these exemptions (see also APRM 2007 Report on the 
Country Review of South Africa). 
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Figure 4.2: A Model for illustrating the Relationship between Corruption and 
Education Outcomes 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leakage of public funding also add an additional burden to the school governing bodies 
(SGBs) who have to intensify fund raising efforts possibly at the expense of other 
functions and it also may also serve as a disincentive to schools to provide students with 
the best possible education, that is funding is highly inconsistent and unreliable. Given 
the above discussions, leakage could have serious implications for education in South 
Africa and therefore should be isolated in the theoretical model explaining education 
outcomes.      
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Technical inefficiency that results in delays in remitting funds to schools potentially 
affects the school‟s ability to plan effectively for the academic year. Delays and 
bottlenecks in the allocation of resources through public administrations (for example, 
salaries, allowances, financing and materials) have been identified in tracking surveys as 
serious problems affecting quality of services and staff morale (Gauthier, 2006). In the 
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case of South Africa, SGBs may not be able to hire extra teachers at the start of the year 
due to lack of funds. The school management may not be able to invest in additional 
resources, such as textbooks, if the materials allocated should fall short of the required 
needs. A technically efficient district education office should be able to provide time and 
adequate technical support to all schools within the district. Lack of adequate staff 
members or vehicles could impede technical efficiency, in which case, some schools 
would not get the technical support as needed.  
 
Accountability implies that the government has a duty to explain and justify the ways in 
which they have used public resources at their disposal (Heald, 1983). It forces positive 
behaviour. For instance, it will ensure that district education offices use their resources 
effectively and efficiently, knowing that there will be consequences, if they do not. The 
figure below illustrates the mechanisms by which the various components of technical 
efficiency convert to education outcomes.  
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Figure 4.3 A Model for illustrating the Relationship between Technical Efficiency 
and Education Outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical Mechanisms by which Allocative Efficiency affects Education 
Outcomes 
 
As discussed in the literature review, the question of whether resources are important for 
education outcomes has been a subject of long-standing debate. This debate is really 
about the impact of additional resources assuming that schools already have minimal 
resources to function. In the developing country context, where the minimal level of 
facilities such as, playgrounds and running water remains scarce, resources could play a 
vital role. In this case, the input-output processes and EPF provide the framework by 
which resources are translated into outcomes.  
 
It is widely accepted in economic theory that a set of inputs (capital and labour) are 
required in producing some specific output. Schools therefore need qualified teachers, 
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to educate pupils. All of these inputs are school resources and are needed to enhance 
learning skills despite pupil‟s innate abilities and socio-economic backgrounds. The 
application of allocative efficiency to education implies that public resources should be 
sufficiently provided and used where it will be most effective in promoting the education 
goals. In other words, it requires (i) defining the goals of the resources, for example,  
expanding enrolment or improving learning outcomes and (ii) determining how resources 
will be allocated within the sector in order to have the greatest impact in achieving these 
goals (Fredriksen, 2008). Whereas, technical efficiency is concerned with effectiveness of 
translating inputs to outputs, allocative efficiency takes into account whether the inputs 
are the best inputs to produce the outputs. The model assumes that allocative efficiency – 
basically, the adequacy of resources and the channelling of the same to activities that 
yield the highest impact – potentially results in improved education outcomes. This is 
illustrated in the figure below.  
 
Figure 4.4 A Model for illustrating the Relationship between Allocative Efficiency 
and Education Outcomes 
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4.4 Conclusion   
This chapter has discussed the theoretical premise that underpins the relationship between 
public expenditure management (PEM) and education outcomes. It began by explaining 
the results chain framework for education outcomes then proceeded to a discussion on the 
theoretical steps to estimating education outcomes. As an appropriate framework for 
examining the relationship between PEM and education outcomes is virtually non-
existent, the study relied mainly on education production functions. Subsequently, the 
author proposed a theoretical framework that incorporated existing frameworks. The 
chapter also discussed empirical models that guide the methodological approach 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This study uses two micro-level surveys: a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) 
and a Quantitative Service Delivery Survey (QSDS) to systematically analyse the 
effectiveness of the public expenditure management system in improving education 
outcomes in two provinces in South Africa. It is the preferred instrument in this study 
because of the precision with which it “tracks” the flow of resources from the source to 
the end-user. It also allows for the collection of a comprehensive dataset on expenditure 
and issues around service delivery. The PETS and QSDS go beyond normal public 
expenditure reviews, which examine the composition of spending and sectoral 
allocations. They are tools that measure, quantitatively, provider incentives and 
behaviours and also allow lessons to be learned about the way spending is transformed 
into services (Dehn, Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). 
 
The Fiscal Incidence Analysis, also known as Benefit Incidence Analysis is often used in 
similar studies. This methodology however, has limitations in terms of ignoring 
behavioural responses and relying on the cost of provision as a proxy for benefits 
received (Van de Walle, 1995). It is also said to be a more effective instrument for 
analysing policies that generate benefits in the short term, such as an education subsidy. 
This particular study requires a framework that can allow for both institutional and 
quantitative analyses. Therefore, the two complementary micro-level surveys are the 
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most appropriate instruments for assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
expenditure management structures and the impact these have on education outcomes.  
5.2 Research Design: Survey Instruments  
Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) and Quantitative Service 
Delivery Survey (QSDS) 
 
The PETS is used to track the flow of resources in order to determine how much of the 
original allocation reaches the intended end-users (for instance from central government 
to schools). While similar to qualitative surveys such as perception of consumers on 
service delivery, this instrument is more rigorous because it is able to capture and 
quantify leakage of funds and problems in the deployment of human and in-kind 
resources to schools such as staff and textbooks (Dehn, Reinikka & Svensson, 2003). The 
PETS collects data at different levels: from service providers (such as schools), local 
government, central government and other sources of data. Several sources are relied 
upon because an individual agent may keep poor records or even misreport accurate data. 
Therefore, the strategy serves to cross-validate information obtained separately from 
different sources. The PETS can also be used as a diagnostic tool: ascertaining why 
certain problems are occurring and how they can be solved.   
 
The QSDS examines the efficiency of public spending and other dimensions of service 
delivery. It allows for the collection of data from schools on inputs (for example, teachers 
and books), outputs (for instance, enrolment and pass rates), school quality (for example, 
number of certified teachers) and more. It is also used at the local government level to 
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assess their operational efficiency by collecting data on issues such as human resource 
capacity, facility and accountability arrangements.  
 
The tracking surveys are developed according to the following stages: (i) identification of 
scope, purpose and actors; (ii) design of questionnaires; (iii) sampling; (iv) execution of 
survey and (v) data analysis. Ultimately, the micro-level surveys show how effective 
resources reach educational facilities and whether the resources are efficiently utilised. 
The surveys also determine whether the governance reforms have allowed for resources 
to be directed where they are needed most.      
 
In this study, the PETS-QSDS were applied at two levels: primary schools and district 
education offices. Therefore, there were two distinct questionnaires used in this study 
(see annexes 2 and 3 for the full questionnaires).
 14
 For the primary schools survey, the 
Head Teacher was the main respondent. A deputy head teacher was an alternative 
respondent as these two individuals are best placed to have a global view of the affairs of 
the school. In the rare event that these two educators were not available, either a long 
standing teacher or senior administrator was interviewed. The district survey was 
designed to have the District Director as the main respondent with allowance for the 
heads of various units to complete relevant parts of the questionnaires. Each of these two 
surveys are briefly elaborated upon below.   
                                                 
14
 A third survey was designed for provincial authorities but neither Superintendent Generals in Gauteng 
and North West granted an interview. Therefore, this level of analysis was not incorporated in the study.  
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Primary Schools Survey 
There were 10 sections in this survey (see appendix 1). The first part dealt with 
identification. Here, data were collected on basic information about the school, for 
example, its geographic location, number of students, whether it was a no-fee or fee-
charging school and the school‟s poverty quintile ranking. Section 2 dealt with student 
outcome indicators such as enrolment, pass, repetition and dropout rates. Section 3 
pertained only to schools that charged fees. There were questions on the amount of fees 
and percentages of schools exempted either fully or partially.  
 
Section 4 asked about the experience and qualifications of principals and teachers as well 
as additional information about teachers such as their salary and the degrees of 
absenteeism. School facilities such as adequacy of school furniture, toilets and drinking 
water were covered in section 5. Proximity of the schools to clinics and public 
transportation were covered in section 6. In section 7, questions were asked about the 
existence of school governing bodies (SGBs) and parent teacher associations (PTAs); the 
top issues discussed at these meetings, frequency of the meetings and the extent of 
parental participation in these bodies. Section 8 dealt with supervision of schools by 
district education inspectors and accountability of schools to district authorities in terms 
of submitting academic reports and audited financial reports. The last two sections dealt 
with finance, where sources of funding were requested in addition to the timeliness of the 
disbursements and finally what the school spent its money on and how much.    
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District Education Office Surveys 
Section 1 collected data on the characteristics of the district education office (DEO). This 
information included the number of staff members in office, the number of staff currently 
reporting for duty in the office, the number of cars and the travelling distance to schools 
in the district. Section 2, on decision-making, asked questions on who makes decisions 
and provides funding for financially needy children, additional books and maintenance 
issues. The frequency of meetings with provincial authorities was covered in section 3 
while section 4 dealt with shortages and requests at the district office in order to establish 
the constraints at the districts office. Section 5 collected data on the number of visits to a 
random sample of schools and information was sought about whether districts received 
annual reports from these schools. The latter is an example of the cross-triangulation 
method to verify information obtained from the schools. Section 6 involved questions on 
delays of receiving funding from the provincial government and the categories for which 
funding was earmarked. Section 7 involved district expenditures, including amounts 
allocated to various quintile schools. In the final section, some questions were asked to 
have an indication of PEM practices. These included: instances of overspending or 
underspending, the consequence of either, publishing of financial accounts and district 
director turnover rates.  
Interviews  
The surveys were designed for face-to-face interviews. All interviews at the district 
education offices in the two provinces were conducted by the PhD candidate. For the 
primary school surveys, 5 research assistants in Gauteng and 5 in North West – a total of 
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10 – were recruited. Training of the research assistants and the process of data collection 
are discussed in more detail in section 5.3.   
5.3 Sample Design  
Scope  
 
The scope of the study is two provinces in South Africa: Gauteng and North West 
provinces. Concerning the district surveys, 10 district education offices out of 15 were 
surveyed in Gauteng. While all 15 were targeted, 5 districts (Tshwane West, Ekurhuleni 
South, Ekurhuleni North, Sedibeng West and Johannesburg South) declined to 
participate.
15
 In North West, all but one district municipality (Bojanala), which declined 
to participate, were surveyed. In terms of the primary schools, the study attempted to 
cover representative sample of public schools in the province. The next sections focus on 
the sampling procedures.  
Population   
 
In South Africa, there are two categories of schools at the primary and secondary levels 
as established by the South African Schools Act: public schools and independent schools. 
Public schools are established by the State, controlled by the State and all receive funding 
                                                 
15
 Their exclusion would introduce a bias if these districts behave significantly different from the other 
districts, for example, having extremely strong or extremely poor performing schools on average. 
Researching the districts for peculiar traits proved to be difficult because of the scarcity of district level 
data. For example, the Gauteng Profile document only provides for data for municipalities and not districts. 
The only education data at district level is provided in the 2007 Annual Report of the Gauteng Provincial 
Government, but on matric scores. It revealed that 2 of the missing districts (Sedibeng West and Erkhurleni 
South) had the lowest pass rates. At 65 and 58 percent, it is difficult to say if they are statistically different 
from the national average of 75 percent. The 5 districts were spread out in the province and not clustered 
together which could indicate non-randomness. In the North West province, the missing region, Bojanala 
emerged to have a mixed profile. It had the highest literacy rate in the province but also had the largest 
population with no schooling. Therefore, from the limited information, it is difficult to conclude non-
biasness however, it appears to be unlikely.   
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(weighted by their poverty profile) from the State. Independent schools were known as 
private schools in the apartheid era and catered only for white pupils. Now known as 
independent schools, they can be created by any individual, according to the Schools Act 
and remain privately governed. Independent schools are also entitled to government 
subsidies, if they request it. These grants come with terms and conditions such as 
unannounced inspections from the provincial education authorities (SASA, 1996). 
Therefore, not every independent school receives government subsidies. The sampling 
frame for this study was limited to public primary schools in Gauteng and North West 
Province. Since the premise of the study is to examine the practice of public expenditure 
management and how it translates into service delivery in terms of educational quality, it 
is appropriate that the study excludes independent schools and focuses only on the 
schools that are completely within the domain of government control.
16
  
 
In the case of the two provinces, an electronic list of schools was obtained from the 
Department of Education in January 2008. The list was comprehensive and included 
primary, secondary and “combined” schools. The latter referred to schools that had both 
primary and secondary. Therefore, secondary schools and independent schools were 
deleted from the list. The end results were 1,318 schools that were entirely public but also 
primary or combined in the Gauteng Province and 1,114 of the same types of schools in 
the North West Province.  
                                                 
16
 Independent primary schools comprise only 10 percent of all primary schools in Gauteng and 1.5 percent 
of primary schools in the North West (Department of Education, 2009).   
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Sampling  
 
The study used a stratification technique in selecting the sample to ensure 
regional/district representativeness of all schools in the two provinces. Stratification 
entails the division of a study population into strata and a random selection of subjects 
within each stratum (Duclos, 2002). Districts/Regions in South Africa are well defined 
administrative classifications within a province. In Gauteng province, there are 15 
districts, though technically, 3 are metropolitan municipalities, 3 are district 
municipalities and the remaining 9 are local municipalities. In North West, there are only 
4 district municipalities and because of their size, commonly referred to as regions. 
Within these regions, there are 21 local municipalities. Therefore, functionally, districts 
and regions are not dissimilar except for size. Hence, the sampling frame was stratified 
according to the 15 districts in Gauteng and 4 regions in North West.   
 
In order to ensure that the sample selection took into account the number of schools in 
each strata, 8 percent of schools in each of the districts in Gauteng were selected using a 
simple random sampling method. Given that North West has fewer schools, 9 percent of 
public primary schools were selected to allow for a slightly larger sample. These 
percentages conform to similar education studies, as discussed later in the chapter and 
were selected to fit within the resources available to undertake the survey. The sampling 
procedure did not take school size into account and therefore in the random selection, 
some schools would have more pupils than others. This does not bias the study the unit of 
analysis is at the school level and not pupil level.  
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An SPSS software was used to select schools at random. Each school in a particular 
district/region had an equal chance of being selected. Simple random sampling is also 
referred to as “epsem sampling” (equal probability of selection method). It is widely used 
in applied educational research because it usually leads to self-weighting in which the 
simple arithmetic mean obtained from the sample data is an unbiased estimate of the 
population mean (Ross, 2005).  
Table 5.1 Sample Allocation over Strata, Gauteng Province 
Districts Total Number of Schools (N) Sample size (n) 
Erkurhuleni North 103 8 
Erkurhuleni South 117 9 
Gauteng East 109 9 
Gauteng North 33 3 
Gauteng West 83 7 
Johannesburg Central 157 13 
Johannesburg East 78 6 
Johannesburg North 102 8 
Johannesburg South 64 5 
Johannesburg West 92 7 
Sedibeng East 53 4 
Sedibeng West 98 8 
Tshwane North 59 5 
Tshwane South 125 10 
Tshwane West 45 4 
TOTAL 1318 106 
 
For Gauteng province, the study would target a sample size of 106 schools.  
Table 5.2 Sample Allocation over Strata, North West Province  
Districts (Regions) Total Number of Schools (N) Sample size (n) 
Bophirima   172 16 
Southern   218 20 
Central 348 31 
Bojanala 376 34 
TOTAL 1114 101 
 
Similarly, 101 schools would be administered in North West. In total, the study aimed for 
to survey 207 schools in the two provinces.  
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Sampling and Stratification Techniques Used in Other Education Surveys  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, PETS-QSDS has been conducted in several countries. The 
sampling approach used in some of these countries is briefly highlighted here to show 
conformity of this study‟s approach to similar studies. In the Uganda PETS, 250 primary 
schools out of 8500 public primary schools (3 percent) were surveyed in 19 of Uganda‟s 
39 districts (Ablo & Reinnika, 1998). The schools surveyed were fixed within the range 
of 10 – 20 due to budget constraints. The 250 schools were derived by selecting 10 
schools from districts with less than 100 public primary schools; 15 schools with districts 
that had 100-200 primary schools and 20 within districts that had more than 200 schools. 
A 3 stage stratification method was used: regional stratification, followed by districts, 
then schools. In Rwanda, 390 schools were surveyed out of 2142 public primary schools 
(18 percent) in all of Rwanda‟s 151 districts. The schools were selected through a random 
sampling method, following a two-stage stratification technique by rural/urban location 
and then schools (Fofack, Obidegwu & Ngong, 2003). In Zambia, a sample of 200 
schools out of 3933 schools (5 percent) was surveyed. It was first stratified by urban and 
rural location before schools were selected. In the case of South Africa, the Systemic 
Evaluation of Grade 6 learners targeted 7 percent of the defined population and in the end 
surveyed 3 percent. The sampling was also done at a pupil level and not a school level:  
34, 015 learners out of 1,107,635 learners (DOE, 2005).  
 
From the above illustrations, it is clear that sample sizes in these kinds of studies tend to 
be arbitrarily selected and range between 3 and 18 percent of the population. So, clearly 
there is no standard or optimal size. Nonetheless, all studies stratify the sample and place 
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more emphasis on minimising non-sampling errors. By aiming for 207 schools (8.5 
percent of total school population) and including a stratification technique, this study falls 
within the sampling norms.  
5.4 Process of Data Collection and Field Work   
Pilot Test Phase 
 
Pretesting – the final stage of questionnaire development – involves the use of the 
questionnaire in a small pilot study to ascertain how well the questionnaire works. 
According to Hunt, Sparkman and Wilcox (1982), pretesting is highly critical and 
attention should be placed in five areas: what specific items should be pretested? What 
method should be used to conduct the pretest? Who should do the pretesting? Who 
should be the subjects in the pre-test? And how large a sample is needed for the pretest?  
 
Taking these as important guidelines, the Primary School PETS-QSDS was piloted in 4 
schools and in 3 districts: Tshwane South, Tshwane West and Gauteng East. The four 
schools were in Capital Park Primary, Brooklyn Primary, Bonwelong Primary and 
Arcadia Primary. The 3 districts were specifically selected due to their accessibility to the 
researcher but the 4 schools were randomly selected from those districts. The selection of 
4 schools falls short of the various recommended pretest sample sizes. For instance, 
Ferber and Vendoorn (1962) recommend 12; Boyd, Westfall and Stasch (1977) 
recommend 20 and Backstrom and Hursch (1963) indicate 30 to be adequate. Clearly, 
according to the literature, there are no fixed sizes for pretest samples. A minimalist 
sample was selected as the timing of the pretest (mid March) coincided with the final 
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days for the end of the first term. Because the questionnaire was also not lengthy, 
contained mostly close-ended questions and was designed for an informed respondent, a 
larger sample for the pretest was deemed unnecessary. Furthermore, the smooth running 
of the interview at the fourth school was an indication that the questionnaire was ready 
for full implementation. The pretest was not limited to specific questions in the 
questionnaire. The entire questionnaire was pretested and the average the time taken to 
complete the questions was 20 minutes.  
 
Because the questionnaire was designed to be face to face, the piloting was conducted in 
that manner, with the exception of one school, where due to scheduling conflicts, the 
interview was conducted telephonically. The experience showed no difference in the 
quality of the data obtained from the face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews. 
Therefore, phone interviews emerged as an alternative method if the preferred method of 
face-to-face was not possible for certain schools. The only potential problem is where 
respondents may conceal the truth about certain facilities in the school, knowing that 
there was no one there to verify. Because of this, interviews by phone would be the 
exception and not the norm.    
 
In most cases, the principal was the main respondent, although some principals invited 
their deputies to participate in the interview. The pilot test also showed that the 
questionnaires were administered more efficiently when the respondent also had a copy 
of the questionnaire in front of them for reference.  
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Lessons Learned from the Pilot Test 
 
The pilot experience gave the researcher the assurance that the availability of data was 
not likely to be a problem as in all schools visited, the schools confirmed that they submit 
a report to their districts authorities every year on academic information and financial 
reports. The pilot also resulted in the deletion of certain questions that seemed to have no 
relevance in the South African context (for example, the payment of teacher bonuses is 
only done by the districts, not the schools) and the inclusion of new or follow up 
questions such as asking the reason why a school does not have a PTA or why some 
classrooms do not have a desk and a table for the teacher. The explanations for the 
classroom questions were not always obvious and could be misinterpreted. For instance, 
one school had 3 classrooms without a desk and a table because those classrooms were 
newly built and were yet to be furnished. The absence of furniture was not to be 
interpreted as an indication of poor facilities.  
Administration of Questionnaire 
 
A total of 10 research assistants were recruited to implement the primary school 
questionnaire, whereby 5 of them were assigned to schools in Gauteng and the other 5 
assigned to schools in the North West province. All the research assistants were 
university students or graduates and were paid a stipend to conduct the fieldwork in a 
time frame of three months. The fieldwork, being more challenging than anticipated 
turned out to be a six-month exercise (April – September 2008). Each researcher was 
allocated 2 or 3 adjacent districts to review all the selected schools. They were 
responsible for making the appointments with the schools, using their own or public 
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transportation to get to the schools and completing the questionnaires. All were trained on 
the use of the questionnaire, in particular how to ask the questions and to record the data.  
 
For the most part, the primary schools questionnaire was administered in a face-to-face 
interview in order to allow for a higher response rate. Follow-up on certain parts of the 
questionnaire that could not be completed at the time of the interview was done either by 
telephone, fax or a follow up visit. Schools that were hard to reach due to distance were 
surveyed by phone and fax. A signed approval letter from the provincial departments of 
education in Gauteng and North West, granting permission to conduct research in its 
institutions facilitated the administration of the questionnaire both at schools and at the 
districts. A number of schools requested that both letter and questionnaire be faxed to 
them in advance before the interview and this was done.   
 
The district questionnaire was administered in a face-to-face interview by the PhD 
candidate. In a few instances, the regional director or deputy director requested that the 
questionnaire be left with the office to allow for consultations and for various 
departments to make the relevant inputs. In all cases, the questionnaire could not be 
completed by an individual.
17
 Input was therefore sought from other officials such as the 
financial/budget officer, human resources specialists and district inspectors.   
Challenges  
 
There were two key challenges encountered in the administration of the questionnaire: 
the reluctance of some schools and government officials to participate and the difficulty 
                                                 
17
 It was originally envisaged that the district director would be able to answer all questions.  
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in sourcing data, especially financial data from both schools and department of education. 
In the case of the schools, some principals felt that the questions were too invasive even 
when they were presented with an approval letter for the Department of Education. This 
occurrence was particularly frequent in the North West, whereby field assistants would 
travel as far as 200km to a school for an interview only to find the principal absent after 
agreeing to an interview. In some cases, the principals did not show up at the school for 
the entire day. Specific to financial reports, the impression given was that the reports 
were available, but the principals were not comfortable releasing what they felt was 
confidential information.  
 
Within the Department of Education, the intention was to sample the national office, two 
provincial offices and 19 district and regional offices in Gauteng and North West. Due to 
lack of cooperation, the fieldwork was limited to the district and regional education 
offices in Gauteng North West provinces. Provincial and national offices were not 
included. As mentioned, data were sought from various units at the education offices (for 
example, budget planning, policy and research, human resources and transport) rather 
than relying solely on the district director‟s office. Despite these efforts, there were some 
gaps in the district questionnaires as record keeping (particularly financial) was 
inconsistent in some districts and regions.  
 
Some district officials also viewed the exercise with suspicion and wanted some 
assurances that this exercise was not a “trick” from the opposition party to undermine the 
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current administration.
18
 This was in spite of two letters from the Department of 
Education (Gauteng and North West province) authorising the research in both schools 
and district offices, after reviewing all the survey instruments two months prior to the 
commencement of the fieldwork. Furthermore, one region in the North West did not 
positively respond to repeated requests for meetings or information. This region 
(Bojanala) is therefore the only regional office in North West that was not surveyed. In 
Gauteng, 10 out of 15 district education offices were surveyed. The remaining five did 
not participate in the survey in spite of repeated requests.   
Data Triangulation 
 
In order to obtain reliable data, the research relied on more than one source especially on 
information relevant to the public expenditure tracking survey. For instance, the amount 
of funds that are allocated to schools was sought from both districts and schools. 
Therefore, there were intentional overlaps in the questionnaire.  
Response Rate and Data Limitations 
 
Of the 207 questionnaires administered, the cumulative response rate was 62 percent. The 
response rate was higher in Gauteng (72 percent). In North West however, the response 
was 51 percent. The breakdown of responses is shown in Table 5.3 below.  
                                                 
18
 This suspicion is not altogether unreasonable as some previous PETS exercises have exposed extensive 
inefficiencies and corruption in the sector (see literature review). In the case of Tanzania, the government 
banned the publishing of the findings. In Peru, researchers were banned from asking certain kinds of 
questions. It should however be recalled that the researcher followed due process by applying for 
authorization from the two provincial authorities two months before the commencement of the fieldwork. 
To South Africa‟s credit, none of the questions were found to be problematic at the time when the 
Department was reviewing the survey instruments. Nonetheless, districts and schools simply chose not to 
answer questions that they were not comfortable with.   
  
122 |  
 
Table 5.3 Response Rate by District/Region 
Gauteng Districts Response Rate (%) NW Regions Response Rate (%)  
Erkurhuleni North 50 
(4/8) 
Bophirima   38 
(6/16) 
Erkurhuleni South 89 
(8/9) 
Southern   40 
(5/20) 
Gauteng East 100 
(9/9) 
Central 84 
(26/31) 
Gauteng North 0 
(0/3) 
Bojanala 26 
(9/34) 
Gauteng West 71 
(5/7) 
  
Johannesburg Central 77 
(10/13) 
  
Johannesburg East 66 
(4/6) 
  
Johannesburg North 88 
(7/8) 
  
Johannesburg South 100 
(5/5) 
  
Johannesburg West 71 
(5/7) 
  
Sedibeng East 100 
(4/4) 
  
Sedibeng West 75 
(6/8) 
  
Tshwane North 40 
(2/5) 
  
Tshwane South 80 
(8/10) 
  
Tshwane West 75 
(3/4) 
  
AV TOTAL 72 %  51% 
Brackets: (number of completed questionnaires/number of questionnaires administered)  
 
In total, 80 and 46 questionnaires were received from Gauteng and North West 
respectively, totalling 126 schools and hence falling short by 81 schools (26 schools in 
Gauteng and 55 schools in North West). The feedback from the researchers is that the 
schools that did not participate were simply not interested in the study. The lack of 
participation by these schools however, presents a potential bias in the study. For 
example, if some schools decided not to participate because of high rates of repetition and 
dropouts, the final sample could suffer from a self selection bias. In this case, the lack of 
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participation, particularly from North West schools in Bophirima, Southern and Bojanala 
districts may present a downward bias in the estimates because these schools are more 
likely to be underperforming. As the study tries to assess the impact of PEM on poor 
education outcomes, the less than optimal number of underperforming schools would 
weaken the results. This means that a lack of significant results in the coefficient 
estimates may be due to sampling errors. It is a concern for this study, but still one that is 
better than a sampling error that would overestimate the results.       
 
In order to reach the targeted sample of schools, a second “random” sample only from the 
suburbs where for one reason or the other, the schools did not participate in the survey 
was drawn. Successful schools were first removed from the list before the second sample 
was drawn. An additional 81 schools were surveyed in attempt to strive for the desired 
sample size. It is acknowledged however, that this method of replacement is tantamount 
to purposive sampling and may compromise the randomness of the data - a quality that is 
sacrosanct in statistical analysis. It may cause a bias in the sample if schools are not 
equally balanced or objectively represented (Ross, 2005). A potential consequence in this 
approach would be erroneously attributing a result on education outcomes to an aspect of 
PEM rather than a sampling bias.   
 
The second round of sampling was however undertaken in order to expand the sample of 
schools with the understanding that missing values tend to be fairly common in survey 
work and rather than working with a substantially smaller dataset, which is also a source 
of bias, it was better to work with a larger dataset. It is worth repeating that serious efforts 
were made to minimise sampling errors by randomly selecting schools within the same 
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locality (suburb) as the original school that did not participate. A similar technique was 
used in the PETS for Papua New Guinea, where schools were replaced by randomly 
selecting from the same district (World Bank, 2004c).  
 
As a result of the second sampling, the study ended up with a total of 175 schools.
19
 Of 
these, there were a total of 96 schools from Gauteng and 79 from the North West 
province. The same problems were encountered during the second fieldwork phase, 
which mainly utilised telephonic and faxing methods and therefore, the targets of 106 and 
101 schools in Gauteng and North West respectively, were not reached. Nonetheless, 
given the experience of other PETS studies, a sample of 175 schools (7 percent of the 
population) is still considered adequate for statistical analysis.   
5.5 Data Analysis   
Introduction  
The study uses both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The qualitative analysis focuses 
on the functioning of institutions at the district level, their levels of efficiency and 
accountability. The aim of the assessment is to shed light on the formal and informal 
rules of the game and the implications on learning outcomes at the school level. It relies 
on interviews, the PETS-QSDS surveys, observations in the field and secondary data. The 
quantitative analysis relies on bivariate and cross-section regression analyses to assess the 
relationship between PEM and education outcomes. A discussion of the distribution of 
the data, rationale for model selection and a specification of the model follows in the next 
section.    
                                                 
19
 From the second drawing, 49 of the 81 schools participated in the survey.  
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Considerations for Model Selection 
 
Various models used in estimating education outcomes, such as OLS models, multi-level 
analysis, randomised experiments and value-added models were discussed in Chapter 4. 
A model should be selected based on its effectiveness in addressing the research 
questions that the study seeks to answer, but also one that is most appropriate for the 
distribution of the data. The prevalence of parametric techniques, particularly OLS 
regressions in education production function studies provides a compelling rationale to 
use OLS regressions in the analysis. OLS techniques typically need to satisfy 
assumptions of normal distribution and linearity. These assumptions are assessed in the 
histograms below which show the distributions for all the education outcome variables to 
be non-Gaussian.  
 
Figure 5.1: Histogram of Education Outcome Variables 
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5.1 (c) Grade 7 repetition rates    5.1 (d) Grade 5 dropout rates 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
1
0
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 5 10 15 20
% of students repeating grade 7
 
5.1 (e) Grade 1 dropout rates 
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The graphs show that there is a large concentration of schools at the extreme end of the 
spectrum. A great majority of schools have 100 percent pass rates and similarly, a vast 
majority have zero rates of repetition and dropout. The graphs show clearly that the 
dependent variables are non-normal and skewed. Normality tests were conducted to 
confirm whether the distributions indeed lacked normality. The results are presented in 
Table 5.4 below.  
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Table 5.4 Results of Normality Tests  
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic Df Sig. Statistic Df Sig. 
% of students passing 
2007 exams 
.318 122 .000 .521 122 .000 
% of students 
repeating Grade 1 
.173 122 .000 .850 122 .000 
% of students 
repeating Grade 7 
.310 122 .000 .579 122 .000 
% of students not 
returning after Grade 1 
.325 122 .000 .475 122 .000 
% of students not 
returning after Grade 5 
.237 122 .000 .764 122 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction     
 
The KS and SW statistics quantify the discrepancy between the distribution of the data 
and the ideal Gaussian distribution (Motulsky, 1999). A significant test means that the fit 
is poor. It is evident, therefore, from the p values (all close to 0) that the data fails the 
normality test and that the population is unlikely to Gaussian. The general 
recommendation is that failing normality tests, skewed distributions can be mitigated by 
transforming variables into logarithms in order to convert non-Gaussian data to a 
Gaussian distribution (Wooldridge, 2000). Taking the logs usually narrows the range of 
the variable and makes estimates less sensitive to outlying observations. A major 
limitation of this transformation is that logs cannot be used if a variable takes on zero or 
negative values (Wooldridge, 2000). Transforming the variables into logs would reduce 
the sample size significantly as most schools have zero values. Leaving them out of the 
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analysis would completely bias the estimates.
20
 Taking these considerations into account, 
a more suitable model would be one that allows for not only a non-normal distribution 
but one that allows for limited dependent variables. These are discussed below.  
 
Limited Dependent Variable Models 
The limited dependent variable (LDV) is defined as a dependent variable whose range of 
values is substantively restricted (Wooldridge, 2000). In some cases, these variables take 
on a binary response (values of one or zero) in which case Logit and Probit models can be 
applied. The dependent variables for this study as shown in Figure 5.1 are roughly 
continuous but limited between 0 and 100. In this instance, there are two other 
econometric models that may be considered. The first is the Tobit model, which is 
explicitly designed to model “corner solution” dependent variables – cases whereby 
optimising behaviour of a sizeable fraction of the population results in zero quantity as 
the optimal solution (Wooldridge, 2000). Examples include the number of married 
women in the labour force or the number of families that would make a charitable 
contribution in a given year.  
 
While the Tobit model appears to be appropriate for data (positive integers) with a huge 
pile up of zeros, which is the case in this study for four of the five dependent variables, it 
is also unsuitable because it is also designed for a broad range of positive values and 
crucially relies on normality and homoskedasticity in the underlying latent variable as 
shown below.  
                                                 
20
 According to Wooldridge (2000), where a variable takes on the value of zero, log (1+y) can be used. It is 
acceptable to interpret it is as log (y) if the data on y is not dominated by zeros. In light of the dominance of 
zeros on the data, this approach is not taken.  
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y* = β0+xβ+µ, µ|x ~ Normal (0,σ
2
)  [5.1] 
 
Even though the Tobit model is more interested in explaining y = max (0,y*) – the 
observed variable – if the assumptions of the homoskedasticity and normality in the latent 
variable is incorrect, then it is difficult to know what the Tobit model is estimating 
(Wooldridge, 2000).  
 
For positive integer distributions such as repetition and dropout rates that take on 
relatively few values, including zeros and are non-normal with heteroskedastic 
distributions, there are two appropriate models: the negative binomial regression model 
(NBRM) and the Poisson regression model (PRM) (Wooldridge, 2002; Long and Freese 
2006). These models have been applied to distributions such as the number of children 
ever born to a woman, number of times someone is arrested per year or the number of 
patents applied for by a firm in a year (Wooldridge, 2000). The PRM is critiqued for 
being much too restrictive. All the probabilities and higher moments of the Poisson 
distribution are determined entirely by the mean and in particular, the model requires that 
the variance be equal to the mean – a restriction that is violated in many applications 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The negative binomial regression model has the same 
mean structure as the Poisson model but is a good alternative to the PRM and more 
efficient in cases of overdispersed data where the variance is much larger than the mean. 
A review of the summary statistics for the sample data for this study (see Table 6.2) 
shows clearly that the sample variances are larger than the sample means in all the 
outcomes variables, except pass rates which in any case is not a Poisson distribution 
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given the absence of zeros. If the assumptions for PRM are incorrect, the expected 
outcomes will not be biased but the standard errors in the PRM will be biased downwards 
and generate small p values and therefore present inappropriate conclusions about 
significance (Long and Freese, 2006). 
 
The Negative Binomial Regression Model     
The NBRM, similar to the PRM, models information on count variables. It differs from 
the PRM through the additional parameter in the equation to address overdispersion of 
count data, which is when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean. To 
illustrate, the probability for observing a count of an outcome Y in the univariate Poisson 
distribution is given by the formula:  
 
Pr (Y = y) = e
-µ 
µ
y
      [5.2] 
                    y! 
The key assumption is that E(Y) = µ and Var (y) = µ, meaning that the mean and the 
variance are equal. In practice, the equidispersion property is often violated. Additional 
dispersion can be accounted for in several ways. Most common is the presence of 
unobserved heterogeneity, which generates additional variability in y (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). Researchers are often unable to collect all of the explanatory variables 
relevant to explaining the variation in the underlying rates of outcomes among the study 
subjects. In the NBRM, an additional parameter is added. For example, if µ were replaced 
with µv, where v is a random variable and specified such that E(v) = 1 and var (v) = σ2, 
then it would be easier to show that v preserves the mean but increases dispersion 
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(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). If σ2 is zero, then we would obtain Poisson variance and if 
σ2 were greater than zero, then the variance would be larger than the mean.  
 
Essentially, the mean structure of the PRM and the NBRM will remain the same but the 
standard errors in the PRM will be biased downwards. It is the incorporation of both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity into the conditional mean, through the addition of 
a parameter that distinguishes the NBRM from the ordinary Poission count model and 
makes it more suitable for overdispersed data. This is an important consideration in this 
study because the education outcomes data used in this study are prone to overdispersion. 
Preliminary diagnostics of the sample data as shown in Table 6.2 show that the variances 
of repetition and dropout rates are consistently larger than the means.  
 
Taking these considerations into account, various studies concerned with overdispersion 
of their outcomes data, have applied the NBRM Model. A few notable examples include: 
the explained inverse relationship between education and fertility in Columbia and Peru 
(Tuman, Ayoub and Roth-Johnson, 2007); regional variation in under 5 mortality rates in 
Kenya (Rutaremwa, 2000) and the relationship between place (schools, churches, 
alcohol-related establishments) and crime (Willits, Broidy, Gonzales and Denman, 2011). 
In these three studies, the outcome variables: crime, fertility and child mortality rates had 
overdispersed count data and were more suitably analysed with the NBRM. 
   
Given the considerations above, the negative binomial regression model is used in this 
study. OLS estimates are also reported even though they may not be the best fit for the 
data and likely to predict conservative values. They are nonetheless included because it 
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always useful to start with a linear model, which are renowned for being robust. It has 
also been argued that a violation of the normality assumption only does minimal damage 
to OLS estimates of β0 and βk as even small sample properties of OLS estimators still 
retain their BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator) characteristics (Hubbard, 1978).  
 
Regression Model Applied  
 
The regression model applied in this study is presented below. The relationship between 
PEM and education outcomes is expressed as:  
 
 
 
Whereby, Educ represents education outcomes (pass rates, Grades 1 and 7 repetition rates 
and Grades 1 and 5 dropout rates). PEM refers to the independent variables (leakage, 
delays, public expenditure, total resource wealth and LTSM expenditure). The model also 
controls for non-school inputs (nonschinp) such as the district socio-economic status. 
This is captured by quintiles, which as index between 1 and 5, reflecting rates of 
unemployment, income and illiteracy within a school catchment area. School inputs 
(schinp) with theoretical and empirical importance such as classroom size are controlled 
for. μ represents the error term (that is, the unmeasured factors that influence education 
outcomes). 
 
The model has to address issues of endogeneity in order to minimise doubt as to whether 
the relationship between two variables is being driven by another unobservable variable. 
Educ = β0 + β1PEM + β2schinp + β3nonschinp + μ [5.3] 
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Two sources of endogeneity: selective migration and purposive programme placement 
are addressed below because they are common problems affecting EPF studies. The 
former is a problem of self-selection and refers to instances where parents choose the 
schools their children attend on the basis of its resources and therefore schools with more 
resources end up having pupils with more favourable family backgrounds. Similarly, 
better qualified teachers may to work in more affluent schools. In this instance, self-
selection can overestimate the effect of resources on outcomes. The first problem is 
minimised to a large extent in the context of South Africa because in the public school 
system, schools are obliged to give admission preference to children living within a 
“school feeder zone”.21 Other children outside of this area are taken on a first come, first 
serve basis or placed on a waiting list. Self-selection is therefore, unlikely to occur on a 
large scale in the case of parental selection of schools. The preference of affluent schools 
by better qualified teachers however, remains an endogenous problem that will have to be 
addressed in the model. This is done by controlling for teacher qualification.       
 
The second source of endogeneity pertains to the targeting of educational resources to 
weaker/disadvantaged schools from a policy standpoint. This is true in the case of South 
Africa, whereby the government provides more resources per capita to poorer schools as 
defined by the quintile ranking. The model addresses this problem by controlling for 
socio-economic status (SES), which would be the factor determining how resources are 
allocated. The SES, an index based on poverty quintiles, is computed nationally at the 
                                                 
21
 School Feeder Zones are set by the Department of Education in consultation with School Governing 
Bodies. Preference is given to learners whose parents live in the feeder zone in their own domicile or 
employer‟s domicile. The second order of preference would be children whose parents work address is in 
the feeder zone. Third would be other learners on a first come, first serve basis (Department of Education, 
1998).  
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level of a school catchment area. It includes three variables: unemployment rates, literacy 
levels and income levels. There are other sources of endogeneity that may also affect the 
explanatory variables. They are addressed in Chapter 8.      
 
The count and OLS regressions do not address aggregate biases and nesting of data, 
which are more appropriately addressed by HLM models (see Chapter 4). This is not a 
concern for this study because the research collects and analyses data at the school level 
and also makes conclusions at the school level, not the pupil level. This is an important 
caveat to bear in mind when interpreting the results. For example, if public expenditure is 
found to be important for an education outcome, such as Grade 1 repetition, the 
interpretation would be that increased public expenditure (by a specific rand amount), all 
things being equal, results in a reduction of Grade 1 repetition at the school level.    
 
In light of the considerations above, the regression model is used to address the following 
research questions: (i) is there a significant relationship between leakage of funds and 
education outcomes? (ii) is there a significant relationship between delays in the 
disbursement of funds and education outcomes? (iii) is there a significant relationship 
between public expenditure (government subsidies) per capita and education outcomes? 
(iv) is there a significant relationship between the total resource wealth of a school per 
capita and education outcomes? and (v) is there a significant relationship between LTSM 
(learning and teaching support materials) per capita expenditure and education outcomes? 
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5.6 Conclusion   
This chapter has explained in detail, the preparations made to ensure technical rigour in 
the research methodology, while exposing all shortcomings and their implications for the 
study. The Chapter has also discussed how the research was undertaken during the field 
work period and indications of how data would be analysed. The following information 
provided the basis for analysis: a micro-level survey of 175 schools in North West and 
Gauteng provinces and 13 local education offices and secondary data. The research 
methodology took into consideration the theoretical discussions around the various 
explanatory variables for education and education outcome variables discussed in 
Chapter 2. It also built on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4 and presented 
a regression model that would be used in the analysis. In the three chapters that follow, 
the results of the survey are presented beginning with a descriptive analysis in Chapter 6, 
a qualitative analysis of technical efficiency at sub-national level in Chapter 7 and 
correlation and regression analyses in Chapter 8.    
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS 
SURVEY 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Earlier chapters established the importance of primary education for growth and 
development and showed that good outcomes are not necessarily generated by increased 
spending. Chapters 1 and 3, in particular, brought the case of South Africa to the fore, 
where primary education in South Africa was shown to absorb the most funding in the 
social services category since the democratic regime, while improvements in education 
have been limited. South African pupils have been placed in the bottom category in 
international reading and mathematics tests. This chapter builds on this discussion by 
presenting a detailed descriptive analysis of the state of education, using public primary 
schools in Gauteng and North West provinces as case-studies.  
 
The analysis is based on a comprehensive survey (covering 100 variables on the school 
system) in 175 public primary schools in Gauteng and North West provinces. The chapter 
begins with a general description of the schools with a focus on geographic location and 
socio-economic status. The results of the outcome variables (pass, repetition and drop-out 
rates) are subsequently presented. This is followed by a discussion of the findings of the 
quality of educators in terms of their qualifications, salaries, experience and degree of 
absenteeism. The next sections focus on the quality of school facilities such as 
classrooms, libraries and playgrounds; the proximity of schools to public transportation 
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and health facilities; the organisation and structure of school governance; the level of 
supervision by district inspectors; accountability of schools to the districts in terms of 
annual reporting, and finally, a discussion of school income and expenditure patterns.  
 
With regards to the school sample, 96 of the 175 schools (out of a total 1,318) were 
selected from the Gauteng province and the remaining 79 schools (out of a total 1,114) 
were selected from the North West province. This represents 7.3 percent and 7.1 percent 
of the school population respectively.  
6.2 General Description of Schools: Geographic and Socio-economic Data  
In terms of geographic location, the majority of schools (60 percent) were located in 
urban areas. Thirty five percent were located in the rural areas and 5 percent were located 
in peri urban areas. All the schools were mixed gender schools. The student population 
ranged from 33 to 1644 students with a median school population of 562 and an average 
of 633 students. The pupil-to-teacher (PT) ratios ranged from as little as 13 pupils per 
teacher to as high as 112 pupils per teacher. The average PT ratio for the sample was 39 
pupils per teacher. The schools with a PT ratio higher than the average were schools with 
very high student populations and were mainly located in Gauteng Province (75 percent).   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the socio-economic status of schools (quintiles) ranges from 1 
(most poor) to 5 (least poor). The table below shows the distribution of quintiles of the 
sampled schools.  
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Table 6.1 Schools’ Quintile Ranking 
 Quintiles Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Gauteng Q1 6 6.2 6.6 
Q2 10 10.3 17.6 
Q3 35 36.1 56.1 
Q4 23 23.7 81.4 
Q5 17 17.5 100 
Total 91 93.8  
Missing System 6 6.2  
Total  97 100.0  
North West Q1 26 33.3 36.6 
Q2 15 19.2 57.7 
Q3 23 29.5 90.1 
Q4 4 5.1 95.7 
Q5 3 3.8 99.9 
Total 71 91.0 100 
Missing System 7 9.0  
Total   100.0  
Gauteng and 
North West 
Q1 32 18.3 19.8 
Q2 25 14.3 35.2 
Q3 58 33.1 71.0 
Q4 27 15.4 87.7 
Q5 20 11.4 100.0 
Total 162 92.6  
Missing System 13 7.4  
Total 175 100.0  
 
The table clearly shows that the majority of the wealthy schools (quintiles 4 and 5) are 
located in the Gauteng province and the majority of the poorer schools (quintiles 1 and 2) 
are located in North West. The regional disparity is quite striking. On the aggregate level, 
the majority (about 36 percent) were quintile 3 schools – medium in the poverty 
spectrum. This was followed by approximately 20 percent in quintile 1, which shows that 
a large concentration of schools was in the poorer to middle spectrum. As previously 
mentioned in Chapter 3, schools in the lower quintiles (particularly 1 and 2) are normally 
given no-fee status. The survey found this to be true as all the schools in quintiles 1 and 2 
were categorised as no-fee schools. Furthermore, 7 out of the 58 schools in quintile 3 
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were also declared as no-fee schools. In total, there were 68 no-fee schools
22
 (40 percent 
of the total sample), which means that as a result of their socio-economic status, they 
were not allowed to charge tuition fees. There were 102 schools (61 percent) ranking 
between quintiles 3 and 5, charged schools fees.  
 
Tuition Fees 
This section only concerns schools with fee-charging status. Tuition fees ranged from as 
little as R25 per annum to R9,800 per annum with a mean of approximately R1,405 per 
annum. In terms of policy, tuition fees in public schools are set annually by the school 
governing bodies, not the Department of Education. Parents who cannot afford the school 
fees can either seek (through the SGBs) to obtain a full or a partial exemption depending 
on their financial status. The survey found that the majority of schools (73 percent) were 
awarding full exemptions to qualified students. Of these, 55 percent also awarded partial 
exemptions in addition to the full exemptions. Therefore, more schools tended to offer 
full exemptions rather than partial exemptions. On the receiving end, qualifying students 
for full exemptions were, on average, 10 percent of all students in the fee-charging 
schools and 8 percent average for partial exemptions.    
 
The schools that did not award any full tuition exemptions were relatively inexpensive. 
On average, the tuition fees were R289 (or R79 average if two schools were to be 
excluded) per annum, which compares favourably with the sample average of R1,405. 
The same applied to schools that that did not offer any partial exemptions. The average 
                                                 
22
 This includes 32 from Quintile 1; 25 from Quintile 2; 7 from Quintile 3 and 4 others that did not specify 
their quintiles.  
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tuition per annum was R471 (or R115, excluding 4 schools that charged over R1,000). 
Therefore, there was substantive evidence that schools were complying with the 
exemption policy. 
6.3 Findings on Education Outcomes: Repetition, Dropout and Pass Rates 
Five indicators of education outcomes were collected in the survey: pass rates; Grade 1 
repetition rates; Grade 7 repetition rates; Grade 1 dropout rates and Grade 5 dropout rates. 
These variables were selected partly because nationally comparable test scores were not 
available for the sample of schools used this study but also because, despite their 
limitations, they were deemed appropriate and relevant for this study and for the South 
African context (see Chapters 1 and 2). A summary of statistics for the other outcome 
variables are presented below. 
Table 6.2 Summary of Statistics for Repetition and Dropout Rates 
 
 
Gauteng 
Province 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pass 83 97.3 7.3 50 100 
Gr_1_rep 91 5.4 5.8 0 24 
Gr_7_rep 84 1.0 1.8 0 9 
Gr_1_dropout 85 4.1 8.3 0 54 
Gr_5_dropout 85 3.3 4.3 0 18 
 
North West 
Province 
Pass 53 95.6 7.6 58 100 
Gr_1_rep 72 12.0 13.4 0 77 
Gr_7_rep 60 3.0 5.2 0 21 
Gr_1_dropout 71 4.4 9.5 0 72 
Gr_5_dropout 68 3.9 4.9 0 22 
 
GP and NW 
Pass 136 96.7 7.4 50 100 
Gr_1_rep 163 8.3 10.4 0 77 
Gr_7_rep 144 1.8 3.7 0 21 
Gr_1_dropout 156 4.2 8.7 0 72 
Gr_5_dropout 153 3.6 4.6 0 22 
   
The table shows that the average pass rates in the two provinces were nearly 97 percent, 
with very little variation between the two provinces. The average repetition rates for 
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Grade 1and Grade 7 pupils were 8.3 and 1.8 percent, respectively, for the two 
provinces.
23
 Dropout rates were 4.2 percent for Grade 1 and 3.6 percent for Grade 5.
24
 
Interestingly, the outcomes indicators are similar for both North West and Gauteng, with 
the exception of Grade 1 repetition, which reveals a large discrepancy. The average 
Grade 1 repetition rate is as high as 12 percent in North West, compared with 5 percent in 
Gauteng. Detailed discussions on each of the outcome variables follow below.   
 
Findings on Pass Rates 
In the case of pass rates, the majority of schools (59 percent) reported a pass rate of 100 
percent; 35 percent reported relatively high pass rates between 90 and 99 percent and the 
remaining 7 percent reported between 50 and 89 percent pass rates. Therefore, pass rates 
on the whole were very high. This finding must be interpreted cautiously for reasons 
explained in Chapter 5, whereby primary school-leaving exams are set internally by 
schools making comparability impossible.  
 
Finding on Repetition Rates 
In the case of Grade 1 repetition, the rates ranged from 0 percent to 77 percent. Although 
not shown in the table, of the 163 schools that provided data on repetition rates, 23 
percent reported that none of their learners repeated Grade 1. The majority of schools, 45 
percent, reported Grade 1 repetition rates as between 1 and 10 percent. There was also a 
sizeable proportion (32 percent) that had Grade 1 repetition rates of over 10 percent, that 
is, between 11 and 77 percent. Of this group of high repeaters, it is important to 
                                                 
23
 As a rough comparison, national statistics provided by the Department of Education (2009) shows Grade 
1 repetitions at 10 percent and Grade 7 repetitions at 5 percent in 2003.  
24
 Department of Education (2009) indicates 10 percent and 2.6 percent dropout rates for Grades 1 and 5 
respectively at the national level in 2003.  
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emphasise that they did not emerge specifically from any of the socio-economic 
categories. That is, 49 percent of them were from fee-charging schools and 47 percent 
were within the range of quintiles 3 and 5. They were also fairly evenly distributed 
between rural and urban locations (46 and 50 percent respectively). The vast majority, 69 
percent of these schools, were located in the North West province.  
 
In the case of Grade 7 repetition rates, the vast majority, 65 percent, did not have any 
repeaters; 32 percent had between 1 and 10 percent repeaters and 3 percent experienced a 
high repetition rate falling between 14 and 21 percent. Of the last group of high repeaters, 
they were all schools in the North West, with 80 percent of them in Bophirima region. 
Furthermore, 60 percent were fee-paying schools and had quintile 3 status. They were all 
rural schools, with the exception of one school in a peri-urban geographic location.   
 
It should be noted that repetition rates in Grade 7 tend to be conservative because 
students who do not successfully meet the academic requirements to move forward to 
secondary school, may not be held back because they may be over the age limit set for 
primary schools in South Africa and, therefore, may choose to continue their education in 
an adult institution or they may have already repeated once before in the phase and 
cannot by policy, repeat twice in the same phase.     
 
Findings on Dropout Rates 
Data on dropout rates were collected for Grades 1 and 5. In Grade 1, almost half of the 
schools surveyed (48 percent) did not have any dropouts. A sizeable group (45 percent), 
however, reported dropout rates of between 1 and 10 percent. Very few schools (6 
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percent) experienced very high dropout rates between 12 and 17 percent. It was a similar 
case for Grade 5, although the dropout rates were slightly more extensive. Forty three 
percent did not have any dropouts in 2007 but, almost half of the schools surveyed (49 
percent), experienced between 1 and 10 percent of dropouts. Eight percent had between 
11 and 22 percent of students dropping out.  
 
The group of schools that had relatively high Grade 1 dropout rates were fairly evenly 
distributed across the two provinces and in socio-economic groupings. In the case of 
Grade 5 dropouts, the schools were mostly in urban areas (75 percent); mostly fee-
charging schools (83 percent) and all, with the exception of one, between quintiles 3 and 
4. Therefore, Grade 5 dropout rates appeared more prominently in schools with a 
relatively high socio-economic status. The reasons for this are not clear. It is possible that 
weaker students were not capable of the academic demands given that these were 
predominantly in the medium quintiles. In examining the general reasons for dropping 
out of the school system (the question was not grade specific), it emerged that most 
students did not return because they transferred to another school (see Table 6.3 below).  
Table 6.3 Main reason for dropping out this year 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid working to support 
family 
6 3.4 5.1 5.1 
transferred to other 
school 
80 45.7 67.8 72.9 
lack of food or 
malnutrition 
3 1.7 2.5 75.4 
Other 29 16.6 24.6 100.0 
Total 118 67.4 100.0  
Missing System 57 32.6   
Total 175 100.0   
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As indicated in the table above, 68 percent of the schools that responded indicated that 
“transferring to another school” was the main reason for dropout. The truthfulness of this 
could be questioned as schools may not wish to admit some form of failure on their part. 
Furthermore, in sparsely populated areas such as those in the North West, it is unlikely 
that parents would have several choices of schools in the communities in which they live. 
Though unlikely, it is still possible that school transfer was a reason for leaving a school. 
Interpretation of findings using dropout rates would therefore require some caution.     
6.4 Findings on Principal and Teacher Experience and Qualification  
Principals were asked to indicate their number of years as an educator, number of years 
as a principal in any school and number of years as a principal in their current school. 
The findings showed that principals were generally well experienced. The years of 
experience as an educator ranged from a minimum of 10 years to 43 years, with an 
average of 25 years work experience. Experience as a principal in any school ranged from 
6 months to 34 years, with an average of 11 years. As a principal of their current schools, 
experience ranged from 4 months to 31 years, with an average of 10 years.  
 
Moreover, additional information was sought on their educational backgrounds by 
explicitly asking about their highest level of education. There was data missing for 25 
principals. These were cases where a Head of Department or other senior administrator 
answered the questionnaire. Only 1 percent had a secondary school certificate as the 
maximum qualification; 27 percent possessed a diploma; 7 percent had undertaken some 
university training; the majority, 37 percent, were however, university graduates and an 
additional 27 percent had post-graduate training.   
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Concerning teachers, the survey found that in 72 percent of the schools, there were no 
teaching gaps and all allocated positions had been filled. The remaining 28 percent 
reported vacant positions ranging from 1 post to 14. It should be clarified that the teacher 
allocations for each public school are determined by the Department of Education. The 
teaching gap could be the result of the Department being unable to provide the full 
complement of teachers on time or it may be that the schools determine their own staff 
ratio which may be different to the Department‟s formula. Therefore, schools have to 
either increase the work burden of available teachers or recruit teachers from the school‟s 
own revenue to fill the teaching gap. Schools that do not have the financial means would 
simply have to operate with a larger than planned student-teacher ratio. Many fee-
charging schools are able to fill this gap and even recruit more teachers than the 
minimum prescribed by the Department in an effort to have smaller teacher-student 
ratios.
25
  
 
In terms of teacher qualifications, all the schools, with the exception of 10, confirmed that 
the teachers had the requisite teaching certificate and were therefore qualified to teach in 
schools. Therefore, about 95 percent of teachers are qualified. The schools with 
unqualified teachers did not have any unique characteristics. They were fairly evenly 
distributed between the two provinces, fee-paying status and quintiles.  
 
As teacher absenteeism is often reported to be a recurring problem in the South African 
media, the survey asked whether all teachers were present and teaching in the school on 
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 The study was unable to collect information on extra teachers hired at the expense of the schools.  
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the day of the survey. Sixty nine percent of schools reported that all their teachers were 
present and teaching on that day and 32 percent reported incidences of teacher 
absenteeism, signifying that on the day of the survey, at least one-third of all teachers 
were not present and teaching. Further on teacher conduct, the survey showed that only 2 
percent of schools had had teachers laid off in the past 12 months. Reasons given 
included: absenteeism and redundancy. Interpreting low levels of dismissals to be cases 
of misconduct is misleading because the study found that laying off teachers in public 
schools is ultimately decided by the Department of Education, who may be reluctant to 
do so as it means that a school would be without a teacher until one is recruited. It is also 
important to note that South Africa has a long history of teacher unionism and these 
bodies have enjoyed a close relationship with government since 1994 and as such, they 
are powerful organisations (Govender, 2004). 
 
Teacher salaries are set by the Department of Education, based on their qualifications 
(academic training and professional experience). The findings showed that monthly gross 
salaries ranged from a minimum of R3, 000 to a maximum of R20, 000. The average 
salary was R8, 807. There were 30 schools (20 percent) whose teachers on average, 
earned more than R10,000 a month. These teachers tended to work in medium sized 
schools (average size 635). Poorly remunerated teachers (earning less than R10,000 a 
month) worked in slightly larger schools (648 average). As shown in the table below, the 
difference in average salary between the two provinces is quite small. This was an 
unexpected finding given that one would have expected better qualified teachers to be 
concentrated in Gauteng, the wealthier province.  
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Table 6.4 Teacher Monthly Gross Salaries by Province 
 
Province where school is 
located 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
GP Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
79 5,000 15,000 8,751.06 2,233.7 
NW Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
70 3,000 20,000 8,869.43 3,219.1 
 
Therefore, there was a fairly even distribution of qualified teachers across the two 
provinces. The data did provide evidence that better qualified teachers tend to work in 
higher quintile schools. Therefore, although this trend did not come across at the 
provincial level, it came across very clearly at the quintile level as shown below.  
 
Table 6.5 Teacher Monthly Gross Salaries by Quintile 
 
Quintile where school is located N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Q1 Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
30 3,000 15,000 8,163.4 2,759.9 
Q2 Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
20 3,957 20,000 8,372.8 3,448.3 
Q3 Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
47 3273 16,599 8,282.7 2,648.8 
Q4 Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
22 7,000 15,000 9,789.7 2,213.7 
Q5 Teacher gross salary 
(monthly) 
17 8,000 13,479 10,072.2 1659.3 
 
The mean statistics show a trend in teacher salaries whereby better paid teachers, who are 
also better qualified teachers tend to be concentrated in the high quintile schools and vice 
versa. The distinction between the lowest three quintiles and the top two quintiles is 
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substantial. Therefore disadvantaged schools are deprived of highly qualified teachers. 
The standard deviation also shows that there is a lot of variation in teacher salary in the 
quintile 2 schools.      
6.5 Findings on School Facilities 
The availability and quality of facilities were mixed. Whereas, most schools had decent 
infrastructure with respect to furniture, water and toilet facilities, many lacked adequate 
roofs, playgrounds, libraries and science laboratories. On the positive side, the majority 
of schools had tables and chairs for teachers in the classrooms. Only 18 percent 
complained of classrooms that did not have a chair and a table for the teacher‟s use. 
Furthermore, 70 percent of schools had toilet facilities in good working order and 86 
percent had piped water as the main source of drinking water. When asked whether the 
water facilities were in working condition and whether students were able to drink from 
that source on the day of the interview, 96 percent answered “yes”. Therefore, only 4 
percent reported problems with the water facilities, citing reasons of recent burglaries in 
the schools whereby the taps were stolen.  
 
In terms of security, 90 percent of the survey schools were surrounded by a fence that 
was in good condition, indicating that most schools were properly secured although very 
few actually had a security guard at the gate as observed by field researchers on the day 
of the interview. In terms of meals, 57 percent of schools were benefiting from the school 
feeding schemes, whereby the majority of their students enjoyed free lunches at the 
school. Only 7 percent of students paid for lunches at the school and 29 percent of 
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schools had students who brought their own lunches. The remaining 6 percent had other 
arrangements, such as going home to eat lunch.  
 
The survey found that nearly half of the schools surveyed (46 percent) complained of 
roofs that leaked when it rained. Furthermore, less than half of the schools (48 percent) 
had libraries, only 21 percent had science laboratories and 31 percent of schools did not 
have a playground or sports area for the students. Though a very small percentage (4 
percent), it was worrying that some schools did not have separate toilet facilities for girls 
and moreover 2 percent did not have a source of drinking water at the school or relied on 
rain.  
6.6 Findings on Location and Distance 
Proximity of schools to amenities such as public transportation and health facilities are 
good indications of a school‟s socio-economic status. Schools that are remotely located 
from public amenities and are largely inaccessible tend to be in the rural areas and have 
the disadvantage of potentially receiving less attention (visitations) from the district 
authorities. Furthermore, in cases of emergencies, these schools would have a longer 
waiting period to reach or receive assistance. The survey found that a sizeable percentage 
were fairly close to public amenities: 33 percent of schools were located within just 100 
metres from the nearest public transport; 21 percent were located between 100 and 500 
metres and another 21 percent were located between 500 metres and 1 kilometre of public 
transport. Almost a quarter of the sample (24 percent), however, were located more than 
1 kilometre from the nearest public transport, which means that children would have to 
walk a considerable distance to reach the schools.  
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In terms of proximity to clinics, not many schools had easy access: only 9 percent were 
within 100 metres to the nearest clinic; 21 percent were located between 100 and 500 
metres; another 21 percent were located between 500 metres and 1 kilometre but the 
majority, 49 percent, were located more than 1 kilometre from the nearest health 
facilities.  
 
Most schools (81 percent) stated that they were not the only schools in the area, meaning 
that there were other options available to parents. For these schools, the principals were 
asked why parents had chosen that particular school. In response, 38 percent of principals 
indicated that it was the academic reputation of the school; 29 percent believed proximity 
was the reason; 17 percent attributed the school selection to the environment/culture; 6 
percent said ethnicity or religion and only 2 percent said cost. The remaining 7 percent 
could not specify the reason or attributed it to other reasons other than those listed above.  
6.7 Findings on Organisation and Governance 
Public schools in South Africa are required to have a school governing body (SGB), as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The SGBs for the most part, have replaced the old system of 
parent teacher association (PTAs), although, some schools maintain PTAs for fundraising 
and other purposes. With the exception of one school which did not provide a response, 
all schools had an SGB. The membership of SGBs ranged from a minimum of 4 to a 
maximum of 16 members. From the sample, 73 percent of schools had an SGB 
membership of  8 and 11 members; 15 percent had members between 4 and 7 and 12 
percent of SGBs had between 12 and 16 members. The average size of SGBs for the 
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entire sample was about 9 members. In most SGBs, parents comprised the majority of the 
membership.  
 
The number of times the SGB met in 2007 ranged from only two meetings to a maximum 
of 22 meetings. Nearly one third of SGBs would meet once a term, which means they met 
4 times in the course of 2007. On average, SGBs met 7 times in a year. The most 
discussed issue by SGBs (56 percent) pertained to budgetary and financial issues. The 
second most discussed issue (11 percent of schools) was on facilities and maintenance; 
for 10 percent of schools, “discipline” was the most discussed issue during SGB 
meetings. Seven percent discussed curriculum and student performance issues; 6 percent 
discussed mainly staff issues; 4 percent mostly discussed fees, while the remaining 5 
percent discussed other issues other than those mentioned above.  
 
Regarding PTAs, only 36 schools (21 percent) had these bodies. Fifteen of these schools 
(about 47 percent) were either in quintile 4 or 5 schools, which is a finding that becomes 
important later in the analysis. Of the schools that did not have PTAs, 70 percent 
attributed it to redundancy; in light of the mandatory establishment of SGB structure and 
22 percent stated that PTAs did not exist because of lack of interest and participation on 
the side of the parents. The remaining 8 percent attributed the absence of PTAs to a lack 
of interest by the school and various reasons other than the ones specified. From the 
schools that had PTAs, participation of parents was mixed. About 48 percent of those 
schools said the participation of parents fell somewhere between “very few” and “less 
than half” and 52 percent had between “about half” and “most” parents participating in 
PTAs.   
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All schools (with exception of 7 that did not respond) held an Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) involving parents in 2007. Furthermore, 96 percent of schools presented the 
school budgets at the AGM meeting. It is not clear why the remaining 4 percent (7 
schools) did not submit their budgets. All were schools in Gauteng Province and with the 
exception of one, were fee-charging schools between quintiles 3 and 4. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that capacity constraint was the issue.    
6.8 Findings on Supervision  
Supervision of schools is a core function of district education offices. They may take the 
form of scheduled or unscheduled visits. District inspectors may visit schools to attend to 
a problem reported by the school principal or undertake periodic assessments of the 
quality of education including areas such as curriculum, learning materials, school 
infrastructure, performance of teachers and management issues. In 2007, the frequency of 
inspections to the surveyed schools varied from nil to a maximum of 50. On the extreme 
ends, 3 percent of schools (5 schools) had no visits at all from the district in 2007 and 4 
percent (7 schools) had at least 20 in the year.  
 
During the interviews with district authorities, it was clarified that needy schools may 
receive more frequent visits due to the several constraints that they face. The survey 
found the opposite. The 7 schools that numerous visits from the district were mostly in 
Gauteng (5 schools) and with the exception of one, were urban schools. Furthermore, 
only 2 of the 7 were no-fee schools and none of the schools were in quintile 1 (all ranged 
between 2 and 4). Conversely, the 5 schools that received no visitations in 2007 tended to 
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fit the profile of needy schools. All were located in North West; 4 out of 5 were in rural 
areas and 3 out 5 were no-fee schools in quintile 1. Surprisingly, they received no 
assistance from the district in terms of school visits. Therefore, this trend is an anomaly 
that requires attention by the department.   
 
On the whole, the majority of schools (41 percent) had between 3 and 5 visits in the year, 
indicating that district inspectors would on average visit a school once a term, thus 4 
times a year. It was a similar trend in 2006, with about 40 percent of schools receiving 
between 2 and 4 visits from the district inspector.  
 
From the information gathered from the survey (see Table 6.6), general inspections form 
the bulk of visitations (about 44 percent) from the district inspectorate, followed by 
advisory visits (18 percent). The former involved among others, assessments of the 
school premises and teaching staff and the latter involved some form of technical 
assistance to the schools. The other visits focused on a variety of issues, including 
facilities and general school quality (11 percent) and assessing teachers (8 percent).    
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Table 6.6 Main purpose of official's last visit 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid general inspection 74 42.3 43.5 43.5 
advisory visit 31 17.7 18.2 61.8 
assessment of teachers 14 8.0 8.2 70.0 
assessment of students 3 1.7 1.8 71.8 
assessment of facilities 
and general quality 
19 10.9 11.2 82.9 
Other 28 16.0 16.5 99.4 
Total 170 97.1 100.0  
Missing System 5 2.9   
Total 175 100.0   
 
Following each visit, it is expected that district inspectors provide some form of feedback 
to the schools. This was not done for about 13 percent of schools, as shown in Table 6.7 
below. Written reports were presented in only about 5 percent of schools. A verbal report 
to teachers was the most common type of feedback (43 percent).   
Table 6.7 Type of feedback from Inspector 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid None 22 12.6 12.9 12.9 
verbal report at staff meeting 24 13.7 14.1 27.1 
verbal report to head teacher only 43 24.6 25.3 52.4 
verbal report to individual teachers 74 42.3 43.5 95.9 
written report to head teacher 6 3.4 3.5 99.4 
written report to individual teachers 1 .6 .6 100.0 
Total 170 97.1 100.0  
Missing System 5 2.9   
Total 175 100.0   
 
6.9 Findings on Accountability    
Public schools are required to adhere to certain measures of accountability, such as the 
submission of an audited report to district authorities every year. Interviews with some 
district directors further indicated that the submission of these reports is a prerequisite to 
receiving funds for the following year. In addition to the audited reports, schools are 
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required to submit their annual budgets and academic reports to the district authorities. 
As shown in the three tables below, with few exceptions, schools tend to adhere to the 
accountability measures.  
Table 6.8: Indicators of School Accountability (Academic Report) 
 
Did school provide academic report to district in 2007? 
Province where school is 
located 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
GP Valid yes 95 99.0 99.0 99.0 
No 1 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 96 100.0 100.0  
NW Valid yes 75 94.9 98.7 98.7 
No 1 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 76 96.2 100.0  
Missing System 3 3.8   
Total 79 100.0   
 
Only two schools did not provide their academic reports. Similarly, a high percentage (97 
percent) submitted their budgets to the district authorities (see table 6.9 below).  
 
Table 6.9 Indicators of School Accountability (Budget Report) 
Did school provide budget to district in 2007? 
Province where school is 
located 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
GP Valid Yes 93 96.9 96.9 96.9 
No 3 3.1 3.1 100.0 
Total 96 100.0 100.0  
NW Valid Yes 73 92.4 96.1 96.1 
No 3 3.8 3.9 100.0 
Total 76 96.2 100.0  
Missing System 3 3.8   
Total 79 100.0   
 
Only 6 schools failed to submit a budget. Moreover, 97 percent presented their latest 
audited financial report to the district authorities (as shown in table 6.10 below). Five 
schools did not submit their audited reports.  
 
  
156 |  
 
Table 6.10 Indicators of School Accountability (Audited Financial Report) 
Did school provide financial report to district in 2007? 
Province where school is 
located 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
GP Valid Yes 94 97.9 97.9 97.9 
No 2 2.1 2.1 100.0 
Total 96 100.0 100.0  
NW Valid Yes 73 92.4 96.1 96.1 
No 3 3.8 3.9 100.0 
Total 76 96.2 100.0  
Missing System 3 3.8   
Total 79 100.0   
 
This shows that by and large, there is a high degree of accountability from schools to 
district authorities. The reason for the high levels of compliance to district education 
regulations is that schools are mandated to submit these reports as a condition for 
receiving government funding for the next academic year. From the table, it is evident 
that a small number of schools failed to submit these documents and still received their 
funding for the following academic year. 
6.10 Findings on School Income and Expenditures  
Public ordinary schools in South Africa have three main sources of income: government 
funds (subsidies), school fees and funds from donors or from fund-raising activities. 
Table 6.11 below summarises the income data per capita for 2007 for the surveyed 
schools. The data excludes teacher salaries, which constitute the largest share of 
education funding and only presents the amounts that goes directly to the schools.  The 
table shows that Gauteng public primary schools on average receive the bulk of their 
funding from school fees and not government subsidies. In fact, the money received from 
households in the form of fees is more than 6 times the money received from 
government. The North West, being the relatively poorer province, receives more funding 
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per capita from government than Gauteng (see mean column in Table 6.10). Both 
provinces, however, rely more on household funds in the form of fees than any other 
means of income. 
Table 6.11 Summary of School Income (Rands) per capita per Province 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Province where school is located N Minimum Maximum  Mean Std. Deviation 
GP Government subsidies 93 27.52 1,685.28  397.0900 255.45640 
Tuition Fees 91 .00 10,374.44  852.3839 1786.55242 
Donor Funding  85 .00 6,015.04  163.0035 725.68491 
NW Government subsidies 72 23.57 1,750.00  425.2923 240.19575 
Tuition Fees 70 .00 3,598.74  216.0845 631.21935 
Donor Funding  63 .00 505.12  35.4620 89.28338 
 
Table 6.11 also reveals that Gauteng schools are more effective in generating income 
from other sources. On average, schools in Gauteng earned about 163 Rands per student 
in 2007 from sources other than government and school fees, compared to 35 Rands per 
student in North West. It is also noteworthy that the highest amount made by a Gauteng 
school in raising other funds is 6, 015 per student (8 million in total, though not shown in 
table), compared to 505 Rands per student (2.4 million) in the North West.  
 
Regarding school expenditure, data was sought on five key expenditure items: 
maintenance, LTSM, utilities, teacher training and administrative costs. The results are 
shown in Table 6.12 below.  
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Table 6.12 Summary of School Expenditure (Rands) per capita 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Province where 
school is located 
N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
GP Amount spent 
on school 
maintenance 
86 .00 7,981.10 19,588.92 227.7781 865.70807 
Amount spent 
on utilities 
84 .00 820.93 9,711.05 115.6078 121.57912 
Amount spent 
on scholastic 
materials 
84 34.40 3,822.72 24,312.46 289.4340 432.19486 
Amount spent 
on teacher 
training, 
bonuses etc 
82 .00 3,645.45 9,677.38 118.0168 498.68950 
Amount spent 
on 
administrative 
costs 
76 .00 1,003.31 13,190.52 173.5595 226.33464 
NW Amount spent 
on school 
maintenance 
65 .00 1214.29 9,242.69 142.1953 178.26359 
Amount spent 
on utilities 
63 .00 1,569.94 5,322.69 84.4871 230.18274 
Amount spent 
on scholastic 
materials 
63 .00 954.55 6742.37 107.0217 127.95266 
Amount spent 
on teacher 
training, 
bonuses etc 
63 .00 1,075.07 2,909.89 46.1887 172.37802 
Amount spent 
on 
administrative 
costs 
64 .00 562.29 6,067.95 94.8117 130.50039 
 
The data shows that schools in Gauteng spend most of their resources on scholastic 
materials (LTSM) than any other category, which is in line with the expectations of the 
Department of Education. This is not the case in the North West province, where poor 
infrastructure and other challenges have resulted in a higher expenditure on school 
maintenance than scholastic materials. Furthermore, the data show that the minimum 
spent by a Gauteng school on scholastic materials per student is R 34, while in North 
West; one school reported not to have any spending on scholastic materials.  
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6.11 Findings on Leakage  
Leakage, as defined in Chapter 5, is the allocated spending that does not reach intended 
beneficiaries and is either used by local government officials for purposes unrelated to 
education or captured for private gain. The study relied on data from the schools by 
asking the principals how much they expected to receive from government and how much 
they actually received. In an effort to triangulate data collection, district officials were 
also asked to provide information on the amount that schools were supposed to receive. 
These two sources of information were consolidated to derive the amount schools were 
meant to receive (intended amount). Actual receipts obtained from school records were 
captured as amounts actually received. To derive leakage, the original amount earmarked 
by the central government is compared with the amounts actually reaching the schools. 
The formula below is used to derive the extent of leakage (modified from Reinikka and 
Svennson, 2001).  
100*}{1
schoolsforearmarkedamountactual
schoolsbyreceivedamount
Leakage      
Of the 164 schools for which financial data was obtained, there were cases of leakage in 
21 schools. Of the 21 leakage schools, 13 were located in Gauteng and the remaining 8 
were located in the North West province. The mean poverty quintile of these schools was 
3.6 but, the modal value was 5. The emergence of a large proportion of wealthy schools 
experiencing leakage is a surprising finding with important implications and will be 
discussed later in the chapter and in Chapter 8. The descriptive data is shown below.  
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Table 6.13: Descriptive Data of Leaked Funds 
Descriptive data of Leaked funds Leaked funds (Rands) 
Minimum 1,000 
Maximum 197,845 
Mean 38,920 
Total amount – Gauteng 
(Average per school) 
612,446 
(47,111) 
Total amount - North West 
(Average per school) 
204,833 
(25,604) 
Grand Total (GP and NW) 817,329 
 
On the whole, a cumulative amount of over R 800,000 or nearly R 40,000 per school was 
leaked or unaccounted for in 21 schools. The extent of leakage per school in Gauteng was 
nearly twice the levels in the North West province. One may argue that this occurrence 
may be due to higher resource allocation in Gauteng schools. On the contrary, the North 
West has a higher allocation per school as shown in Table 6.11. The high levels of 
leakage in Gauteng are related to the earlier finding of high incidences of leakage among 
relatively wealthy schools. These schools rely mainly on tuition fees and other non-state 
funding and therefore are less likely to pay attention to their subsidy allocations and 
ensuring that they receive the amounts that they are entitled to. Corrupt officials within 
sub-national levels may target these schools for this purpose. One would expect that the 
poorer schools that do not charge fees and rely solely on subsidies would monitor 
government subsidies more closely.   
 
Leaked funds (according to Reinikka and Svennson‟s 2001 definition) may be the result 
of misappropriation. It could also be that these funds cannot be accounted for simply due 
to poor accounting (by schools or government). Both of these are governance concerns. It 
is important to recall the provisions made by government for underprivileged schools (no 
fee and non-section 21 schools) as discussed in Chapter 3. For these schools, the 
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Department of Education manages their finances and as indicated by District officials 
during the interviews, the department at times makes payments for certain categories of 
spending such as utilities and maintenance on behalf of the school. One may argue that 
this explains the discrepancies in funding. Therefore, one would have to examine whether 
the district offices made some payments on utilities and maintenance for these schools 
that would be equivalent to the leaked amount. In examining the expenditure statements 
of the 21 schools, it was observed that only five of these schools did not make utility 
payments in 2007 and one could infer that payments were made on their behalf by the 
district authorities. In the end, questions remain about the funding gap for the remaining 
11 school funds that made utility and maintenance payments.   
 
For Gauteng Province, 13 percent of funds earmarked for public schools in Gauteng 
province were leaked as shown below. Therefore, only 87 percent of the allocated funds 
reached the schools.   
%13100*}
222,257,2
976,971,1
{1_ LeakageIGP  
In the North West Province, a considerably higher proportion, 28 percent of funds were 
leaked meaning that only 68 percent of funds reached the schools.  
%28100*}
520,735
637,530
{1_ LeakageINW  
Even though in terms of a Rand amount, the leakage problem is more endemic in 
Gauteng, the pervasiveness of leakage in the North West cannot be overlooked. The fact 
that over a quarter of education funds are leaked in that province warrants a serious 
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concern, especially if public funds are found to be highly correlated with outcomes. This 
is examined in Chapter 8.   
 
In comparison with Table 1.1, where leakages in other African countries were as high as 
78 percent in one country, leakage in the South African school system is relatively 
modest. It is also important to recall that personnel funds are excluded since teacher 
salaries are paid directly to the teachers by the Department of Education. These funds, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, constitute the largest share of education funding. Therefore, the 
leakage calculations are relatively minimal. When examined from the perspective that 
any given school could be losing nearly R40,000 a year of funds that could upgrade 
facilities and supplement learning materials,, the leakage amount warrants some concern. 
6.12 Findings on Release of Funds (Delays)  
For schools that primarily depend on state resources (subsidies), one could argue that 
significant delays would adversely impact education outcomes. In this light, this section 
analyses the relationship between the timing of the release of public funds and education 
outcomes. To begin with, schools were asked to indicate the schedule upon which funds 
are disbursed. Four options were presented: (i) no delays (ii) less than 2 weeks delay (iii) 
between 2 weeks and 2 months and (iv) more than 2 months. The findings are captured in 
the pie chart below. 
  
  
163 |  
 
Figure 6.1 Frequency of Delays in Receiving Government Funding in Primary 
Schools 
Frequency of Delays in Receiving Government 
Funding in Primary Schools
No Delay s
26%
Less than 2 w eeks 
Delay
12%
Delay s betw een 2 
w eeks and 2 months
57%
More than 2 months 
Delay
5%
 
 
 
As shown in the chart, the majority of schools experienced between 2 weeks and 2 
months delay in receiving their funding from government. Rarely do schools receive 
funding after 2 months and a sizeable number experience no delays or less than 2 weeks 
delay. 
6.13 Conclusion 
The descriptive analysis of the survey data revealed some important findings. Firstly, 
education outcomes are encouraging across schools in terms of high pass rates and 
relatively low dropout and repetition rates. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, these 
outcome indicators do have limitations. Principals and teachers meet qualification 
thresholds but, teacher absenteeism occurred in about a third of the schools. The 
prevalent student teacher ratio was about 40 to 1 for the most part, but a high 
concentration of schools, particularly, in Gauteng, had overcrowded classrooms.  
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Concerning facilities, most schools have adequate furniture, water and toilet facilities, but 
a great number suffer from leaking roofs, and a lack of playgrounds, libraries and science 
laboratories, all of which are important for basic education. Additionally, although most 
schools are accessible by public transport, almost half of the schools (49 percent) are far 
from hospitals or clinics.   
 
In terms of organisation and governance, all schools have SGBs and parents are 
adequately represented on the SGBs, although, the survey could not ascertain how 
effective the parents are in terms of meaningful participation and decision-making. 
Budgetary and financial issues dominate most SGB meetings, followed by facilities and 
maintenance. Most SGBs meet at least once a term – 4 times a year. Schools also 
consistently have annual general meetings, where the vast majority present the annual 
budgets to parents.  
 
District supervision of schools was found to be the most problematic area. There were 
some schools that did not receive a single visit from the district in an entire year. Others 
received over 20 visits. The survey revealed that contrary to the indications by district 
authorities that needy schools require more visits, it was the needy schools that tended to 
be neglected. On the positive side, the district inspectors tended to give feedback to the 
schools after the inspections, although they were mostly verbal and not written.  
 
In terms of income and expenditure, Gauteng schools were better resourced and relied 
more on private funds than schools in North West, which tended to rely more heavily on 
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government subsidies. Gauteng schools also tended to spend more of their income on 
learner materials than the North West, which spent the bulk of their allocations on 
maintenance. Delays in remitting funds were not very rampant as most schools receive 
the funds within a timeframe of two weeks to two months. Leakages only occurred in 13 
percent of the schools but, the amounts were substantial (R 800,000), which is 16 percent 
of the total education funding allocated to the schools, excluding personnel costs.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AT THE SUB-
NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Technical efficiency, as explained in the introductory chapter, refers to the capacity of 
line agencies to use allocated resources in a manner that ensures efficient and effective 
delivery of public goods and services. A key value in technical efficiency is the systemic 
orientation that encourages government officials to focus on performance and strategic 
objectives. Among other requirements, technical efficiency relies on a well-functioning 
accounting and financial management system; and attention to the links between 
budgeting and financial management systems and other service-wide systems and 
processes. This chapter therefore qualitatively examines the extent to which sub-national 
structures in Gauteng and North West provinces succeed in being technically efficient 
and the extent to which deficiencies therein affect the provisioning of quality education 
services.  
 
The chapter delves into questions such as: are the current decentralised education 
structures optimally designed to promote sound education outcomes? Is there adequate 
financial management capacity at the local government level? Are district offices 
properly equipped to enable officials to fully perform their functions? Are local education 
authorities provided with an enabling environment that incentivises optimal delivery of 
social services? The findings reported are based on interviews with 10 of the 15 District 
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Education Offices (DEOs) in the Gauteng Province that participated in the survey and 3 
out of the 4 Regional Education Offices (REOs) in the North West Province. The chapter 
begins with an analysis of the decentralised education structure in the two provinces and 
how the structural design hinders or promotes effective service delivery. The next 
sections focus on financial management and an analysis of human resource capacity.            
7.2 Decentralisation and Effective Service Delivery  
Overview of Decentralised Education Structures in Gauteng and North West 
Provinces  
 
The administration of education in South Africa is decentralised, with the highest-
decision making authority being the National Department of Education, followed by the 
Provincial Education Departments (PEDs). The PEDs are headed by Members of the 
Executive Council (MECs) for Education. The next hierarchal position at the provincial 
level is the Superintendent General, who essentially ensures that the department is 
efficiently and effectively managed in terms of administration. A Deputy Director 
General (DDG) or Head of Department (HOD) oversees the operation of the executive 
managers in charge of the district/regional levels.  
 
Beyond the provincial level, the structure varies by province. In Gauteng, there are 
District Education Offices (DEOs) in all districts, but in North West, clusters of districts 
are governed by a regional education office (REO) – four in total. The decentralised 
structure at the provincial level is a devolution of power, whereby PEDs have full 
authority and discretion over most of their affairs. Beyond that level, it becomes a 
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deconcentration of power, whereby the districts and regions remain under the hierarchal 
authority of the provinces.  
 
At the time of the survey, there were 15 DEOs governing a total of 1,880 public ordinary 
schools, 1,617,124 learners and 47,990 educators in Gauteng province (National 
Treasury, 2007).  In the North West province, there are 4 REOs supported by 21 Area 
Project Offices (APOs) that governed 2,115 public ordinary schools, 894,249 learners 
and 30,388 educators in 2007 (National Treasury, 2007). Due to resource constraints, the 
APOs are not fully established offices like the DEOs. They are smaller offices headed by 
a Chief Education Specialist (who serves at the level of a Deputy Director) and supported 
by managers and subject specialists offering direct support to schools. APOs generally 
provide support to a cluster of schools within a demarcated area (comprising of several 
districts).  
Effectiveness of Sub-National Education Structures in providing Support to 
Primary Schools   
 
In light of the efforts to enhance accessibility of education services and to facilitate 
efficiency in the delivery of these services, it is important to examine whether these 
decentralised education structures are effective in providing optimal services to schools. 
The starting point in this analysis pertains to accessibility: Are DEOs and REOs 
conveniently located to allow for optimal scheduled and unscheduled visits to schools? 
Table 7.1 below shows the location of these offices in relation to the schools within the 
region/district.  
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Table 7.1 Location of District/Regional Education Offices 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
GP How many minutes it 
takes to reach closest 
school from office 
9 1 35 10.22 11.311 
How many minutes it 
takes to reach the 
farthest school from 
office 
9 25 90 49.78 19.633 
How many minutes it 
takes to reach a school 
on average school from 
office 
9 15 60 31.22 16.200 
 
NW 
How many minutes it 
takes to reach closest 
school from office 
3 1 5 3.00 2.000 
How many minutes it 
takes to reach the 
farthest school from 
office 
3 90 180 150.00 51.962 
How many minutes it 
takes to reach a school 
on average school from 
office 
3 30 60 43.33 15.275 
 
The table shows that the REOs in the North West have a greater distance to cover to 
reach the average school and the farthest school, compared to the DEOs in Gauteng. 
Indeed, due to the large size of the province, it can take up to 2 hours to get to a school 
within a single region in the North West.
26
     
 
Decentralising the administration of schools should ideally allow for regular monitoring 
and supervision of schools through regular on-site visits, for instance, and offering 
schools, technical support as needed, in order to meet pre-established educational goals. 
The study was able to examine whether district officials consistently pay on-site visits to 
schools. The study was also able to address questions such as, how do schools with more 
                                                 
26
 The study does not take APOs into account as they do not provide the full range of services provided by 
the REOs.  
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supervision fare in terms of education outcomes and how do schools with less supervision 
fare in terms of education outcomes?     
Supervision of Schools by District/Regional Education Inspectors   
 
The main purpose of district education offices is to support the delivery of the curriculum 
and to ensure that all learners are afforded good educational learning opportunities 
(Roberts, 2001). As part of their set functions, district officials periodically visit schools 
for a number of reasons. They include among others, periodic inspection of the premises; 
assessments of students/teachers; evaluation of the quality of education; attending to 
specific problems that have been reported by the school principal; training of teachers on 
new curricular; school governance and resolving management/conflict issues. The 
particular staff responsible for these supervisions at district/regional levels are: 
Institutional Development Support Officials (IDSOs) – in Gauteng Province and Area 
Project Officers (APOs) – in the North West Province.   
 
While there is no theory on an acceptable quantity of on-site visits to schools in a term or 
in a year, one can assume that at least a single visit within a term to each public school 
would be expected and it would appear irregular if some schools did not receive a single 
visit from a district official within a school term for a quality assessment or any other 
reason. Therefore, for the sake of making some assessment in the absence of specific 
guidelines on the adequacy of the number of school visits, zero visits to any schools 
(whether performing or underperforming) will constitute a problem on the part of the 
district/regional offices. It may indicate that district offices are understaffed or lacking 
capacity to conduct the required inspections. It may also suggest that certain schools are 
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not easily accessible and therefore, district inspectors do not make the effort to go there. 
The implication could be highly detrimental to education outcomes.   
 
At the same time, some schools may receive numerous visits in a year. According to 
district officials, this happens in the context of underperforming schools as they demand 
more attention. Therefore, one would observe a higher frequency of visits in such 
schools. Although, excessive visits could theoretically overwhelm the principal, who 
already has competing demands on his/her time, the rationale offered by IDSOs during 
interviews means that a high volume of visits may be a necessary occurrence that 
generates positive results in education outcomes.  
 
Table 7.2 below shows the average number of visits by districts inspectors in 2006 and 
2007 in Gauteng and North West provinces. For both provinces, it is clear that some 
schools did not have a single visit from the district in a term. As there are four terms in a 
year, one would expect at least 4 visits in a year. In Gauteng, however, there are instances 
of only one visit in a year. In the case of North West, some schools did not see a district 
inspector at all during the year.   
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Table 7.2 Frequency of Visits by District Inspectors 
Descriptive Statistics 
Province where school is located N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
GP # of visits by district 
inspector in 2007 
90 1.00 32.00 7.5222 5.56116 
# of visits by district 
inspector in 2006 
86 1.00 30.00 7.1395 5.55012 
NW # of visits by district 
inspector in 2007 
73 .00 50.00 6.2055 6.97607 
# of visits by district 
inspector in 2006 
65 .00 50.00 6.4308 7.31430 
GP & 
NW  
# of visits by district 
inspector in 2007 
163 .00 50.00 6.9325 6.24908 
# of visits by district 
inspector in 2006 
151 .00 50.00 6.8344 6.35655 
 
Given that some schools in both provinces scarcely interact with the district officials at 
the school premises, it is important to examine those schools. As previously mentioned, 
one would expect these schools to fall within the top quintiles - which is also a signal of 
well performing schools and hence needing less visits. 
 
Of the 175 schools surveyed, 44 schools (25 percent) emerged with less than 4 visits in 
the entire school year, as reported by the school principals. The majority of these (64 
percent) were from the North West province, most especially from the Central Region. 
One would expect this trend to be more prevalent in the North West given the sparsely 
populated characteristic of the province and considerable distance of schools from the 
REO.  However, it is worrying that up to five schools in the North West did not receive a 
single visit from a district official in the entire academic year. 
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The study was further interested in knowing the types of schools that were receiving 
considerable or very limited supervisory visits in terms of their socio-economic status. 
From the group that received less than 4 visits in a year, 44 percent fell between quintiles 
1 and 2 and 78 percent fell between quintiles 1 and 3. This finding shows that contrary to 
expectations, a sizeable number of disadvantaged schools that would require more 
technical assistance from the districts (be it proactive or reactive visits), did not receive 
this support unless these schools were generally perceived by the districts to be efficient 
even if disadvantaged. It may also be that these schools were remotely located which 
presents a constraint to the district supervisors. The major concern here is that the criteria 
for supervision is not clear.    
7.3 Environmental Constraints of Sub-National Education Structures in 
Delivering Services to Schools and Communities  
 
The effectiveness of districts and regions in delivering education services can be 
compromised by environmental constraints at the district/regional offices such as poor 
infrastructure and inadequate facilities. In that regard, significant variation was observed 
in terms of office infrastructure at the district/regional levels. DEOs, such as those in 
Ekurhuleni North, Gauteng East, Johannesburg East and Johannesburg North had better-
quality infrastructure such as a well-maintained building, compared to other districts such 
as Gauteng North, Gauteng West and Tshwane South where the offices were fragmented 
or visibly run-down, crowded and had furniture in dire condition. In the latter offices, 
there also appeared to be a lack of organisation and the working environment seemed 
disorganized. On the contrary, the three REO buildings surveyed in North West were all 
in fairly good condition.   
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All of the offices surveyed in the two provinces had government-issued vehicles, ranging 
from 18 cars in one district to 50 cars in another district. While 99 percent of vehicles 
were said to be in working condition in 9 DEOs in Gauteng, only 78 percent of vehicles 
were in working order in North West, which is seen as problematic given the larger 
distance they have to cover in the region.
27
  
7.4 Financial Management at the Sub-National Level  
To a large extent, the management of education funds is tasked to provincial authorities. 
Some of this burden has been shifted to the districts/regions and schools whereby, DEOs 
and REOs manage the funds for non-section 21 schools (for example, paying their utility 
bills) while, School Governing Bodies (SGBs) of section 21 schools, manage the funds 
received from government. Given the fiscal responsibilities given to sub-national 
structures, it is important that local education offices adhere to budgetary controls and 
other fiscal mechanisms observed at the national level.   
 
 
The study found that all the DEOs and REOs surveyed had an accounting unit that 
handles all the financial and procurement matters for the office. In spite of this, it was 
observed that record-keeping in the finance offices was highly problematic in most 
districts. These challenges were more pronounced in the North West, where the regional 
offices frequently deferred questions on expenditures and finance issues to the provinces.   
 
                                                 
27
 This pertains to only Central and Southern Regions. Bophirima was unable to provide data on vehicles 
and Bojanala did not participate in the survey.  
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When asked whether there was regular auditing of the district/regional accounts, 8 
districts/regions said yes and 3 district/regions said no. Upon further investigation on 
these inconsistencies, it was clarified that auditors may visit the district/regional offices 
as part of the audit exercise of the provincial audit. Therefore, in a strict sense, the lower 
levels of the sub-national offices are not audited. The lack of auditing of the district and 
regional offices may be rationalised by the fact that these decentralised structures are 
simply deconcentrated structures with no distinct powers. As these offices are not only 
managing their own accounts, but that of non-section 21 schools, one could query the 
practice of not auditing district/region accounts.   
 
The study further found that district and regional education offices are not mandated to 
publish their financial accounts. Nevertheless, all 13 offices indicated that they operate 
within the regulations of the PFMA, which provides punitive actions for overspending or 
under-spending. Regardless, some of the districts and regions did admit that overspending 
and under-spending had occurred in the past under certain budgetary items, but since the 
accounts are balanced at the provincial level, these anomalies are corrected at that level. 
This indicates that any mismanagement of funds at the district and regional level would 
only be known by provincial authorities and not the public at large. 
District and Regional Office Procurement Arrangements  
 
District education offices in Gauteng province procure goods and services through a 
centralised system known as the Gauteng Shared Services Centre (GSSC). The rationale 
for the GSSC is to harness the GPG's collective buying power by reducing the cost of 
buying goods and services. Consolidating and outsourcing office support functions would 
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enable the decentralised education offices to focus and excel in service delivery. 
Therefore, there is a strong justification for this system of procurement. There are also 
drawbacks according to some district officials. The predominant concern is that of delays. 
As the GSSC has to service 11 departments in the province, delays are unavoidable. 
Some districts also feel that due to local knowledge, it would be more efficient and cost-
effective for districts to procure their own goods and services. It should be noted 
however, that not all districts share this view. Some were supportive of the status quo 
despite its drawbacks. They noted that an agreement exists for procurement turnaround 
time. It was, however, clear that the GSSC does not always adhere strictly to the 
agreement and it is not clear what alternatives exist if they fail to procure services in the 
stipulated timeframe.    
 
In North West, regional education offices procure directly from the service providers. As 
explained by one Chief Director, REOs have to source three quotations before procuring 
goods/services and the turnaround time is usually a month. Evidently, the two provinces 
have different procurement systems. Given that both provinces experience constraints in 
areas like infrastructure and maintenance, it is difficult to say which system is more 
effective and efficient. The feedback from the interviews on the success of requests for 
items like supplies and maintenance can offer some answers.  
 
Of the four DEOs in Gauteng, who reported shortages in supplies, two noted that the 
request was not fully resolved. In North West however, only one REO (out of three) 
reported some shortage in supplies, but also reported that the request was fully resolved. 
Therefore, the shortage of supplies was only a concern for the Gauteng province and not 
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the North West province. In terms of building infrastructure, six out of ten DEOs in 
Gauteng reported problems. Of the six, only two DEOs reported that their requests were 
fully attended to. In the North West, there was only one REO that complained of building 
problems, but also reported that requests in this regard were fully resolved. From these 
results, one could conclude that the procurement system is more effective and efficient in 
North West province. It is important to recognise that these accounts are self-reports and 
may be subjective. They do however, align with the observation by the researcher made 
earlier that DEOs in Gauteng varied significantly in terms of the quality of infrastructure 
while the North West REO buildings were in good condition.    
7.5 District/Regional Education Office Human Resource Capacity  
 
In terms of human resource capacity, none of the surveyed district and regional offices in 
Gauteng and North West were fully staffed. The education sector tends to experience 
substantive horizontal and vertical movement of staff. It is common for teachers to leave 
schools and take up employment at the district/regional education offices and for 
education officials to move from one district to the other or from district to province. 
Among the 13 education offices surveyed, 7 provided complete information on the staff 
complement. The results are presented in Table 7.3.  
Table 7.3 District and Regional Education Office Staff Vacancy Rate 
PROVINCE DISTRICT/REGION VACANCY RATE (%) 
GAUTENG Johannesburg Central 37.04 
Johannesburg East 30.93 
Johannesburg West  43.59 
Tshwane North 13.30 
NORTH WEST Central 27.31 
Bophirima 43.0 
Southern 20.00 
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As the table shows, the vacancy rate ranges from 13 to 43 percent with significant 
variation within provinces though it is not clear why there is so much intra-provincial 
variation. With the exception of Gauteng North and Gauteng West, the remaining 11 
districts and regions surveyed admitted to experiencing staff shortage in 2007 and had 
subsequently notified the Department. Of the 10 DEOs/REOs that provided further 
information as to whether requests made on staff shortages were successful or not, only 2 
DEOs indicated that the request was fully successful. For the others, the requests were 
either partially successful (3); not successful (2) or pending (3).  
 
These responses show some level of dissatisfaction with the manner in which the 
Department is responding to the human resource needs at the district and regional levels. 
One North West Regional Office indicated that shortage of staff continues to be a 
problem because (i) advertisement of staff is centralized and (ii) advertisements are not 
budgeted for at the regional level, which explains why vacancies were not advertised for 
three years. It is not clear why the regions would neglect to budget for advertisements.  
 
Furthermore, six out of the thirteen DEOs and REOs surveyed indicated that they had 
experienced a problem of late payment of staff in 2007. Although this problem was 
resolved in four of those cases, one district indicated that it was only partially resolved 
and in the case of another district, the issue of staff payment was still pending. District 
officials did however, mention that late payment of staff may be a result of late 
submission of paperwork by the staff concerned and delays in opening bank accounts. 
Therefore, the issue may not be related to technical inefficiency at the district offices. 
While, the study was unable to verify this as interviewing staff was beyond the scope of 
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this study, observations during the fieldwork showed that inefficiencies are likely to be 
dominant in the district offices.
28
   
Findings on Dismissals and Turnovers of District Directors and Senior Staff    
 
High turnovers and dismissals in any institution are signs of technical inefficiencies and 
may stem from weak recruitment or appointment policies and practices and lack of solid 
management/leadership. These in turn, affect the stability of the working environment 
and can affect output. Table 7.4 below shows (i) the numbers of district or regional 
directors that have headed the education office in the past 5 years and (ii) accounts of 
dismissals of senior staff based on non-performance or irregularities.   
Table 7.4 Incidences of Dismissals and District Director Turnover 
PROVINCE DISTRICT/REGION Number of District 
Directors in Past 5 
Years 
Account of 
Dismissal of 
Senior Staff  
GAUTENG Gauteng North 2 No 
Gauteng West 7 Yes 
Johannesburg Central  2 No 
Johannesburg East 1 No 
Johannesburg North  1 No 
Johannesburg West n/a No 
Sedibeng East 3 No 
Sedibeng West  2 No 
Tshwane North  2 No 
Tshwane South 3 No 
NORTH WEST Bophirima  1 No 
Central 1 No 
Southern 2 No 
 
                                                 
28
It was observed in one district in Gauteng Province that there are problems of either overlapping duties or 
lack of clarity in certain responsibilities. For instance, in the process of conducting an interview with the 
Finance Director in one DEO, a teacher came in to complain that her salary had been paid to a closed bank 
account. She recalled that she had previously informed the district of her new banking details in writing. 
The Finance Director referred her to the Human Resource office but moments later, the teacher came back 
stating that the human resource office had indicated that it was the finance office‟s responsibility. The 
finance director was adamant that the matter was outside his jurisdiction. In the end, it was not clear if and 
how the matter was resolved, but the incidence revealed a serious level of technical inefficiency – one 
which was having a distressing effect on a teacher(s) and could indirectly affect the quality of teaching.     
 
  
180 |  
 
As shown in the table, the district of Gauteng West stands out in terms of having seven 
district directors in five years. Tshwane South and Sedibeng East have had three district 
directors, while the rest have had either one or two. Gauteng West is also the only district 
that has had the experience of dismissing senior staff based on irregularities or lack of 
performance. This shows that the district may have some fundamental problems in the 
area of technical efficiency – a finding that could compound the problems of educational 
quality in that district. One could argue that the finding for Gauteng West is attributed to 
the rigour that is applied to service delivery and therefore, high turnovers are a reflection 
of low tolerance for non-performance. The fact remains that high turnovers in any 
organisation is perceived negatively and often symptomatic of internal 
organisational/efficiency problems.    
 
For this reason, it is useful to examine the indicators of education outcomes in the 
Gauteng West district in comparison with other schools in the province. A compendium 
of the four education outcomes in all the fifteen Gauteng districts is presented in Table 
7.5 in the appendix. A similar table is presented below but compares the education 
outcomes in Gauteng West with the averaged education statistics in the other 14 districts 
in the province.  
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Table 7.6 A Comparison of Education Outcomes between Gauteng West District 
and All Other Districts in Gauteng Province. 
 
Districts in Gauteng 
Province  
Indicators of Education 
Outcomes  
N Mean Std. Deviation 
 
 
All Gauteng Districts 
Except Gauteng West  
    
% of students repeating 
Grade 1 
86 5.20 5.72 
% of students repeating 
Grade 7 
79 .85 1.53 
% of students dropping 
out after Grade 1 
81 3.53 6.38 
% of students dropping 
out after Grade 5 
81 3.34 4.35 
 
 
Gauteng West  
% of students repeating 
Grade 1 
5 8.40 7.54 
% of students repeating 
Grade 7 
5 2.80 4.09 
% of students dropping 
out after Grade 1 
4 15.75 25.67 
% of students dropping 
out after Grade 5 
4 2.50 3.79 
 
The results show that with the exception of one indicator: Grade 5 dropout, schools in the 
Gauteng West district performed comparatively worse than other schools in the province. 
Gauteng West schools had higher repetition rates for Grades 1 and 7 and significantly 
higher Grade 1 dropout rates. The data for Grade 1 dropout is particularly alarming as 
Gauteng West schools experience on average nearly 16 percent dropout rates, compared 
to about a 4 percent average in other districts. There may be several reasons why schools 
in Gauteng West appear to be underperforming. This is a potential area for future 
research but, one of those reasons could be the lack of technical efficiency at the district 
office, as evidenced by high turnovers and accounts of dismissals.   
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7.6 Conclusion   
This chapter focused on a qualitative analysis of efficiency and effectiveness of sub-
national governments. On a positive note, all had accounting offices although record 
keeping was fairly poor, especially in the North West. It raises questions about how 
certain DEOs and REOs manage the accounts of section 21 schools, given their own lack 
financial management capacities. Human resource capacities are also a major challenge 
as none of the district/regional education offices were fully staffed. In fact some of the 
vacancy rates were significantly high. Gauteng West was singled out for unusually high 
turnover rates. It was also the only province with a record of recent dismissals of senior 
staff for irregularities. It was therefore no surprise that schools in Gauteng West 
performed worse than schools in other districts. The study also found problems in school 
supervision, where poorer and underachieving schools were receiving less supervisory 
visits than better off schools.  
 
In conclusion, the study revealed problems in the operational management at the district 
levels. In terms of policy implications, it is clear that human resource capacity needs 
beefing up. District offices require adequate staff capacity, support in record-keeping, 
enough vehicles to allow for optimal supervisory visits and adequate infrastructure that is 
conducive for productivity.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEM AND EDUCATION 
OUTCOMES 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The overarching aim of this study is to examine whether PEM is a significant factor in 
explaining education outcomes. So far, the study has established that despite increased 
resources, outcomes in education are substandard in Africa. This is also true for South 
Africa (Chapters 1, 2 and 3). The study also established that poor practices in public 
expenditure management (PEM) have resulted in extensive leakages of education funds 
in several African countries and that 13 and 28 percent of education subsidies in Gauteng 
and North West provinces respectively were leaked in 2007 as evidenced by the sample 
surveyed for this study (Chapter 6). In Chapter 7, it was evident that technical 
inefficiencies which prevail in some districts may also be related to poor education 
outcomes.  
 
This chapter empirically examines whether the variations in technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency trends independently influence variations in education outcomes. 
This is done through correlation and regression analyses and robustness checks to verify 
the validity of the results.    
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8.2 PEM and Education Outcomes: Results of Correlation Analysis   
 
The first step in establishing whether a significant relationship exists between PEM and 
education outcomes is to establish a correlation. A correlation analysis would indicate 
both the sign and the strength of the relationship between two variables. This is done 
through bivariate correlations where statistically significant results are reported at 0.05 
and 0.1 levels. The findings on the strengths of PEM in education outcomes are presented 
below. This is followed by preliminary regressions between the education outcome 
variables and other explanatory variables in order to establish the important school and 
non-school inputs that should be incorporated in the regression model.    
Results on Technical Efficiency: Leakage and Delays 
 
 
In Chapter 6, leakage of funds was found to occur in only 13 percent of the schools 
sample, although the amounts were substantive. Delays in the channelling of funds from 
the government to schools were frequent occurrences but not severe as most schools 
received their subsidies within two weeks to two months. Nonetheless, it is important to 
assess whether leakages and delays, regardless of severity, were an important factor in 
education outcomes. The results of the correlations are shown in Table 8.1 below.
29
  
                                                 
29
 The results for leakage are derived from parametric bivariate correlations (pearson r). Given that the 
delay variable is categorical in nature, cross-tabulations were computed to assess the correlation between 
delays and education outcomes. The chi square results are presented in the table.  
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Table 8.1 Correlation between Leakage, Delays and Education Outcomes 
 
Correlations 
  % of students 
passing 2007 
exams 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 7 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 5 
Leakage Pearson 
Correlation 
-.033 -.049 .045 -.020 .000 
Sig.  .710 .550 .602 .812 .993 
N 127 152 134 145 143 
Delays Pearson Chi-
Square 
17.43 15.68 15.34 27.70* 25.58* 
Sig .425 .943 .355 .117 .142 
N 128 154 136 147 145 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level  
 
According to the results, there are no statistically significant results for leakage but delays 
are significantly associated with dropout rates. The positive signs are the expected signs 
indicating that increased delays – an indicator of technical inefficiencies in the 
management of education funds – is associated with students not returning to the school. 
In the case of leakage, as was explained in Chapter 6, leakages were more frequent in 
relatively wealthy schools (the majority being quintile 5 schools). The two possible 
explanations are that the wealthier schools do not rely strongly on government subsidies 
and therefore, do not pay attention to leakages. It may also be that these schools report 
leakages more accurately than poorer schools. In either scenario, a significant correlation 
between leakage and performance would only be evident in poor schools. The results of 
leakage disaggregated by low and high poverty quintiles are shown in Table 8.2 below.   
  
186 |  
 
Table 8.2 Correlation between Leakage and Education Outcomes by Quintile 
 
Correlations 
  % of students 
passing 2007 
exams 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 7 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 5 
Leakage (Q1, Q2) Pearson 
Correlation 
-.396** .044 .402** .070 -.145 
Sig.  .01 .75 .00 .62 .31 
N 39 52 42 50 50 
Leakage (Q4, Q5) Pearson Chi-
Square 
.072 -.078 -.116 -.074 .087 
Sig .65 .61 .45 .64 .58 
N 41 43 43 41 42 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
Note: Quintile 3 schools are excluded because they fall within the middle spectrum of the poverty scale. 
Their exclusion also allows us to see clearly the difference in outcomes between the schools at the opposite 
ends of the poverty quintile scale. The remaining schools are grouped into two in order to compare wealthy 
versus poor schools.   
 
As shown in the table above, in high quintile schools, there are no significant results 
showing leakages to be associated with education outcomes but in low quintile schools, 
two significant results emerge for two of the outcome variables (pass rates and Grade 7 
repetition rates). The significant correlations are further analysed in a scatter diagram to 
assess whether the relationship may be driven by outliers.    
 
Figure 8.1: Scatter Plots of Leakage in Low Quintile Schools and Education 
Outcomes 
 
8.1(a) Leakage and Grade 7 repetition  8.1(b) Leakage and Pass Rates 
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The diagrams, mapping out the relationship between leakage and Grade 7 repetition in 
the first chart and pass rates in the second chart, show a clear outlier of R 82,000 in 
leakage in the case of one school. When this single outlier is removed, the bivariate 
correlations lose all significance as shown in Table 8.3 below.  
 
Table 8.3 Correlation between Leakage and Education Outcomes for Low Quintile 
Schools 
Correlations 
  % of students 
passing 2007 
exams 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 7 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 5 
Leakage (Q1, Q2) Pearson 
Correlation 
.054 .003 -.127 .035 -.074 
Sig.  .74 .98 .42 .80 .61 
N 38 51 41 49 49 
Note: The table excludes the outlier shown in figure 8.1 
 
Therefore, leakage is not likely to be correlated with outcomes. The lack of significance 
could be also attributed to data limitations and more research drawing from a more 
representative dataset would be required to draw meaningful conclusions on the impact of 
leakage.  
Results on Allocative Efficiency: Public Expenditure, Total resource wealth 
and LTSM Expenditure 
 
This section explores the relationship between the three variables of education 
expenditure and education outcomes. Public spending refers only to government 
subsidies. Total resource wealth of a school includes subsidies, tuition fees and donor 
contributions. LTSM spending refers to the amount a school spends on learning, teaching 
and support materials. The results of the bivariate correlations are presented below.  
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Table 8.4 Correlation between Education Expenditure per Capita and Education 
Outcomes 
 
Correlations 
  % of students 
passing 2007 
exams 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 7 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 5 
Per capita 
government 
funding  
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.097 .066 .075 .089 .063 
Sig. .27 .41 .38 .27 .45 
N 129 156 137 149 146 
per capita amount 
received from 
govt, fees and 
donor 
contributions 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.175* -.145* -.152* -.097 .024 
Sig.  .06 .09 .09 .27 .78 
N 115 137 121 131 130 
 
Per capita LTSM 
spending 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.119 -.214** -.153* -.006* -.077 
Sig.  .21 .01 .09 .94 .38 
N 112 137 120 132 129 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level  
 
As the bivariate correlations show, total resource wealth per capita and LTSM spending 
per capita is significantly associated with education outcomes. The coefficients are not 
only statistically significant but also have the expected negative signs, showing that 
increased total and LTSM spending is strongly associated with reduced repetition rates. 
The lack of correlation for public spending however, may be explained by the 
redistributive component in terms of how resources are allocated to schools. In other 
words, a correlation may not be apparent in a situation where government allocates more 
funds to more disadvantaged schools as is done in South Africa whereby funding is 
weighted against a schools poverty quintile. In this context, there is a need to control for 
poverty quintiles.  This is done in a partial correlation, shown below.  
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Table 8.5 Partial Correlations between Public Expenditure and Education 
Outcomes 
 
Partial Correlations 
  % of students 
passing 2007 
exams 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
repeating 
Grade 7 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 1 
% of 
students 
dropping 
out after 
Grade 5 
Per capita 
government 
funding  
 for Quintile 1 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.000 .003 .001 .005 -.000 
Sig. .79 .412 .44 .12 .91 
N 121 147 129 140 137 
Per capita 
government 
funding  
for Quintile 2 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.000 .004 -.000 -.008** -.000 
Sig.  .79 .27 .69 .023 .72 
N 121 147 129 140 137 
 
Per capita 
government 
funding  
 for Quintile 3 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.000 .004 .001 .006* -.000 
Sig.  .83 .20 .49 .08 .75 
N 121 147 129 140 137 
Per capita 
government 
funding  
 for Quintile 4 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.000 .003 .000 .007** .000 
Sig.  .85 .36 .67 .02 .98 
N 121 147 129 140 137 
Per capita 
government 
funding  
 for Quintile 5 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.002 .001 -.000 .004 -.003 
Sig.  .42 .74 .92 .29 .13 
N 121 147 129 140 137 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level  
 
The correlations show that when SES is controlled for in the partial correlations, public 
spending still lacks significance in four of the outcome variables. Grade 1 dropout 
emerges as significant when the middle quintiles (two, three and four) are controlled for. 
Only one of them (quintile 2) emerges with the expected negative sign. Possibly, there 
may have been significant correlations with more robust indicators of SES. The quintile 
index is narrow in its categorical spread. While it reveals a clear difference between the 
top and bottom ranks, the significance of the variations in the middle quintiles could be 
marginal. It may also be the case that public spending is tenuously associated with 
education outcomes, which, as previously mentioned is heavily supported in the 
literature.         
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Results on School and Non School Inputs  
 
In this section, a series of exploratory OLS regressions are undertaken using subgroups of 
school and class size, facilities, socio-economic characteristics, school-based governance 
and teaching characteristics – all of which have theoretical importance. The aim is to 
establish which of these variables are significantly associated with changes in education 
outcomes and should be included in subsequent stages of the analysis. The results are 
presented in Table 8.6 below.  
 
Table 8.6 OLS Correlations of School and Non-school Inputs 
 
Variable Pass 
rates 
Grade 1 
repetition  
Grade 7 
repetition  
Grade 1 
dropout 
Grade 5 
dropout 
School/Class size 
Student  population -.000 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Pupil-to-teacher ratio .020 
(.036) 
-.054 
(.059) 
-.041 
(.038) 
-.052 
(.073) 
.018 
(.036) 
Pupil-to-classroom ratio 53.92** 
(28.10) 
-88.46** 
(41.86) 
-53.06** 
(23.44) 
119.7** 
(49.90) 
61.50** 
(24.77) 
Obs 128 155 136 148 145 
R-squared  .046 .058 .079 .117 .094 
Facilities  
Leaking roofs -.176* 
(.114) 
.052 
(.195) 
.201** 
(.095) 
.473** 
(.238) 
.255** 
(.114) 
Library dummy .492 
(.926) 
-3.381** 
(1.446) 
.424 
(.758) 
.081 
(1.783) 
1.881** 
(.921) 
Science lab dummy 1.899* 
(1.034) 
.517 
(1.681) 
-1.702** 
(.860) 
-1.149 
(2.099) 
-1.562* 
(1.043) 
Working toilets dummy -.961 
(.874) 
-1.800 
(1.368) 
.436 
(.706) 
-.029 
(1.666) 
.501 
(.831) 
Playground dummy .413 
(.869) 
2.897** 
(1.350) 
-.487 
(.708) 
-1.396 
(1.657) 
-1.027 
(.836) 
Obs 131 157 139 150 148 
R-squared  .081 .076 .073 .044 .072 
Socio-economic Characteristics  
Poverty Quintile 1 -2.703* 
(1.486) 
8.707** 
(2.312) 
-.173 
(1.247) 
5.813* 
(3.330) 
.812 
(1.622) 
Poverty Quintile 2 -3.600** 
(1.330) 
6.828** 
(2.167) 
1.876* 
(1.111) 
2.553 
(3.076) 
1.593 
(1.485) 
Poverty Quintile 3 -2.001* 
(1.087) 
3.754** 
(1.785) 
1.071 
(.897) 
2.672 
(2.561) 
1.939* 
(1.242) 
Poverty Quintile 4 -1.820* 1.407 .903 7.202** 3.924** 
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(1.192) (2.00) (.984) (2.886) (1.365) 
Urban dummy .310 
(1.044) 
6.080** 
(1.636) 
-.686 
(.877) 
-.067 
(2.345) 
.-.320 
(1.122) 
District population -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
District Av Household size 6.196** 
(1.276) 
-2.921* 
(1.969) 
-3.985** 
(1.030) 
-1.287 
(2.821) 
-.195 
(1.359) 
District access to electricity .245** 
(.067) 
-.116 
(.110) 
-.223** 
(.057) 
.023 
(.160) 
-.033 
(.075) 
District access to piped water  -.019 
(.052) 
-.076 
(.081) 
-.005 
(.042) 
.027 
(.117) 
-.009 
(.075) 
Obs 124 149 132 142 140 
R-squared  .028 .245 .281 .062 .066 
School Based Governance 
PTA  Dummy  1.787** 
(.918) 
-.357 
(1.400) 
-1.147* 
(.728) 
-2.925* 
(1.808) 
.581 
(.912) 
SGB Meetings in 2007 .049 
(.114) 
.110 
(.173) 
-.043 
(.094) 
-.191 
(.219) 
-.048 
(.114) 
Number of SGB Members -.300 
(.279) 
-1.013** 
(.410) 
.248 
(.226) 
-.475 
(.540) 
-.299 
(.271) 
Number of SGB Parents .277 
(.454) 
1.804** 
(.691) 
-.358 
(.376) 
-.807 
(.883) 
.165 
(.457) 
Obs 126 152 134 145 143 
R-squared  .004 .004 .002 .007 .001 
Educator Characteristics  
Principal experience -.056 
(.055) 
.110 
(.097) 
.067 
(.048) 
.026 
(.124) 
-.145** 
(.065) 
Principal University Degree 
Dummy 
1.204 
(.931) 
-1.917 
(1.473) 
-.741 
(.769) 
.611 
(1.848) 
-1.546* 
(.997) 
Teacher absenteeism Dummy .597 
(.896) 
-2.533* 
(1.528) 
-.225 
(.789) 
-.1474 
(1.907) 
-1.529* 
(1.033) 
Teacher salary .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
Obs 97 116 102 108 105 
R-squared  .034 .051 .037 .009 .084 
Notes:  
Standard errors are provided in the brackets after coefficients.  
* denotes significance at 0.1 significance level.   
** denotes significance at 0.05 significance level. 
District population, household size, access to water and electricity were sourced from Statistics South 
Africa, 2007a, 2007b. All other data is obtained from PETS-QSDS survey collected for this study.  
 
 
In the first category of school and class size, only one variable, pupil-to-classroom ratio, 
matters significantly for all five of the outcome variables but interestingly, the signs are 
mixed. For pass rates and repetition rates, the signs are not the expected ones. A high 
pupil-to-classroom ratio (more crowding) is associated with higher pass rates and lower 
repetition rates, which is counter intuitive. One would expect that smaller classes foster 
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interactive learning and cater better to the needs of students. There is evidence supporting 
this in the literature as discussed in Chapter 2. The results for dropout rates show the 
expected results whereby, larger classes are associated with higher dropout rates.     
 
In terms of the other variables, school facilities, particularly the quality of the roofs and 
the existence of science labs appeared to matter for certain learning outcomes. Socio-
economic characteristics mattered for pass rates but were particularly strongly associated 
with repetition rates and even explained about a quarter of the variation in repetition 
rates. Conversely, socio-economic characteristics had minimal association with dropout 
rates as evidenced by the low R squares – a finding that will be revisited at the end of this 
section. The PTA dummy was significant for three outcome variables, which is very 
interesting given that only 21 percent of the sample had PTAs. This is indicative that the 
additional functions served by PTAs, for instance fund raising and additional parental 
involvement do contribute to learning outcomes. It may also be an indicator that picks up 
the SES factor given the finding in Chapter 6 that most schools with PTAs fall within 
Quintiles 4 and 5.
30
 On the contrary, SGBs were only important for Grade 1 repetition. 
The principal‟s education and experience mattered only for Grade 5 dropout rates and 
schools that did not have all teachers present and teaching on the day of the survey 
(captured as a dummy variable) emerged to be correlated with two of the outcome 
variables. Teacher salaries were insignificant in all the outcome variables.  
 
The preliminary regressions provide an indication of the broad categories that are 
important for various indicators of outcomes. With the exception of pupil-to-classroom 
                                                 
30
 It should be noted here that SES is not conditioned for in this stage of preliminary regressions.  
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ratio (which had mixed signs), no single indicator emerged to be significant for all five 
indicators of outcomes. What is particularly striking in Table 8.6 is the revelation that 
external factors (mainly socio-economic conditions) strongly influenced repetition rates 
while internal factors within the school system influenced dropout rates. As was already 
mentioned, SES, which explains about a quarter of variations in repetition rates had 
virtually no correlation with dropout rates, be it Grade 1 or 5. The overcrowding of a 
classroom and a leaking roof alone explained about 16 percent of the variation in Grade 1 
dropout. For Grade 5 dropout rates, a combination of overcrowding in classrooms, 
teacher characteristics and the absence or deficiencies in various facilities explained 
about 24 percent of the variation. The result showed that dropping out was a strong 
reflection of school inefficiencies and one that should be easier to address from a policy 
standpoint as compared with repetition rates. In what follows below, these preliminary 
results are tested more rigorously to isolate the key factors that determine education 
outcomes.      
8.3 PEM and Education Outcomes: Regression Analysis   
Given the established importance of delays, total resource wealth and LTSM expenditure 
per student through the bivariate correlations, the strengths of these associations with 
education outcomes are further examined in a regression analysis. While holding constant 
the relevant school and non-school inputs that emerged as significant in the preliminary 
regressions and assuming that variation between pupils is fixed, the model tries to predict 
the percentage change in education outcomes given a unit change in educational spending 
and delays.   
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The relationship between delays in disbursement of funds, total resource wealth and 
LTSM expenditure and education outcomes can be expressed as:  
 
 
 
 
Whereby, Educ is represented by five education outcome variables (exam pass, Grades 1 
and 7 repetition rates and Grades 1 and 5 dropout rates); Delay represents a dummy 
variable for none/minimal delay or extensive delay in the disbursement of subsidies to 
schools; LTSM representing spending on learning and teaching materials per student and 
Totalres represents a sum of government subsidies, household contributions in terms of 
tuition fees and donor contributions per student. The model controls for school inputs 
(schinp) non-school inputs (nonschinp), which essentially incorporate only the variables 
in Table 8.6 which emerged as significant. These will vary according to outcome 
variable. Therefore, each model only includes variables that have been determined as 
important. μ represents the error term (that is, the unmeasured factors that influence 
education outcomes for example, innate abilities).  
 
Given the prominence of OLS in cross-section regression analysis, the least squares 
model is used but, given its substantive limitations for count data and heteroskedasticity 
as discussed in Chapter 5, negative binomial regression estimates are also reported for all 
the outcome variables with the exception of pass rates, whose distribution is not Poisson 
(no zeros). The models also check for multi-collinearilty and indicate in the notes under 
Educ = β0 + β1Delay + β2LTSM + β3Totalres + β4schinp + β5nonschinp + μ 8.1 
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the regression tables where a variable is dropped due to high collinearity. The regression 
results are presented in Table 8.7.  
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Table 8.7 OLS and Negative Binomial Regressions of PEM and Education Outcomes  
 
 Pass Rates Grade 1 repetition Grade 7 repetition Grade 1 dropout Grade 5 dropout 
Variable OLS  OLS  NBRM  OLS  NBRM OLS  NBRM OLS  NBRM 
LTSM expenditure 0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.010* 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Total resource wealth -0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Delay Dummy -0.093 
(0.909) 
-0.632 
(1.468) 
-0.132 
(0.256) 
-1.054* 
(0.703) 
-0.001 
(0.471) 
2.711* 
(1.833) 
0.316 
(0.412) 
-2.282** 
(0.961) 
-0.541* 
(0.339) 
Class size  20.65 
(26.05) 
-40.34 
(46.16) 
-6.294 
(9.149) 
-38.61** 
(19.52) 
-35.89** 
(16.75) 
202.8** 
(49.24) 
26.52** 
(9.758) 
67.08 
(23.08) 
11.48 
(8.095) 
Leaking roof -0.172 
(0.128) 
  0.252** 
(0.101) 
0.066 
(0.055) 
0.570** 
(0.277) 
0.173** 
(0.067) 
0.364** 
(0.153) 
0.077* 
(0.050) 
Library  -1.242 
(1.606) 
-0.167 
(0.264) 
    3.017** 
(1.134) 
0.689* 
(0.391) 
Science lab 0.410 
(1.350) 
  -0.601 
(0.884) 
-0.087 
(0.558) 
  -4.218* 
(1.323) 
-1.194** 
(0.439) 
Playground  2.009 
(1.706) 
0.249 
(0.297) 
      
PTA Dummy 1.059 
(1.125) 
  -0.448 
(0.840) 
0.480 
(0.559) 
-3.879* 
(2.221) 
-0.830* 
(0.543) 
  
SGB members   -1.406* 
(0.555) 
-0.268** 
(0.107) 
      
SGB parents  2.206** 
(0.799) 
0.356** 
(0.148) 
      
Principal experience        -0.128* 
(0.069) 
-0.400* 
(0.026) 
Principal degree         -1.588* 
(0.950) 
-0.189 
(0.315) 
Teacher absenteeism   0.970 
(1.464) 
-0.006 
(0.255) 
    -1.038 
(0.967) 
-0.209 
(0.354) 
Quintile 1 -2.198 
(2.413) 
8.990 
(4.015) 
0.917 
(0,640) 
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Quintile 2 -3.679* 
(2.021) 
7.185 
(3.553) 
0.957 
(0.592) 
      
Quintile 3 -1.535 
(1.994) 
1.546 
(3.352) 
0.157 
(0.537) 
      
Quintile 4 -1.329 
(1.876) 
-1.368 
(3.300) 
-0.144 
(0.525) 
      
Urban Dummy  4.934** 
(2.183) 
0.831** 
(0.411) 
      
District Av household size 5.780** 
(1.497) 
-3.327 
(2.625) 
-0.209 
(0.375) 
-3.685** 
(0.071) 
-2.482** 
(0.669) 
    
District access to electricity 0.196** 
(0.054) 
  -0.174** 
(0.041) 
-0.115** 
(0.029) 
    
Observations 91 107 107 105 105 113 113 99 99 
R squared/ 
Pseudo R squared  
0.346 0.286 0.029 0.332 0.119 0.207 0.046 0.349 0.042 
 
Notes:  
standard errors are provided in the brackets after regression estimates.  
* denotes significance at 0.1 significance level. 
** denotes significance at 0.05 significance level. 
Control variables that are excluded in certain models, for example, district variables in Grades 1 and 5 Dropout, are excluded because they do not 
alter the results and are insignificant in explaining those outcomes variables.   
Quintile 5 is omitted due to collinearity with other quintiles. 
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Results of Regressions  
  
The regression results produced in Table 8.7 showed that in the majority of cases, both 
the OLS and NBRM models were in agreement on the sign of the coefficient and agreed 
on the variables that were are significant or insignificant. For the PEM variables, both 
OLS and NBRM models produced insignificant results for total resource wealth in all the 
outcome variables. This finding aligns with many empirical studies that argue that 
resources do not matter or only matter conditionally (see Chapter 2). For LTSM 
spending, only one model yielded a significant result, suggesting that an increase of R 1 
per student in LTSM spending is associated with a 0.01 percent decrease in Grade 1 
repetition rates. Put differently, an increase of R100 per child is related with a one percent 
decrease in Grade 1 repetition rates.  
 
While several significant results emerged for the delay variable, only one model produced 
the expected positive sign, indicating that extensive delays in disbursing funds is 
associated with a 2.7 percent increase in dropout rates at Grade 1 level. On the whole, the 
models did not produce very strong results for the PEM variables across the spectrum of 
the education outcome variables. A possible reason for this is that PEM variables interact 
with other variables such as poverty quintiles or class size and it is through this 
interaction that an impact is made on education outcomes. Interactions are tested later in 
the chapter.  
 
In terms of the control variables, significant results were produced for several variables 
such as class size, the various indicators of school facilities, indicators of school 
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governance, geographic location and district effects. The poverty quintiles were only 
tested in the pass and repetition rate models and largely emerged to lack significance in 
both OLS and NBRM models. The lack of importance may due to the narrow categorical 
spread as mentioned earlier because the significance of the district effects showed that 
socio-economic status did matter.  
 
Notwithstanding a few cases of divergences between the OLS and NBRM models, the 
OLS and NBRM models produced similar results showing that the OLS, despite its 
shortcomings for non-normal data produces robust results. A key difference worthy of 
note between the two models is the size of the coefficients. This is not obvious in the 
Table 8.8 because the coefficients have to be interpreted differently. For example, the 
OLS model, which is easier to interpret, suggests that an increase in an additional 
member to the SGB results in a 1.4 percent decrease in Grade 1 repetition rates. In the 
NBRM model, if a school were to increase its SGB membership by one person, the 
difference in the logs of expected rates of Grade 1 repetition would decrease by 0.268. 
This is equivalent to a decrease in 0.764 percent.
31
 The OLS models therefore yield larger 
coefficients than the NBRM.  
 
As was previously mentioned, the general lack of significance for the PEM variables, 
specifically, the expenditure variables could be linked to the absence of an interaction 
effect. Possibly, the relationship between education spending and learning outcomes 
could be driven by poverty, such that schools in disadvantaged areas struggle to convert 
resources into outcomes. Teacher quality may also be of interest if providing learning 
                                                 
31
 This is calculated by taking the exponential of -0.268.   
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materials improves outcomes because of the qualifications and experience of the teacher. 
The preliminary regressions in Table 8.6 showed teacher qualification (measured by 
salary) to be unimportant in all five outcomes. Another variable of interest as far as 
interactions are concerned is the size of the class, whereby increased spending in 
textbooks may only make an impact in a small classroom setting. In previous analyses, 
pupil-to-classroom ratio emerged as important and therefore could be a driving factor in 
the relationship between PEM variables and education outcomes. A series of interactions 
are therefore tested and the results are presented in Table 8.8 below.  
 
Table 8.8 OLS and Negative Binomial Regressions of PEM with Interaction Effects 
and Education Outcomes  
  
 Pass 
Rates 
Grade 1 
repetition 
Grade 7 
repetition 
Grade 1 
dropout 
Grade 5 dropout 
Variable OLS  OLS  NBRM  OLS  NBRM OLS  NBRM OLS  NBRM 
LTSM 
expenditure 
0.024 
(0.080) 
-0.091 
(0.089) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.071 
(0.064) 
-0.000 
(0.040) 
0.020 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
LTSMxQ1 -0.034* 
(0.020) 
0.010 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.022 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
    
LTSMxQ2 0.013 
(0.011) 
-0.016 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
  
 
  
LTSMxQ3 -
0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
    
LTSMxQ4 0.021 
(0.015) 
-0.044* 
(0.024) 
-
0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
    
LTSMxAvHH 0.012 
(0.018) 
0.015 
(0.028) 
0.003 
(0..004) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
    
LTSMxElec -0.000* 
(0.000) 
  0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
    
LTSMxClass 
size 
-0.010 
(0.289) 
1.163* 
(0.677) 
0.202* 
(0.117) 
-0.032 
(0.203) 
0.165 
(0.169) 
-0.498 
(0.390) 
0.005 
(0.098) 
-0.177 
(0.178) 
-0.035 
(0.056) 
Total 
resource 
wealth 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-
0.000* 
(0.000) 
TotalxQ1 -0.001 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-.000 
(0.002) 
    
TotalxQ2 0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.001) 
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TotalxQ3 0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.000* 
(0.000) 
-
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-
0.004** 
(0.001) 
    
TotalxQ4 -0.002 
(0.015) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001** 
(0.001) 
    
TotalxAvHH -0.004 
(.003) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
    
TotalxElec -0.000 
(0.000) 
  0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
    
TotalxClass 
size 
0.003 
(0.039) 
-0.033 
(0.045) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.021 
(0.022) 
-0.023 
(0.027) 
-.023 
(0.055) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
0.052** 
(0.024) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
Obs 91 107 107 98 98 113 113 99 99 
R square 0.529 0.435 0.060 0.481 0.178 0.233 0.046 0.382 0.029 
Notes:  
All regressions include the full set of controls as in Table 8.8 
standard errors are provided in the brackets after regression estimates.  
* denotes significance at 0.1 significance level. 
** denotes significance at 0.05 significance level. 
Quintile 5 is omitted due to collinearity with other quintiles. 
Control variables that are excluded in certain models, for example, district variables in Grades 1 
and 5 Dropout, are excluded because they do not alter the results and are insignificant in 
explaining those outcomes variables. 
 
The regression results produced very strong evidence that interacting total resource 
wealth and LTSM expenditure with poverty quintiles matters when it is a high quintile 
school (quintile 4). That is, wealthier schools are better able to convert these resources 
into outcomes – a finding that aligns strongly with Van der Berg (2008). In poorer 
schools, there is no substantial evidence that increasing resources will curb repetition 
rates. The importance of LTSM spending was also shown in the interaction between 
LTSM and class size where Grade 1 repetition was concerned. Nonetheless, as was 
previously discussed, it remains unclear how class size impacts repetition rates given the 
unexpected sign in the correlation analyses. Therefore, quintiles remain the most 
important interaction effect in as far as LTSM spending is concerned.     
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In earlier regressions, total resource wealth did not show any significance in all the 
models. Interacting it with Quintile 4 and class size revealed that the volume of resources 
mattered, but did so conditionally – a theme that recurs in Fleisch (2008). Here again, it is 
the privileged schools that are better able to convert resources into outcomes. 
Furthermore, the significance of dropout rates when total resource wealth is interacted 
with class size reveals that smaller classes are important channels that drive the 
relationship between resources and dropout rates.   
Robustness Checks  
 
Thus far, the analyses have shown that only LTSM spending and delays matter on their 
own (Table 8.7). Total resource wealth only matters when driven by other variables. This 
section therefore tests the robustness of the LTSM results to assess whether LTSM 
spending contributes to improved education outcomes or whether schools with good 
outcomes tend to spend more on LTSM. Reverse causality does not apply to delays 
because delays are largely exogenous – it is very unlikely that underperformance by 
schools would cause delays. As explained in Chapter 6, as long as schools submit their 
financial reports and budgets on time, which is largely the case in this sample, they 
should receive their disbursements. Therefore, the endogeneity tests focus on LTSM 
spending.  
 
In order for OLS to give consistent estimators, the error term should be unrelated to the 
regressors. When this assumption is violated, a common approach is to use instrumental 
variables (also discussed in Chapter 4). The instrumental variable is a substitute variable 
to eliminate endogenous variables from the model but also estimates causal impact. 
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Parental approval of the budget is selected as the instrumental variable because it is 
statistically correlated with LTSM spending as shown below in Table 8.9. Therefore, it 
can be argued that parents have an interest in ensuring that schools spend adequately on 
learning and teaching materials. Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between 
LTSM spending and SGB approval. Therefore, the parental approval satisfies two 
requirements of IVs: it is logically related to LTSM spending and also statistically 
correlated with LTSM spending.  
 
Table 8.9 Correlation between LTSM Spending Parental Approval of the Budget 
PerCap_LTSM Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Budget_Appr 49.34072 21.94705 2.25 0.026 5.933285 92.74816 
_cons 150.0856 15.6326 9.6 0 119.167 181.0041 
 
The IV regression is conducted only for Grade 1 repetition which was the only model that 
showed LTSM expenditure to be significant. Only the control variables that had 
importance in the earlier regressions are included.  The results are presented in Table 8.10 
below.  
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Table 8.10 Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Regression 
Variable Grade 1 repetition  
LTSM expenditure -.046 
(.051) 
Class size -58.48 
(52.90) 
SGB members  -1.518** 
(.559) 
SGB parents 2.469** 
(.928) 
Urban Dummy 3.129 
(3.156) 
District Av household size -2.652 
(3.598) 
Observations 128 
R squared/ 
Pseudo R squared  
. 
Post-estimation tests:  
        Durban Test .826 (p=.363) 
        Wu-Hausman Test .780 (p=.378) 
Notes:  
standard errors are provided in the brackets after regression estimates.  
* denotes significance at 0.1 significance level;  
** denotes significance at 0.05 significance level. 
Instrumented: LTSM Expenditure 
 
Results of Instrumental Variable Regression 
Significant results would confirm that LTSM spending, while endogenous is still a 
determining factor of repetition rates. As Table 8.9 indicates, LTSM loses significance in 
the IV model. These results may be reflective of a weak instrument or may suggest 
LTSM spending is in fact not significantly related to repetition rates. It must be recalled 
that the IV approach assumes that the LTSM is endogenous. A post estimation test, the 
Durban-Wu-Hausman test (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009) is able to test whether LTSM is 
indeed endogenous. The null hypothesis for the test is that the variables are exogenous. 
The p values turn out not to be significant and therefore, the hypothesis cannot be 
rejected signifying that we cannot reject the exogeneity of the LTSM variable. If the 
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LTSM variable is indeed exogenous, the OLS outputs should be efficient. Therefore, the 
OLS results showing LTSM spending to be significantly associated with outcomes, 
specifically Grade 1 repetition remains a valid finding.   
8.4 PEM and Alternative Education outcomes: Regression Analysis   
In Chapter two, the limitations of the dependent variables were discussed in detail. In 
particular, dropout rates were noted to be limited in the sense that they capture students 
who do not return to that particular school in the following year. This does not mean they 
are lost to the education system. Repetition rates are also limited in the sense that they are 
not directly comparable across schools. For example, repetition rates may be 
underestimated in weaker schools and vice versa. Therefore, in the absence of test scores, 
alternative variables that measure “school efficiency” or “school quality” can be 
considered. The PETS-QSDS survey provides data such as the existence of a play 
ground, science laboratories and libraries. This section aims to explore the relationship 
between PEM and alternative education outcome variables that describe school quality 
and the efficiency of the school in converting inputs into outputs. Descriptive data on the 
three output variables are shown in Table 8.11 below.  
Table 8.11 Descriptive Data on School Facilities 
Variables Frequency Percent 
Does the school have a science laboratory?   
Yes 37 22.22 
No 131 77.98 
Does school have a playground or sports area?   
Yes 115 68.05 
No 54 31.95 
Does school have a library?   
Yes   82 48.52 
No 87 51.48 
  
206 |  
 
 
The null hypothesis being tested here is that: there is no significant relationship between 
PEM and the three school facilities specified above. LTSM spending is excluded for lack 
of a theoretical basis or intuitiveness linking spending on learning materials to the 
provision of school infrastructure. The other two expenditure variables (total resource 
wealth and public education spending) as well as leakages and delays are examined in a 
binary regression analysis. For each of the dependent variables, explanatory variables that 
have no significant correlations with the dependent variables at 0.05 percent level are 
excluded from the model. The three regression equations are therefore estimated as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whereby, totalres represents total resource wealth per student (includes subsidies, tuition 
fees and donor contributions); publicsp represents public spending (subsidies) per 
student, publicspxSES is an interaction between public spending per pupil and poverty 
quintiles; totalxSES is the interaction between total spending per pupil and poverty 
quintiles; leakage is the gap between what schools expected and what they actually 
received in terms of subsidies and the delay is a dummy variable with a value of 0, 
Sciencelab = β0 + β1totalres + β2publicsp + β3totalxSES + β4publicspxSES 
+ β5delays + β6Q1 + β7Q2 + β8Q3 + β9Q4 + β10schoolsize +β11districtpop + 
β12districtwater + β13districtelec + μ 
 
Playground = β0 + β1totalres + β2totalxSES + β3Q1 + β4Q2 + β5Q3 + β6Q4 
+ β7schoolsize +β8districtpop + β9districtwater + β10districtelec + μ 8.3 
8.2 
Library = β0 + β1totalres + β2publicsp + β3totalxSES + β4publicspxSES + 
β5leakage + β6Q1 + β7Q2 + β8Q3 + β9Q4 + β10schoolsize +β11districtpop + 
β12districtwater + β13districtelec + μ 
 
8.4 
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signifying extensive delays as opposed to none or minimal delay. The model also 
includes dummy variables for each poverty quintile (quintile 5 is excluded due to 
collinearity with quintile 1) as control variables. Additional control variables include the 
size of the school in terms of its student population and district fixed effects, specifically, 
district population, percentage with access to electricity in the district and percentage 
with access to piped water in the homes. μ represents the error term. The regression 
results are presented in Table 8.12 below.  
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Table 8.12 Binary Outcome Regressions of PEM and Alternative Education Outcomes Variables  
 
 Science Lab Playground Library 
Variable LPM  
OLS 
Logit  
MLE 
Probit 
MLE 
LPM  
OLS 
Logit  
MLE 
Probit 
MLE 
LPM  
OLS 
Logit  
MLE 
Probit 
MLE 
Total resource wealth/pupil .000** 
(.000) 
.008** 
(.004) 
.004.** 
(.002) 
.000* 
(.000) 
.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001** 
(.000) 
.013 
(.009) 
.008* 
(.005) 
Total x SES -.000** 
(.000) 
-.001* 
(.000) 
-.000** 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.001 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000** 
(.000) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.001) 
Public Expenditure/pupil -.000 
(.000) 
-.028 
(.014) 
-.014 
(.007) 
   -.001 
(.000) 
-.013 
(.010) 
-.008 
(.006) 
Public x SES .000** 
(.000) 
.005** 
(.004) 
.002** 
(.002) 
   .000* 
(.000) 
.002 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
Leakage        .000* 
(.000) 
.000** 
(.000) 
.001* 
(.001) 
Delays -.038 
(.472) 
-.309 
(.980) 
-.087 
(.535) 
      
School size .000** 
(.000) 
.000 
(.001) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000* 
(.000) 
.001 
(.000) 
.000* 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Quintile 1 -.848** 
(.200) 
-.169 
(4.845) 
-.220 
(2.659) 
-.464** 
(.272) 
-.968 
(2.279) 
-.582 
(1.381) 
-.674** 
(.340) 
-37.53 
(1163) 
-21.88 
(459.6) 
Quintile 2 -.757** 
(.150) 
1.271 
(4.031) 
.479 
(2.192) 
-.187* 
(.248) 
.215 
(2.074) 
.163 
(1.255) 
-.624** 
(.257) 
-37.14 
(1163) 
-21.57 
(459.5) 
Quintile 3 -.908** 
(.126) 
-7.591** 
(3.246) 
-3.684** 
(1.576) 
-.246** 
(.221) 
-.157 
(1.826) 
-.046 
(1.103) 
-.624** 
(.218) 
-37.19 
(1163) 
-21.59 
(459.6) 
Quintile 4 -.751 
(.128) 
-5.401** 
(2.408) 
-2.989** 
(1.291) 
-.099* 
(.210) 
.455 
(1.687) 
.340 
(1.009) 
-.533** 
(.222) 
-36.30 
(1163) 
-21.00 
(459.6) 
Quintile 5 - - - - - - - - - 
District population -.000** 
(.000) 
-.000** 
(.000) 
-.000* 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
District access to electricity .013 
(.004) 
.390** 
(.154) 
.195** 
(.076) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-.032 
(.040) 
-.022 
(.024) 
-.007 
(.007) 
-.048 
(.045) 
-.029 
(.026) 
District access to water -.003 
(.003) 
-.130* 
(.081) 
-.067* 
(.043) 
.003 
(.005) 
.032 
(.040) 
.016 
(.020) 
.012** 
(.005) 
.085** 
(.039) 
-.052* 
(.023) 
Observations 120 130 130 131 131 131 128 128 128 
R squared/ 
Pseudo R squared  
.686 .707 .702 .145 .148 .151 .361 .350 .351 
Log likelihood ratio  -20.15 -20.56  -67.16 -66.92  -57.62 -57.49 
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Results of Binary Outcomes Regression 
According the results, total resource wealth per student matters significantly for school 
quality when science laboratories are used as indicators for school quality. This is 
consistent across the three models. Two models also revealed a significant relationship 
between total resources and school libraries as an indicator of quality. For the existence 
of playgrounds, only the linear probability model produced significant results. The 
positive signs on the coefficients indicate that schools with more resources, regardless of 
their poverty status, were associated with key educational facilities such as science 
laboratories, playgrounds and libraries in the school. Therefore, while resources may not 
translate into outcomes such as repetition and dropout rates, it is linked with 
improvements in school quality.   
 
The importance of public expenditure was tested in the science laboratory and library 
models. On its own, public spending was not significant in any of the models but when 
interacted with SES to correct for the redistributive component, whereby the government 
disproportionally allocates more funding to poorer schools, public spending emerged as 
statistically significant in the science lab models but in the libraries model, only the LPM 
model was significant. The significance of quintiles across the various models and the 
interaction terms suggest that wealthier schools are better able to convert resources into 
“outputs”. This contrasts with the earlier finding whereby interacting expenditure with 
quintiles had no significant effect on “outcomes”.   
 
Leakage was tested only in the libraries model. In all three models, it emerged as 
significant. Interestingly, the coefficients were positive linking higher leakages with more 
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facilities, which is counter-intuitive. It does, however, align with the finding that was 
made earlier in the chapter and also in Chapter 6 that leakages occur in wealthier schools. 
In the end, the coefficients are very close to zero so variation in leakages has a negligible 
impact on facilities. Delays were also found to be unimportant in the regressions possibly 
due to the coping mechanism that schools have adopted as was earlier discussed.  
8.5 Conclusion   
The analyses of PEM and education outcomes presented mixed evidence. Technical 
efficiency in terms of leakages was found not to be correlated with education outcomes 
but, delays were significantly correlated with one of the outcome variables. In terms of 
allocative efficiency, resources in terms of public spending and total spending were not 
associated with outcomes. Total resources only mattered through SES and class size.  
Spending on LTSM emerged as important and remained so after robustness checks. 
Alternative dependent variables (measures of school quality) were used to further assess 
the significance of PEM. The results showed that technical efficiency in terms of delays 
and leakages did not have a tangible effect on school quality. The expenditure variables 
were however, significant in the provision of certain facilities such as science labs and 
libraries, but not others such as playgrounds. Further research would be required to 
understand the variation of the expenditure results depending on the indicator of school 
quality.    
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Introduction  
The objective of this study was to examine whether sound public expenditure 
management (PEM) contributes to improved education outcomes. PEM was defined as 
good fiscal discipline, allocative efficiency and technical efficiency. The latter two 
aspects of PEM formed the central aspects of the analysis. In analysing allocative 
efficiency – that is, the allocation of adequate funds to high impact activities – the study 
focused on the impacts of public education expenditure (government subsidies to 
schools); total resource wealth (inclusive of government and private contributions 
through tuition fees and donor support) and LTSM expenditure (allocations towards 
learning and teaching support materials) on education outcomes. The analysis of 
technical efficiency – defined as adoption of measures that ensure efficient allocation of 
resources and effective delivery of services – focused on the analysis of leakage 
(misappropriated funds); delays in the remittance of funds from government to schools 
and other characteristics of the district education offices and whether or not these 
variables impact education outcomes.  
 
The search for explanations and solutions necessitated the incorporation of other non-
PEM factors that may affect education outcomes, such as school-based governance, 
socio-economic status and school facilities. Therefore, the collection of a comprehensive 
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cross-section of data on school systems and other external agents that interact with the 
schools was required. Two micro-level surveys, applied at 175 public primary schools 
and 13 district education offices (DEOs) in two provinces in South Africa, allowed for 
this wealth of data and analysis. The results have been presented in Chapters 6 to 8. This 
chapter summarises these results, presents the limitations of the study, suggests areas for 
further research and concludes with some policy recommendations.      
9.2 Restatement of the Problem 
The study was motivated by the need to deepen the understanding of the factors that yield 
sound education outcomes. Conflicting empirical results and speculations have often led 
to policy prescriptions that do not result in improved education outcomes. It has often 
been assumed that the problems in education were due to lack of adequate resources. 
There is evidence showing that increasing government allocations have not always 
corresponded with school improvements. Therefore, resource availability cannot possibly 
be the sole explanation of the persistent high repetition and drop-out rates, low pass rates, 
sub-standard scores and low levels of absorptions into the labour force in developing 
countries, including South Africa.     
 
The undertaking of public expenditure tracking (PET) exercises by the World Bank was 
ground-breaking in confronting this paradox of poor social outcomes despite available 
resources. It revealed massive bureaucratic inefficiencies within the various education 
departments/ministries in several countries, which manifested in poor service delivery in 
the education sector. The PET studies showed that the notion that public spending alone 
will improve services is misleading. Certainly, under-spending and high unit costs of 
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schooling could play a part in poor education outcomes, however, the paradox is clearly 
more complex and other factors, such as the management of education resources, which 
have largely been neglected in the economics of education literature, needed to be looked 
at. Therefore, this study sought to bridge this gap by empirically analysing the 
relationship between sound public expenditure management (PEM) and primary 
education outcomes.  
9.3 Summary of Findings 
This section presents the key findings of the research. That is, the significance of 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency respectively in explaining education 
outcomes. It also presents the findings of other factors such as school inputs, socio-
economic status and school-based governance and their respective significance in 
explaining education outcomes.  
 
Technical Efficiency and Education Outcomes  
 
Qualitative assessment of district education offices revealed that the districts have 
significant human resource constraints. Capacity is lacking and record-keeping, 
particularly on financial information is very poor. Lack of technical efficiency or bad 
operational management could result in among others, misappropriation of funds 
(leakage) and extensive delays in remitting funds to schools, which in turn could lead to 
poor education outcomes.  
 
The study found evidence of leakage. The leaked funds did not necessarily imply that 
public funds were being siphoned by public officials for private gain. The weaknesses in 
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public financial management and poor record-keeping are possible explanations, which in 
itself constitutes a concern. The study found that leakage in education funds occurred in 
13 percent of the sampled schools in Gauteng province and 28 percent of schools in the 
North West province. Cumulatively, the leaked funds, excluding personnel costs, 
amounted to over R 800,000, equivalent to nearly R 40,000 of annual funding for one 
school. For some schools, this can be a significant amount that could impede educational 
progress. Even though schools in the North West cumulatively have more leakage, the 
study found that leakages occur more frequently in Gauteng schools and in higher 
quintile schools (the majority being quintile 5 schools). This indicates that leakages occur 
in schools that do not rely heavily on government subsidies but are able to operate 
efficiently through the substantive resources received from households and donor funds. 
The study also found that information asymmetry allows space for leakages because 
through the data triangulation, it emerged that not all schools were knowledgeable on the 
amounts they were supposed to receive.  
 
Empirical analysis was conducted to assess whether there is a strong relationship between 
leakage of funds and education outcomes. There was no significant relationship between 
the two variables. The explanation offered was that leakage tended to occur in high 
quintile schools that did not rely much on subsidies and therefore did not pay attention to 
leaked funds. In that scenario, leakage would not be associated with poor outcomes. The 
essential finding is that there is evidence of leakage of education funds and although it 
does not happen on a large scale, the amounts are significant enough to warrant policy 
measures to tighten resource management practices.  
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The study also found evidence of delays in the remittance of funds from government to 
schools. The delays were not too extensive, however. The vast majority of schools 
received their allocations between two weeks and two months after the start of the school 
year. Nonetheless, the study found evidence that delays in remitting funds were 
negatively associated with education outcomes, specifically in terms of Grade 1 dropout 
rates.  
 
The study also examined the importance of technical efficiency in education outputs. The 
intent was to further explore the importance of technical efficiency using alternative 
dependent variables. The analysis corroborated the earlier findings on leakages in that 
leakages had no association with indicators of school quality in schools. Delays were also 
found to be unimportant in the provision of key educational infrastructure.         
Allocative Efficiency and Education Outcomes  
 
The Government of South Africa has shown that it values education by the weight it 
gives to education in the equitable share formula and the systematic real increases in 
education expenditure at the national level. In particular, primary schools receive most of 
the education expenditure. At the provincial level, the study showed that Gauteng 
province allocates more than double what North West province allocates to primary 
education at an aggregate level. Interestingly, North West not only spends more per 
learner than Gauteng, its per learner spending is higher than the national average. This 
section of the study sought to investigate whether education expenditure was significantly 
associated with education outcomes.    
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The results showed that public spending and total resource wealth had no relationship 
with education outcomes. The study acknowledged that the finding on public spending 
could be explained by the redistributive component in how resources are allocated to 
schools. In other words, a correlation may be positive or not apparent in a situation where 
government allocates more funds to historically disadvantaged or underperforming 
schools. When socio-economic status (SES) was controlled for, public spending was still 
insignificant. The interaction of SES and public spending proved to be important in the 
provision of science laboratories and libraries indicating that public resources are useful 
in improving school quality in higher quintile schools that are better able to convert 
resources into quality improvements. At the same time, improvements in school quality 
do not necessarily lead to improvements in school outcomes. This is an important 
limitation of public spending.    
 
In terms of LTSM expenditure, there was strong evidence that schools that spend more on 
LTSM tend to have lower rates of Grade 1 repetition. This finding remained robust after 
further tests. The impact of LTSM on Grade 1 repetition was amplified when interacted 
with high quintile (privileged schools) showing again that wealthier schools are better 
able to convert learning resources into outcomes. It is acknowledged that other factors 
such as style of teaching or level of content preparation may also be an underlying factor 
explaining the correlation between LTSM spending and outcomes. The study could not 
control for this. At the same time, LTSM did not matter in the other outcome variables. 
Grade 7 repetitions were strongly driven by district characteristics while dropout rates 
were largely driven by school inputs and delays.            
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Total resource wealth, which includes government subsidies, tuition fees and other donor 
contributions, on its own did not appear to matter for any of the education outcome 
variables. It mattered when interacted with high quintile schools and class sizes, 
indicating that total resources matter for education outcomes in as far as they are schools 
with pupils from wealthier socio-economic backgrounds and smaller pupil-to-classroom 
ratios.    
Other Key Considerations in Education Outcomes  
 
The study found that school inputs such as pupil-to-teacher ratios, teacher salary and 
teacher experience had no relationship with education outcomes for the sample study. 
Other non-PEM factors were however, found to be correlated with education outcomes. 
Key among these were pupil-to-classroom ratio (an alternative measure of class size), 
membership of school governing bodies, principals experience and qualification, school 
facilities and socio-economic characteristics, particularly at the district level.  
 
The importance of district effects which were captured by average household size and 
access to electricity showed that an improvement in poverty at the community level goes 
a long way in improving education outcomes. Improved socio-economic development 
manifests in the ability of parents to provide additional learning support, a stable home 
environment, excellent healthcare, nutrition and basically all the extra comforts that 
children need to excel in school. Children from poverty stricken homes lack these 
privileges and this could affect their performance in school. This finding is also heavily 
supported in the literature as discussed in Chapter 2.    
 
  
218 |  
 
9.4 Policy Implications 
The findings discussed above have a number of policy implications for primary 
education. First among these is the need for better management of resources and technical 
efficiency at the sub-national level. The study found evidence of leakage in the amount of 
R 800 000, which is substantive enough for government to undertake serious corrective 
measures. The leakage amount could be greatly understated as a result of data limitations.   
District education offices need to have the requisite human resource capacity and training 
in financial management and also require good oversight. The government of South 
Africa may wish to consider regularising auditing of the accounts at district levels, which 
is currently not the case.  
 
Secondly, the study showed that spending on learning and teaching support materials is 
very important in Grade 1. Therefore, it would be a wise policy decision to ensure that 
learners in Grade 1 (as well Grade 1 teachers) receive adequate levels of learning and 
teaching materials. The early stages of learning are critical. The qualitative analysis 
showed that not all schools spend most of their funds on LTSM as required by the 
government. In the North West province, the average school spends most of their 
allocations on maintenance. Therefore, education authorities need to ensure that adequate 
resources are earmarked for LTSM. 
 
The study revealed that the underlying factors associated with repetition and dropout 
rates are entirely different. While repetition rates are strongly rooted in poverty levels at 
the district level, dropout rates are more linked to disbursement delays and school 
characteristics and less to poverty quintiles. This was a very important finding. It showed 
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that lack of facilities, poor school management and lack of service delivery at the schools 
may drive pupils to leave the schools. From a policy standpoint, schools and districts 
authorities can make quick wins in reducing dropouts by improving efficiency and the 
quality of the services. This contrasts with repetition rates that require a more systemic 
change at the district level – one that takes considerable time to yield the expected results.  
 
The final policy implication refers to teachers. In South Africa, it is often speculated that 
shortcomings in teacher characteristics explain the poor education outcomes. This study 
did find considerable evidence of teacher absenteeism to the tune of 32 percent of the 
schools sampled. In the regression models, however, absenteeism did not have any strong 
correlations with the outcome variables when other factors were controlled for. 
Furthermore, 95 percent of teachers had the requisite qualifications. Notwithstanding that 
there are other measures of teacher characteristics, such as content preparation that were 
not included in this study, the study found that teacher attributes (including absenteeism, 
salary and qualifications) were not correlated with education outcomes. The study did 
show that better qualified teachers, as determined by their salary, tended to work in 
wealthy schools while less qualified teachers (but qualified nonetheless) tended to work 
in poorer schools. The study found that very good teachers were not largely present in 
disadvantaged communities. Policymakers have to find other incentives to attract highly 
skilled teachers in poor communities or raise the skills of teachers already based in these 
communities.         
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9.5 Limitations and Areas for Further Research 
 
This study has a number of limitations. For one, it does not seek to explain all key factors 
that determine education outcomes as done in education production function studies. It 
focuses mainly on PEM-related variables. The OLS regression models explained about a 
third of the factors that determine education outcomes. Future research needs to look 
beyond these factors. Student characteristics were held constant. The reality is that 
children with different backgrounds respond to school environments in different ways. 
Innate ability has often been speculated as important but, understandably under-
researched because of its complexity and even controversy. Other factors that need to be 
explored may include: migration trends, nutrition, language barriers and the age at which 
pupils start school, to name a few.   
 
There were a number of methodological limitations. The sampling errors occurred in the 
form on non-responses from some schools and districts offices. The cross-sectional 
natures of the data meant that causality could not be assigned. The inclusion of poverty 
quintiles brought out important insights. At the same time, quintiles are narrow in 
categorical spread and this potentially limited the power of the analysis. The most 
important limitation can be attributed to the selected dependent variables: pass, repetition 
and dropout rates which are very revealing of school inefficiencies but have limitations as 
proxies of learning abilities.   
 
On the limited findings in technical efficiency, it must be emphasised that the analysis of 
leakage was significantly limited by lack of information/data from the district officials 
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which was needed to triangulate information from the schools. The study would have 
benefited tremendously from financial information from the district officials. This 
information was not forthcoming and therefore information on leakage from district 
sources was obtained for only 26 schools. This was a limitation because the study found 
that schools were not always aware of the total amount they were supposed to receive that 
year. This means that the leakage amount presented is possibly understated. It would be 
useful for future research to conduct a more comprehensive PETS on a large sample of 
schools in order to better assess the extent of leakage.   
9.6 Conclusion  
This study provided a cross-section analysis of the relationship between sound public 
expenditure management (PEM) and education outcomes concerning 175 schools in 
North West and Gauteng provinces. The empirical analysis showed that there are areas of 
PEM to be concerned about, specifically leakages of funds and some delays in the 
disbursement of funds to schools. The study found that leakages were by and large not 
fundamental factors in explaining education outcomes. The more important contributors 
to education outcomes, in terms of PEM were the delays in disbursing funds and 
spending on learning and teaching support materials. Total resource wealth only mattered 
in high quintile schools and small class sizes. In the end, non-PEM factors particularly, 
socio-economic characteristics remained strong predictors of education outcomes.     
 
Periodic tracking of public expenditure is fundamental in revealing governance blockages 
in social service delivery and should be institutionalised in the public service. By 
undertaking a tracking survey, the study was able to identify some of these governance 
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blockages and concludes with a strong recommendation for policymakers to address 
certain issues of public expenditure management, namely improved financial 
management at sub-national levels. Increased spending in learning and teaching support 
materials at Grade 1 level is vital to stem repetition rates. Improvements in school 
management and the quality of services are also important in the retention of pupils. On 
the whole, socio-economic development matters very strongly for education outcomes 
and should feature prominently in government efforts to improve education outcomes.    
 
 
 
 
  
223 |  
 
APPENDIX 1  
 
(Public Expenditure Tracking and Service Delivery 
Survey for Public Primary Schools)  
 
Section I: Identification 
 
Question Unit Value 
1. Name of School Name  
2. Province Name  
3. District Name   
4. Rural, Urban, or Peri Urban 1 = rural, 2 = urban  
5. Boys, Girls or Mixed 1=boys, 2=girls, 3=mixed  
6. Number of students in 
primary school (Grades 1 -
7) 
Number  
7. Is this a no fee school? 1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
8. National Quintile Ranking Number (1-5)  
or “99” for don‟t know 
 
9. Respondent 1 = Principal 
2 = Deputy Principal 
3 = Other Teacher 
 
 
Section II: Students: Repetition, Dropout and Completion 
   
Question Unit Value 
10. How many students were enrolled in 
Grade 1 in 2007? 
No. of students  
11. How many students were enrolled in 
Grade 5 in 2007? 
No. of students  
12. How many students were enrolled in 
Grade 7 in 2007? 
No. of students  
13. How many of students received a 
passing mark on the primary leaving 
exam (Grade 7) in 2007? 
No. of students  
14. Of these, how many were girls? No. of girl students  
15. How many students are repeating 
Grade 1 this year? 
No. of students  
16. Of these, how many were girls? No. of girl students  
17. How many students are repeating 
Grade 7 this year? 
No. of students  
18. Of these, how many were girls? No. of girl students  
19. How many students did not return 
after completing Grade 1 last year? 
No. of students  
20. Of these, how many were girls? No. of girl students  
21. How many students did not return 
after completing Grade 5 last year? 
No. of students  
22. Of these, how many were girls? No. of girl students  
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23. What is often the main reason given 
for students dropping out of school? 
1= non payment of fees 
2 = needed for work to 
support family 
3 = transferred to other 
school 
4 = lack of food/ 
malnutrition 
5 = health-related 
problems 
6 = other (specify) 
 
 
Section III: Information on Tuition and Low Income Students 
(No Fee Schools should skip to section IV)  
 
24. What is the school fee (tuition) 
amount per student, per year?  
Amount (Rands)  
25. How many students right now are 
completely exempted from paying 
schools fees? 
Number   
26. How many students right now are 
partially exempted from paying 
schools fees? 
Number   
27. For the students who are partially 
exempt, what percentage of the 
normal school fees do they pay?   
(Give average estimate)  
Percentage  
 
Section IV: Principal and Teachers 
 
Question Unit Value 
 
Questions here refer to Principal Only (if respondent is not principal, skip to Qu.32) 
 
28. Number of years as an 
Educator? 
Years   
29. Number of years as 
Principal?  
Years   
30. Number of years as 
Principal in this school?  
Years   
31. Highest level of education 
 
1=secondary school 
2= Diploma 
3 = some university 
4 = university degree 
5 = post-graduate work 
 
 
Questions here refer to Teachers 
32. How many teaching 
positions are officially 
allocated to this school? 
Number  
33. How many of the official 
positions are actually 
filled by permanent staff? 
Number   
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34. How many teachers have 
teaching certificate? 
Number  
35. Are all teachers present and 
teaching in this school 
today? 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
 
36. What is the average gross 
salary of teachers at this 
school? 
Amount Rand (per month)  
37. Have any teachers been 
fired or laid off in the past 
twelve months? 
Number fired  
38. If so, what has been the 
predominant reason for 
firing these teachers?  
        1= absenteeism  
        2 = abuse of children 
        3 = bad teaching 
        4 = services no longer   
               needed/redundant 
         5 = conflicts with staff 
         6 = other 
 
 
Section V: Facilities 
 
Question Unit Value 
39. How many classrooms 
are there in this school? 
Number   
40. How many classrooms 
have a roof that leaks 
when it rains? 
Number   
41. How many classrooms 
(that are not newly built) 
do NOT have a chair 
and a table for the 
teacher? 
Number  
42. Does this school have a 
library? 
1=Yes 
2 = No 
 
43. Does this school have a 
science laboratory? 
1=Yes 
2 = No 
 
44. Are there enough 
working toilets for the 
students to use? 
1= Yes 
2 = No 
 
45. Are there separate toilet 
facilities for girls? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
46. What is the main source 
of drinking water at this 
school? 
0 = None 
1 = Rain water tank 
2 = Spring/lake/river 
3 = Well /bore hole 
4 = tap/piped 
5 = other 
 
47. Are students able to 
drink water from that 
source today? 
1=Yes 
2 = No 
 
48. How do the majority of 
students eat lunch 
(NOTE: if the answer 
1 = free school lunch at school 
cafeteria 
2 = students pay for lunch at 
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differs by Grade level, 
answer for students in 
Grade 5) 
cafeteria  
3 = Students bring their own 
lunch and eat at school 
4 = students are sent home for 
lunch and then they come back 
5 = school ends before lunch time 
6 = other 
49. Does the school have a 
playground or sports 
area? 
1=Yes 
2 = No 
 
50. Is the school surrounded 
by a wall or fence? 
1=Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
Section VI: Location and Distance  
 
Question Unit Value 
 
How far from this school is the nearest of each of the following: 
51. Public transport 1 = Less than 100m 
2 = Between 100m and 500m 
3 = Between 500m and 1km 
4 = More than 1km 
 
52. Hospital or Health clinic 1 = Less than 100m 
2 = Between 100m and 500m 
3 = Between 500m and 1km 
4 = More than 1km 
 
53. Are there other schools 
that local children could 
go to instead of this one? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
 
54. If yes, what are the main 
reasons that parents or 
children choose this 
school? 
1 = proximity 
2 = academic reputation 
3 = ethnicity or religion 
4 = school environment/culture 
5 = cost 
6 = other (specify) 
 
 
Section VII: Organisation and Governance  
 
Question Unit Value 
55. Does the school have a 
School Governing 
Body?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
If no, skip to 61 …If yes,   
56. How many times did the 
SGB meet in 2007? 
Number of meetings  
57. How many times did the 
SGB meet in 2006? 
Number of meetings  
58. What were top 2 issues 
discussed at the most 
recent SGB meeting?  
1 = discipline 
2= school budget/finance issues 
3 = fees 
4 = staff issues 
5 = curriculum matters 
6 = student performance 
# 1 Issue : 
 
 
# 2 Issue :  
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7 = facilities/maintenance 
8 = other school quality 
9 = other 
59. How many people are on 
the SGB? 
Total Number   
60. How many parents are 
on the SGB? 
Number of Parents  
61. Does the school have a 
Parent Teacher 
Association (PTA)?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
If yes, skip to 63 …   
62. If no, what is the reason 
for no PTA 
1 = Not required / necessary 
(explain)  
2= Not enough participation by 
parents 
3 = Not enough interest by school 
4 = Other (specify) 
 
63. How many times did the 
PTA meet in 2007?  
Number   
64. How many times did the 
PTA meet in 2006? 
Number   
65. When was the last PTA 
meeting? 
month, year 
(mm, yyyy) 
 
66. How many parents 
attended the last 
meeting? 
0 = very few 
1 = less than half 
2 = about half 
3 = more than half 
4 = about all 
 
67. Does the school have an 
Annual General 
Meeting, involving 
parents?  
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
68. Was the school budget 
presented during the last 
AGM? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
 
School decision making  
Who has the most say in:  
69. Approving the budget 1 = Principal/School Executive 
2 = other teacher 
3 = other staff 
4 = District/Province  
5 = SGB 
6 = PTA 
7 = Parents  
8 = Local politician 
9 = community 
10 = other (specify) 
 
 
70. General school quality 
 
1 = Principal/School Executive 
2 = other teacher 
3 = other staff 
4 = District/Province  
5 = SGB 
6 = PTA 
7 = Parents  
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8 = Local politician 
9 = community 
10 = other (specify) 
 
Section VIII: Supervision and Accountability 
 
Question Unit Value 
71. How many visits were 
made to this school by a 
district official in 2007? 
Number of visits  
 
72. How many visits were 
made to this school by 
the district official in 
2006? 
Number of visits  
73. What was the main 
purpose of the official‟s 
last visit? 
1 = general inspection 
2 = advisory visit 
3 = assessment of teachers 
4 = assessment of students 
5 = assessment of facilities and 
quality in general 
6 = other (specify) 
 
74. What kind of feedback 
was given at the end of 
the 2007 visit? 
0 = none 
1 = verbal report to all teaching 
staff 
2 = verbal report to Principal only 
3 = written report to Principal 
4 = written reports to teachers  
 
75. Is the school compelled 
by law to give annual 
reports to district 
authorities?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
76. Did school provide 
academic report to 
district authorities in 
2007?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
77. Did school provide its 
budget to district 
authorities in 2007? 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
78. Did school provide 
financial report to 
district authorities in 
2007? 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
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Section IX: School’s Sources of Funding  
 
Source a. How 
much was 
the school 
entitled to 
receive 
from this 
source in 
2007? 
b. How 
much did 
the school 
actually 
receive 
from this 
source in 
2007? 
c. on what 
schedule 
were the 
funds 
from this 
source 
disbursed? 
d. how 
much 
delay 
was 
there in 
receipt 
of these 
funds? 
e. what 
procedure 
this the 
school go 
through to 
get these 
funds? 
f. Did this 
funding 
come ear-
marked 
for certain 
categories 
of 
spending? 
g. If so, what 
category or 
categories of 
spending was 
this source of 
funding 
intended for? 
 
List all that 
are 
applicable  
c. How 
much is 
expected 
from this 
source in 
2008? 
 Amount  Amount  1 = all at 
once 
2 = 2 to 3 
installmen
ts 
3 
=monthly 
4 = other 
 
1 = 
None/ on 
time 
2 = Few 
weeks 
delay 
3 = 
Several 
months 
delay 
4 = 
difficult 
to say  
 
1 = 
automatic 
(mail or 
direct 
deposit) 
2 = school 
responsibl
e for pick-
up 
3 = 
significant 
paper 
work 
burden 
4 = cash 
or check 
paid at the 
school 
5 = other 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
1= paying 
staff 
2 = scholastic 
materials 
3 = 
maintenance 
4 = 
administratio
n 
5 = special 
programs 
6 = 
construction 
or expansion 
of facilities 
7 = other 
 
Amount  
79. National 
capitation 
grants 
        
80. PTA fees 
 
        
81. Tuition 
fees 
        
82. Fundraisi
ng and 
other fees 
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Section X: What did the School spend its money on in 2007? 
 
 a. How much was 
spent in the school 
budget on these 
items? 
b. Did the school receive any of these items 
in-kind from outside sources? 
 Amount  1 = yes 
2 = no 
83. School building 
maintenance and 
rehabilitation  
  
84. Utilities (water and 
electricity) 
 
 
 
85. Scholastic materials 
(textbooks, pens etc) 
  
86. Teacher training and 
bonuses 
  
87. Administrative Costs 
 
  
 
 
End of Interview 
 
Request for copies of financial and budget reports for 2007 if 
available. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
(to be completed at the end of each 
school interview) 
 
Question Unit Value 
1. Did the Principal seem 
confident in providing 
the information on 
funding and 
expenditure? 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
2. Does the school keep 
records of its income 
and expenditure? 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
3. Is the school neat and 
tidy?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
4. Did you see any broken 
windows?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
5. Was the toilet clean and 
in working condition?  
 
Interviewer must ask to go 
to the toilet.  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
6. Was there a security 
guard at the gate?  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
 
7. Is the school fence in 
good condition (for 
example, not broken to 
allow access to 
trespassers)  
1 = yes 
2 = no 
99 = don‟t know 
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APPENDIX 2  
(Public Expenditure Tracking and Quantitative 
Service Delivery Survey for District/Regional 
Education Office) 
 
Section I: Characteristics of District Office  
 
Question Unit Value 
88. How many staff members 
does this office have? 
 
Number  
89. How many members of 
staff reported for duty 
today? 
 
Number  
90. Does this office have an 
accounting unit? 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
91. How many 
cars/motorcycles does this 
office have at present? 
 
Number  
92. How many of these 
cars/motorcycles are in 
working condition today? 
Number  
93. How long does it take to 
reach the closest school to 
this office? 
Minutes  
94. How long does it take to 
reach the furthest school to 
this office? 
Minutes  
95. How long does it take to 
reach the average school 
to this office? 
Minutes  
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Section II: Decision-making   
 
 96. Which of the following 
have to make a decision to:  
97. Which of the following 
have to provide money for: 
 1= Department of 
Education 
2=Province 
3=Head-teacher/ 
School Executive 
4=Teachers 
5 =PTA / Parents 
6=Churches/Donors 
7= School Governing 
Body 
8 =Community 
9 =Other 
 1=Department of 
Education 
2=Province  
3=Head-teacher/ 
School Executive 
4=Teachers 
5=PTA Executive 
6=Churches/Donors 
7=School Governing 
Body 
8 =Community 
9=Other 
 
 Most Important 2
nd
 most 
important 
Most Important 2
nd
 most 
important 
1. Decide on School 
fees 
    
2. Exempt a child from 
school fees 
    
3. Provide financial 
support to a child 
who is particularly 
needy 
    
4. Provide additional 
classrooms for 
children in this 
school 
    
5. Repair something 
that has broken down 
in the school like a 
window. 
    
6. Provide textbooks 
that are in short 
supply after the 
allotment from the 
district 
    
7. Major rehabilitation 
of classrooms/ 
offices 
    
8. Hire an extra teacher 
to supplement 
shortage of teachers 
in a school 
    
9. Transfer/Suspend a 
teacher in a school 
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Section III: Meetings with Province  
 
Question Unit Value 
98. How many meetings did 
you have with the 
Province (director level) in 
2007? 
Number  
99. When was the last time 
you had a meeting with the 
Province? 
Month, Year  
100. What was the reason for 
this meeting? 
 
1=Discuss national policy 
2=Educational Event 
3=Collect district allocation 
4 = Financial  
5=Other 
 
 
Section IV: Shortages and Requests 
 
 101. Did you 
experience a 
shortage/problem 
in 2007 with 
__________? 
1=Yes 
2=No 
(*) 
If NO fill in 2 & 
skip to next row 
102. Did  
you make a 
request? 
1= Yes 
2=No 
If YES 
skip next 
column 
 
103. If not 
why not 
1= Requests 
never 
successful 
2=Problem 
was 
not serious 
3=Other 
(Specify) 
 
104. If yes 
to 
whom 
1=DoE 
2= 
Province 
3=Other 
 
 
105. Was your 
request 
successful? 
1=Fully 
Successful 
2=Partially 
Successful 
3=Not 
Successful 
4=Request is 
pending 
1. Shortage of 
vehicles 
     
2. Shortage of 
office 
supplies 
     
3. Shortage of 
staff 
     
4. Late 
payment of 
Staff 
     
5. Problem 
with 
building 
maintenance 
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Section V: Supervision and Accountability 
(five randomly selected schools) 
 
Question 106. How 
many 
visits 
were 
made to 
this 
school by 
the IDSO 
district 
official in 
2007? 
107. What 
about 
2006? 
108. What was 
the main 
purpose of 
the 
inspector‟
s last 
visit? 
 
1 = general 
inspection 
2 = advisory 
visit 
3 = 
assessment of 
teachers 
4 = 
assessment of 
students 
5 = 
assessment of 
facilities and 
quality in 
general 
6 = other 
109. What 
kind of 
feedback was 
given at the 
end of the 
2007 visit? 
 
0 = none 
1 = verbal 
report at staff 
meeting 
2 = verbal 
report to head 
teacher only 
3 = verbal 
report to 
individual 
teachers 
4 = written 
report to head 
teacher 
5 = written 
reports to 
individual 
teachers  
110. Did 
school 
provide 
academic 
report to 
district 
authorities 
in 2007? 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
111. Did 
school 
provide 
financial 
report to 
district 
authorities 
in 2007? 
 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
a)    
 
    
b)        
c)        
d)        
e)        
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Section VI: Disbursement of Funds  
 
Source 112.  on 
what 
schedule 
were the 
funds from 
this source 
disbursed? 
113.  
how much 
delay was 
there in 
receipt of 
these 
funds? 
114.  
what 
procedure 
this the 
district go 
through to 
get these 
funds? 
115.  
Did this 
funding 
come ear-
marked for 
certain 
categories 
of 
spending? 
116.  If so, 
what category or 
categories of 
spending was 
this source of 
funding intended 
for?  
 1 = all at 
once 
 
2 = 2 or 3 
instalments 
 
3 = monthly 
 
4 = other 
1 = None/ 
on time 
2 = less than 
2 weeks 
3 = between 
2 weeks and 
2 months 
4 = more 
than 2 
months 
1 = 
automatic 
(mail or 
direct 
deposit) 
2 = district 
responsible 
for pick-up 
3 = 
significant 
paper work 
burden 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
1= paying district 
admin 
expenditures  
2 = scholastic 
materials for 
schools 
3 = special 
programs 
4 = curriculum 
support;  
5 = other 
a) National govt 
funding 
     
b) Subsidies to schools 
 
     
c) Donor Support 
 
     
d) Other sources      
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Section VII: District Expenditures in 2007  
 
 
Question 
 
Amount  
117. What was your total budget for 2007? 
 
118. How much was spent on office / admin 
expenditure?  
119. How much was spent on transport (including 
vehicle maintenance and 
fuel)? 
 
120. How much in total was disbursed to public 
primary schools?   
121. Of this amount, how much was allocated to 
quintile 5 schools?  
122. Of this amount, how much was allocated to 
quintile 4 schools?  
123. Of this amount, how much was allocated to 
quintile 3 schools?  
124. Of this amount, how much was allocated to 
quintile 2 schools?  
125. Of this amount, how much was allocated to 
quintile 1 schools?  
126. How much was spent on teachers salaries? 
 
127. How much was spent on teachers bonuses? 
 
128. How much was spent on telephone and 
electricity bills?  
129. How much was spent on other items (specify)? 
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Section VIII: School Receipts 
(same five randomly selected schools)  
 
Schools 130.  
How 
much 
was 
given 
to this 
school 
in 
2007? 
131.  
On what 
schedule 
were the 
funds from 
this source 
disbursed? 
132.  
How 
much 
delay 
was 
there in 
receipt 
of these 
funds? 
133.  What 
procedure 
this the 
school go 
through to 
get these 
funds? 
134.  Did 
this 
funding 
come ear-
marked 
for certain 
categories 
of 
spending? 
135. If so, 
what category 
or categories 
of spending 
was this 
source of 
funding 
intended for?  
136.  
How 
much 
is the 
school 
to 
receive 
in 
2008? 
 Amount  1 = all at 
once 
2 = 2/3 
instalments 
3 = more 
than 
monthly 
4 = other 
 
1 = 
None/ on 
time 
2 = less 
than 2 
weeks 
3 = 
between 
2 weeks 
and 2 
months 
4 = more 
than 2 
months 
 
1 = 
automatic 
(mail or 
direct 
deposit) 
2 = school 
responsible 
for pick-up 
3 = 
significant 
paper work 
burden 
4 = cash or 
check paid 
at the school 
5 = other 
1 = yes 
2 = no 
 
1= paying staff 
2 = scholastic 
materials 
3 = 
maintenance 
4 = 
administration 
5 = special 
programs 
6 = 
construction or 
expansion of 
facilities 
7 = other 
 
Amount 
a)         
b)         
c)         
d)         
e)         
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Additional Questions 
 
Organisation and Management (technical efficiency)   
 
Question Answers 
137. Are there formal 
constraints on district 
spending or is district 
legally allowed to 
spend beyond the 
budget? 
 
138. Are there punitive 
actions for 
overspending? 
 
139. Is the district office 
mandated to publish 
their financial 
accounts?  
 
140. How many district 
directors have there 
been in the past 5 
years?  
 
141. Is promotion of senior 
managers linked to 
performance?  
 
142. Is there any account 
of dismissal of senior 
staff based on non-
performance or 
irregularities in the 
past 5 years?  
 
143. Is there clear 
specification of output 
to be produced by 
district every year? 
 
144. Is there regular 
auditing of district 
accounts? 
 
145. Are district budgets 
done in consultation 
with community 
members? 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
List of Schools Sampled  
 School Province District Geog_Loc Schl_Gender Student_pop No_Fee Quintile 
1.  Alberview GP ES urban mixed 1025 no fee 5 
2.  Avante GP GW urban mixed 936 no fee 4 
3.  Baisitse NW Bophirim rural mixed 580 fee 1 
4.  Bakgatla NW Bojanala rural mixed 253 no fee 3 
5.  Banabaka NW Central rural mixed 668 fee 1 
6.  Bancho NW Bophirim rural mixed 48 fee  
7.  Barelwan NW Bojanala rural mixed 1168 no fee 3 
8.  Biakaget GP GE urban mixed 640 no fee 3 
9.  Bobuants NW Bojanala rural mixed 256 fee 2 
10.  Boikanyo GP JW urban mixed 626 no fee 4 
11.  Bonwelon GP JE urban mixed 1644 fee  
12.  Bopang GP ES urban mixed 1364 no fee 4 
13.  Boshoek NW Bojanala urban mixed 745 no fee 3 
14.  Bothibel NW Bojanala urban mixed 1013 fee 1 
15.  Bulelani GP GW urban mixed 837 no fee 3 
16.  Busisisw GP JC urban mixed 430 no fee 3 
17.  Capital GP TW urban mixed 600   
18.  Carlison NW Central rural mixed 208 fee 1 
19.  Central NW Bojanala urban mixed 546 no fee 4 
20.  Collinda NW Bophirim peri urban mixed 1053 no fee 3 
21.  Dan_Phar GP GE urban mixed 1139 fee 1 
22.  De Beer NW Southern rural mixed 140 no fee  
23.  Die_Aren GP GE urban mixed 705 no fee 5 
24.  Dikhukun NW Central rural mixed 33 fee 1 
25.  Dimakats GP TW urban mixed 682 fee 2 
26.  Dithakwa NW Central rural mixed 177 fee 1 
27.  Doringkl GP TS urban mixed 956 no fee 5 
28.  Dowlinga GP JN urban mixed 1148 no fee 4 
29.  Dr_Knak GP JE urban mixed 1104 fee 2 
30.  Driefont NW Southern peri urban mixed 370 no fee 3 
31.  Dumehlez GP GE urban mixed 827 no fee 3 
32.  EH_Mogas NW Central rural mixed 552 fee 1 
33.  EW Hobbs GP JC urban mixed 1360 no fee 4 
34.  Eastleig GP EN urban mixed 806 no fee  
35.  Edleen GP EN urban mixed 916 no fee 5 
36.  Eendrach GP TW urban mixed 773 no fee 4 
37.  Elethu_T GP JS rural mixed 603 fee 2 
38.  Eligwa GP SW urban mixed 310 no fee 4 
39.  Elspark GP ES urban mixed 790 no fee 5 
40.  Emzimbvu GP JW urban mixed 410 no fee 3 
41.  Fairland GP JN urban mixed 806 no fee 5 
42.  Fairview GP JE urban mixed 478 no fee 3 
43.  Fapha NW Bojanala urban mixed 1254 no fee 3 
44.  Florida GP JW urban mixed 750 no fee 5 
45.  Gaesegwe NW Central rural mixed 760 fee 1 
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46.  Garsfont GP TS urban mixed 1308 no fee 5 
47.  Gedensko NW Southern urban mixed 702 no fee 3 
48.  Germisto GP ES urban mixed 652 no fee 4 
49.  Glen_Ali NW Central rural mixed 38 fee 1 
50.  Glenstan GP TS urban mixed 1330 no fee 5 
51.  Gontse NW Southern rural mixed 1462 no fee  
52.  Gustav GP JW urban mixed 451 no fee 5 
53.  Hartsriv NW Bophirim rural mixed 487 fee 1 
54.  Hendrik NW Bojanala urban mixed 665 no fee 5 
55.  Hurlyval GP EN urban mixed 880 no fee 5 
56.  IB_Damon NW Bojanala urban mixed 417 no fee 3 
57.  Ikwezi GP JC urban mixed 320 no fee 3 
58.  Ipoloken GP JN urban mixed 530 no fee 3 
59.  Irene_Mi GP TS urban mixed 513 fee 2 
60.  Isaac_M NW Bojanala peri urban mixed 625 no fee 4 
61.  Isulihle GP JC urban mixed 1229 no fee 3 
62.  Ithuthe GP JE urban mixed 1087 fee 2 
63.  Itumelen NW Bojanala      
64.  Jatholim NW Central rural mixed 237 fee 1 
65.  Kabelo NW Central rural mixed 557 fee 1 
66.  Kagisano NW Central rural mixed 180 fee 1 
67.  Karlien NW Bojanala urban mixed 548 fee 2 
68.  Keleraya NW Central rural mixed 220 fee 1 
69.  Kgatelob GP JC urban mixed 320 no fee 4 
70.  Khandubu GP JN urban mixed 358 no fee 4 
71.  Khayakhu NW Bojanala rural mixed 155 no fee 3 
72.  Kloof NW Bojanala urban mixed 1027 no fee 4 
73.  Koi_Koi NW Central rural mixed 195 fee 1 
74.  Kolong NW Southern peri urban mixed  no fee 3 
75.  Kwgakilw NW Bophirim rural mixed 1016 fee 2 
76.  La_Hoff NW Southern urban mixed 594 no fee 5 
77.  Lakeside GP ES urban mixed 1097 no fee 4 
78.  Lekgophu NW Central rural mixed 223 fee 2 
79.  Lelokwan NW Central rural mixed 142 fee 1 
80.  Leresche GP JN urban mixed 427 no fee 3 
81.  Lesedi GP SW rural mixed 1025 fee 1 
82.  Lesego NW Southern urban mixed 1003 no fee 3 
83.  Mabafeng GP TS urban mixed 660 no fee 3 
84.  Maboelle GP SW rural mixed 450 fee 3 
85.  Machadam NW Bojanala rural mixed 255 no fee 3 
86.  Madibeng NW Southern urban mixed 830 fee 1 
87.  Magaabue NW Bophirim rural mixed 59 fee 2 
88.  Makwelen NW Bojanala rural mixed 161 fee 1 
89.  Matsedis GP ES urban mixed 821 no fee 3 
90.  Mboweni GP TS urban mixed 194 no fee 4 
91.  Mbuyisa GP JW urban mixed 347 no fee 3 
92.  Meyerton GP SE urban mixed 841 no fee 3 
93.  Mmadiseb NW Central rural mixed 542 fee 2 
94.  Mmuso GP GE urban mixed 640 fee 3 
95.  Mochocho GP JC urban mixed 286 no fee 4 
96.  Mohajane NW Bojanala urban mixed 393 no fee 3 
97.  Mohato GP JC urban mixed 203 no fee 4 
98.  Moitshok NW Bojanala rural mixed 1481 fee  
99.  Mokonyam GP TN urban mixed 1061 fee 1 
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100.  Monnapha NW Bophirim rural mixed 742 fee 2 
101.  Morgenst NW Central rural mixed 98 fee 1 
102.  Morokwen NW Bophirim rural mixed 562 fee 2 
103.  Motlajoe NW Bojanala rural mixed 262 fee 1 
104.  Motlhaba NW Central rural mixed 256 no fee 3 
105.  Motlhako NW Central rural mixed 395 fee 2 
106.  Motlhats NW Central urban mixed 529 fee 1 
107.  Mshuluan GP GN urban mixed 872 no fee 3 
108.  Mthimkhu GP ES urban mixed 896 no fee 4 
109.  Naletsan NW Central rural mixed 357 fee 1 
110.  Nka Thut GP JC urban mixed 405 no fee 4 
111.  Nkholi GP JC urban mixed 510 no fee 4 
112.  Nomnekan GP GE urban mixed 731 fee 2 
113.  Olifants GP TS urban mixed 1238 no fee 5 
114.  Olifants GP JS rural mixed 420 fee 1 
115.  Onaleron NW Bophirim rural mixed 396 fee 2 
116.  Opadiatl NW Central      
117.  Parkview GP JN urban mixed 261 no fee 5 
118.  Pelonngw NW Bophirim rural mixed 192 fee  
119.  Peme NW Central rural mixed 183 no fee 2 
120.  Pheasant GP ES rural mixed 841 fee 1 
121.  Pheladi GP TS urban mixed 419 no fee 3 
122.  Phemolon GP EN urban mixed 1050 fee 3 
123.  Phera NW Central rural mixed 309 fee 1 
124.  Phiri GP JC urban mixed 250 no fee 3 
125.  Potchefs NW Southern urban mixed 540 no fee 3 
126.  Protea NW Bojanala urban mixed 980 no fee 5 
127.  Ramatla NW Bojanala rural mixed 509 fee 2 
128.  Ratlou NW Central rural mixed 465 no fee 3 
129.  Reaithut NW Central rural mixed 159 fee 1 
130.  Reitsosi NW Central rural mixed 181 fee 1 
131.  Rekopane NW Central peri urban mixed 805 fee 2 
132.  Renonofi NW Central rural mixed 427 no fee 3 
133.  Republie GP SE urban mixed 223 no fee 4 
134.  Rethabis GP GN peri urban mixed 1398 fee 3 
135.  Retshege NW Bophirim rural mixed 358 no fee 3 
136.  Riviera GP TN urban mixed 350 no fee  
137.  Roodepoo GP JW urban mixed 1200 no fee 4 
138.  Rynfield GP EN urban mixed 907 no fee 5 
139.  Rynsoord GP EN urban mixed 800 no fee 5 
140.  Saffola GP EN rural mixed 286 fee 1 
141.  Sandile GP GW urban mixed 682 no fee 4 
142.  Sazakhel GP EN urban mixed 485 fee  
143.  Sechaba GP GE urban mixed 401 fee 3 
144.  Sedibeng GP SW rural mixed 269 fee 2 
145.  Seeikile NW Bojanala rural mixed 625 no fee 3 
146.  Seeiso GP SE rural mixed 1104 no fee 3 
147.  Senkgwe NW Central rural mixed 824 no fee 3 
148.  Shalom GP TW urban mixed 716 no fee 3 
149.  Sindawon GP TS urban mixed 350 no fee 4 
150.  Sivuse GP SW urban mixed 563 fee 3 
151.  Spectrum GP JS urban mixed 1026 no fee 3 
152.  Strathva NW Southern urban mixed 747 no fee 4 
153.  Suidheuw GP JS urban mixed 498 no fee 4 
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154.  TC Este GP JN urban mixed 569 no fee 3 
155.  Tamaho GP ES peri urban mixed 1350 fee 2 
156.  Thembeli GP GE urban mixed 910 no fee 3 
157.  Thipanya NW Central rural mixed 171 no fee  
158.  Thusanan GP JC urban mixed 458 no fee 3 
159.  Tlatlogo NW Southern rural mixed 117 fee 1 
160.  Tlhageng NW Bojanala rural mixed 155 no fee 3 
161.  Tsakani GP GW urban mixed 954 no fee 3 
162.  Tshepana GP JS rural mixed 980 fee 2 
163.  Tshing NW Southern urban mixed 1107 no fee 3 
164.  Tshirele GP JW urban mixed 410 no fee 3 
165.  Tsimong GP GE urban mixed 362 no fee 4 
166.  Tsoarana GP SE urban mixed 1135 fee 2 
167.  Tumisang NW Central urban mixed 1158 fee 2 
168.  United NW Southern urban mixed 407 no fee 3 
169.  Valhalla GP TS urban mixed 589 no fee 5 
170.  Wedela NW Southern urban mixed 774 fee 2 
171.  Wendywoo GP JE urban mixed 954 no fee 5 
172.  Western GP GW peri urban mixed 760 no fee 3 
173.  Winnie GP JN urban mixed 796 no fee 3 
174.  Zibambe GP JC urban mixed 572 no fee 3 
175.  Zithulel GP SW urban mixed 486 fee 3 
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APPENDIX 4  
 
[Statistical Output] 
 
 
Chapter 2: Additional Robustness Tests for Repetition and Dropout Rates 
 
One way to illustrate the appropriateness of these indicators was to conduct correlations 
between dropout and repetition against test scores using existing datasets that have all 
three variables. The SACMEQ dataset was used to conduct correlations between (i) 
dropout rates and test scores and (ii) repetition rates and test scores. The results of the 
crosstabulations are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below. Both results show a very 
significant correlation (p=0.00) indicating that there is a strong and statistically 
significant relationship between numeracy test scores and repetition and dropout rates. 
These results give additional credibility to repetition and dropout rates as credible 
outcome variables.    
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Table 2.1 Results of Cross Tabulation between Repetition and Test Scores  
 
         Pearson chi2(57) = 363.2741   Pr = 0.000
     Total       1,774      1,361       3,135 
                                             
    1065.3           2          0           2 
  983.7248           3          0           3 
  934.5546           7          0           7 
  898.5489           7          0           7 
  869.8569           5          0           5 
  845.6655           8          0           8 
  824.6247           8          0           8 
  805.8342           5          2           7 
  788.8441          12          1          13 
  773.2041          11          0          11 
  758.5768           9          0           9 
  744.9622          11          1          12 
  732.0226          16          1          17 
  719.6457          19          2          21 
  707.8313          15          1          16 
   696.467          20          2          22 
  685.5528          14          0          14 
  674.8636          20          2          22 
   664.512          26          3          29 
  654.2729          20          2          22 
  644.3713          21          4          25 
  634.5823          19          3          22 
  625.0182          31          4          35 
  615.4542          16          4          20 
  606.0027          26          5          31 
  596.6638          12          4          16 
  587.4373          34          8          42 
  578.0983          20          3          23 
  568.8719          38         11          49 
  559.6454          29          8          37 
  550.3065          29         18          47 
    541.08          34         11          45 
  531.6285          54         21          75 
   522.177          34         24          58 
   512.613          53         26          79 
  502.9365          64         53         117 
  493.0349          82         59         141 
  483.0208          78         64         142 
  472.7817          77         70         147 
  462.3176          89         84         173 
  451.5159          84        110         194 
  440.4891          92        117         209 
  429.0123         105        106         211 
  417.0854          84         99         183 
   404.821          81        105         186 
  391.8815          85         78         163 
  378.3794          56         86         142 
  363.9771          27         58          85 
  348.7872          23         36          59 
  332.4721          20         18          38 
  314.9193          11         17          28 
  295.5663          13         11          24 
  274.1879           5          9          14 
  250.1091           6          0           6 
  222.3172           2          7           9 
  189.1245           1          0           1 
   147.718           1          2           3 
  .4322608           0          1           1 
                                             
& sd=100]       never   repeated        Total
 [mean=500   r:/ grade repetition 
 500 score  
  math-all  
     pupil  
     scr:/  
. tabulate zmalocp zprepeat, chi2
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Table 2.2 Results of Cross Tabulation between Dropout and Test Scores  
 
         Pearson chi2(57) = 830.1526   Pr = 0.000
     Total       2,622        491       3,113 
                                             
    1065.3           0          2           2 
  983.7248           0          3           3 
  934.5546           1          6           7 
  898.5489           1          6           7 
  869.8569           0          5           5 
  845.6655           0          8           8 
  824.6247           3          5           8 
  805.8342           2          5           7 
  788.8441           2         11          13 
  773.2041           2          9          11 
  758.5768           3          6           9 
  744.9622           2         10          12 
  732.0226           3         14          17 
  719.6457           4         17          21 
  707.8313           3         13          16 
   696.467           6         16          22 
  685.5528           4         10          14 
  674.8636          12         10          22 
   664.512          15         14          29 
  654.2729          14          8          22 
  644.3713          14         11          25 
  634.5823          11         11          22 
  625.0182          20         15          35 
  615.4542          12          8          20 
  606.0027          20         11          31 
  596.6638          13          3          16 
  587.4373          32          9          41 
  578.0983          20          3          23 
  568.8719          37         12          49 
  559.6454          25         12          37 
  550.3065          44          3          47 
    541.08          39          6          45 
  531.6285          59         13          72 
   522.177          54          3          57 
   512.613          67         10          77 
  502.9365         105         11         116 
  493.0349         123         15         138 
  483.0208         127         13         140 
  472.7817         133         13         146 
  462.3176         160         12         172 
  451.5159         177         16         193 
  440.4891         193         16         209 
  429.0123         193         17         210 
  417.0854         174          6         180 
   404.821         169         16         185 
  391.8815         150         13         163 
  378.3794         123         18         141 
  363.9771          81          4          85 
  348.7872          56          3          59 
  332.4721          37          1          38 
  314.9193          23          5          28 
  295.5663          21          3          24 
  274.1879          14          0          14 
  250.1091           6          0           6 
  222.3172           8          1           9 
  189.1245           1          0           1 
   147.718           3          0           3 
  .4322608           1          0           1 
                                             
& sd=100]    sometimes     never        Total
 [mean=500   problem-pupil dropout
 500 score        r:/ school
  math-all  
     pupil  
     scr:/  
. tabulate zmalocp zspupp04, chi2
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Table 8.5 Descriptive Statistics on Education Outcomes for Schools in Gauteng 
Province  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
District where school is located N Mean Std. Deviation 
EN % of students repeating Grade 1 8 .7500 2.12132 
% of students repeating Grade 7 8 1.8750 1.95941 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
8 2.5000 6.30193 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
8 .6250 1.40789 
Valid N (listwise) 8   
    
ES % of students repeating Grade 1 9 4.0000 3.74166 
% of students repeating Grade 7 9 .8889 1.36423 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
9 2.5556 3.39526 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
9 2.7778 4.17665 
Valid N (listwise) 9   
    
GE % of students repeating Grade 1 9 4.4444 4.77261 
% of students repeating Grade 7 9 2.8889 2.52212 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
9 .1111 .33333 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
9 2.2222 2.77389 
Valid N (listwise) 9   
    
GN % of students repeating Grade 1 2 6.5000 4.94975 
% of students repeating Grade 7 2 .5000 .70711 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
1 .0000 . 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
1 1.0000 . 
Valid N (listwise) 1   
    
GW % of students repeating Grade 1 5 8.4000 7.53658 
% of students repeating Grade 7 5 2.8000 4.08656 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
4 15.7500 25.66937 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
4 2.5000 3.78594 
Valid N (listwise) 4   
    
JC % of students repeating Grade 1 10 2.2000 2.29976 
% of students repeating Grade 7 8 .3750 1.06066 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
10 7.1000 7.35527 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
8 4.6250 4.68851 
Valid N (listwise) 6   
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JE % of students repeating Grade 1 5 7.4000 8.53229 
% of students repeating Grade 7 4 .2500 .50000 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
5 2.8000 2.16795 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
4 4.2500 2.87228 
Valid N (listwise) 4   
    
JN     
% of students repeating Grade 1 8 5.6250 7.72635 
% of students repeating Grade 7 7 .0000 .00000 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
6 6.1667 10.08795 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
7 2.8571 2.79455 
Valid N (listwise) 4   
JS     
% of students repeating Grade 1 5 2.4000 1.51658 
% of students repeating Grade 7 5 .0000 .00000 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
5 5.2000 6.37966 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
5 3.6000 4.50555 
Valid N (listwise) 5   
JW     
% of students repeating Grade 1 5 7.0000 6.89202 
% of students repeating Grade 7 6 .1667 .40825 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
5 2.4000 2.88097 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
6 2.3333 2.06559 
Valid N (listwise) 4   
SE     
% of students repeating Grade 1 4 5.7500 4.92443 
% of students repeating Grade 7 4 .0000 .00000 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
3 .6667 .57735 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
4 2.2500 4.50000 
Valid N (listwise) 3   
SW     
% of students repeating Grade 1 6 7.0000 5.44059 
% of students repeating Grade 7 4 .5000 1.00000 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
6 3.5000 4.18330 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
6 3.1667 3.60093 
Valid N (listwise) 4   
TN     
% of students repeating Grade 1 2 15.5000 12.02082 
% of students repeating Grade 7 1 .0000 . 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
1 .0000 . 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
1 17.0000 . 
Valid N (listwise) 1   
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TS     
% of students repeating Grade 1 10 7.7600 6.08444 
% of students repeating Grade 7 10 .7000 .94868 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
10 5.5000 11.33578 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
10 5.9500 6.87366 
Valid N (listwise) 10   
TW     
% of students repeating Grade 1 3 9.0000 6.55744 
% of students repeating Grade 7 2 1.5000 2.12132 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
1 
3 1.3333 2.30940 
% of students dropping out after Grade 
5 
3 3.0000 5.19615 
Valid N (listwise) 2   
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